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Preface 
 
 On 7 May 1945, Victory in Europe (VE) Day, the United States Army Air Forces 
(USAAF) lost five airmen and two aircraft in two fatal accidents. While the country celebrated 
the defeat of Nazi Germany, the need for qualified aircrew, while declining, did not cease. It 
should also be noted that VE Day, when it came to accidents, was not an average day for the 
Army Air Forces: it was below average. Throughout the war, the Army Air Forces suffered over 
6,500 fatal accidents in the continental United States resulting in the loss of 7,114 airplanes and 
the death of 15,530 personnel.
1
 This was an average of ten deaths and nearly 40 accidents, fatal 
and non-fatal, a day. The Army Air Forces reached its peak for both training and accidents in 
1943. That year the Army Air Forces suffered 2,268 fatal accidents that resulted in over 5,600 
fatalities and over 2,500 aircraft damaged or destroyed.
2
 The situation was better in 1944 with a 
14 percent drop in accidents compared with 1943.
3
 However, there were still nearly 2,000 fatal 
accidents and the death of 5,000 pilots and crew.
4
  
Some of these accidents were due to pilot error, such as poor navigation and piloting 
skills, or even, to be blunt, stupidity, such as showing off for sweethearts or family, who were 
forced to watch in horror as their loved ones died in horrible accidents. Numerous accidents were 
the result of inattention by the ground crew in performing their maintenance tasks. In addition, 
                                                 
1
  Anthony J. Mireles, Fatal Army Air Forces Aviation Accidents in the United States, 1941-1945 (Jefferson NC: 
McFarland, 2006), xi. 
2
  Ibid., xi. 
3
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4
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the blame for other accidents could be laid upon poor decisions in aircraft design that made some 
airplanes difficult to fly, especially for the rapidly-trained wartime pilots. Whatever the cause of 
these accidents, once the United States entered World War Two, the USAAF had to produce an 
ever-increasing number of pilots in the first half of the war. Nonetheless, the Army Air Forces, 
rather counterintuitively, began to place more emphasis on safety during this period of rapid 
expansion.  
 In 1938, President Roosevelt had called for the production of 10,000 aircraft annually; by 
1940, with an eye on events in Europe, he had increased that number to 50,000 — a difficult task 
to be sure, but it could be accomplished by increasing the budget of the Air Corps for 
procurement and training. On the other hand, Roosevelt’s mandate would also require an 
expansion of the industrial base. This task was made easier by the fact that aircraft technology, at 
the time, was not so advanced as to be beyond the capability of the general manufacturing base 
of the United States. The more daunting task facing Major General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of 
the Air Corps and the General Headquarters Air Force Staff, would be to produce the aircrews to 
operate those planes. The Air Corps had always been selective in admitting cadets into the flight 
program and the pace of the prewar Air Corps had made flight training highly individualistic. 
However, the proposed expansion forced Arnold and his staff to evaluate both selection and 
training. 
 Throughout the interwar period the Army Air Service, later Army Air Corps, and finally, 
in June 1941, Army Air Forces, adopted some “leisurely practices” in light of the war.5 The three 
phases of flight training — primary, basic, and advanced— were divided into three twelve-week 
                                                 
5
 Cameron, Rebecca Hancock, Training to Fly: Military Flight Training, 1907-1945 (Washington DC: Office of Air 
Force History, 1999), 371. 
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courses. Each phase of training was reduced to ten weeks just prior to the United States’ entry 
into the war and further reduced to nine once the United States entered the war. In addition, even 
though the Air Corps, initially, had first call on personnel raised by the draft, there was some 
relaxing of the minimum requirements for entering training, such as replacing the requirement 
for two years of college with an entrance exam. Anticipating a 40 percent failure rate in flight 
training, the Air Corps Staff believed that the changes in the standards were necessary to insure 
an adequate pool of cadets. In addition, with more planes coming off the assembly line, the Air 
Corps would have to graduate more pilots meaning it would also have to recruit more young men 
for flight training. The question then arises: What was the cumulative effect of these actions on 
training and safety in the Army Air Forces?  
 There have been scores of studies, books, and memoirs on the Army Air Forces in World 
War II. However, most give training a brief mention, if any at all, before rushing into the glories 
and trials of aerial combat. This study is an attempt to analyze the preparation of these men and, 
in many cases, boys for combat.
6
 In particular, what effects did training losses have on policies 
and procedures within the Army Air Forces? Can these losses be attributed to the rapid 
expansion of the force in order to meet the wartime emergency? Did the chain of command ever 
voice concern over these losses or were they considered “acceptable losses” brought about by an 
extraordinary situation? What effect did reports from the field have on the training program? Did 
the experience of combat inject new, and perhaps more hazardous, training requirements?  
A higher accident rate was to be expected in primary flight training, the first stage of flight 
training, however it was even higher in advanced flight training, the phase before a pilot began 
                                                 
6
 One 22-year-old B-17 pilot recalled that his crew ranged in age from 18 to 28. Eugene Fletcher, Mister: The 
Training of an Aviation Cadet in World War II (Seattle WA: University of Washington Press, 1992), 200. 
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transition training into the aircraft he would fly in combat (See Table 5). However, the fatality 
rate increased as the cadets progressed through training. In addition, the greatest number of 
fatalities occurred during transition flight training, the last training stage before the pilot or crew 
deployed to a group or squadron (See Table 6). Was this due to the difference in the performance 
characteristics of the aircraft or was it due to a more rigorous program of instruction (POI) when 
the pilots entered the last phase of training before being posted to an operational unit? Another 
possibility for the increase in fatalities during this phase of flight training might have been 
overconfidence on the part of the pilot. By this phase each had survived a grueling process and 
were becoming masters of their profession. This often times led them to overestimate their 
ability and take unnecessary risks. 
 Another aspect of this study is to place the experience of the US Army Air Forces within 
the framework of organizational culture. The military is a distinct culture within the society it 
represents and each branch of service possesses a unique subculture. The culture of the Army Air 
Forces’ revolved around flying, and flying is an inherently risky business. A brief review of 
societal views on safety, at the time, can provide insights into how outside influences might 
effect an organization such as the Army Air Corps. In the Army Air Forces’ case, did the 
interwar culture make wartime fatalities more palatable?   
The pre-World War Two generation of pilots had grown up in the infancy of aviation, a 
generation that included such men as “Hap” Arnold, who took ground instruction from Orville 
Wright. In addition, every new advance in aviation technology brought some degree of risk. It 
was part-and-parcel of the profession; deaths were inevitable. At times in Air Force history, this 
was truer for training and peacetime than for combat. For example, during World War One two 
xiv 
 
cadets were killed in training for every combat death.
7
 In another example, during the brief 
period from 16 February to 8 May 1934 the Air Corps, because of a political crisis, took over 
airmail delivery from the airlines. During those 78 days, the Air Corps suffered 66 accidents that 
resulted in the death of 12 pilots not to mention a completion rate of less than 6 percent, meaning 
that less than 6 percent of the planes and their cargo reached the intended destination intact and 
on time.
 8
 While the airmail fiasco, as it came to be known in some circles, made front-page news 
and brought new attention to the Air Corps’ safety record, the Air Staff could not anticipate the 
scrutiny that training fatalities would bring once the expansion for World War Two began.  
In April 1942, Arnold was called before Congress to discuss the rise in non-combat 
related accidents and fatalities in the USAAF. A staff officer sent Arnold a memo suggesting that 
the "alleged" high accident rate might not be borne out by the data. He assured Arnold that the 
data would indicate a decrease in the accident rate when compared with prewar rates. Based on 
prewar experience, Arnold’s assistant was suggesting that if the loss numbers approximated the 
prewar figures then they would be “acceptable.” 9 This suggests that the close-knit and exclusive 
culture of the pre-World War Two Air Corps, composed of men such as Arnold, Eaker, and 
Spaatz, had accepted that fatalities were inevitable and that a certain number were considered 
acceptable. On the other hand, the prewar Air Corps had never had to deal with the scale of the 
fatalities and accidents it faced as its training operation expanded. Over the course of the 
interwar period the average number of fatalities was 51 per year. Between 1942 and 1945, the 
                                                 
7
 Weekly News Letter from the Secretary of War, 7 Dec 1918. 
8
 Shiner, John F., “Foulois: In the Beginning,” in Makers of the United States Air Force, Frisbee, John L., ed, 
(Washington DC, Office of Air Force History, 1987), 30-31. 
9
Routing and Record Sheet 1942 4-9 from Colonel Dunn to General Arnold. Subect: High Accident Rate in the 
Army Air Forces. RE: Upcoming congressional investigation into aircraft accidents.   
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average was 3,675.
10
 Coupled with both private and Congressional concerns over the number of 
accidents, the Army Air Forces began taking steps to address the safety problem. One of the Air 
Staff’s first actions was the establishment of the Office of Flying Safety in April 1942 although 
funding and staffing would be an ongoing issue for this organization. The office produced 
cartoons, films, posters, pamphlets to educate Army Air Forces personnel about safety. By May 
1943, the monthly history of the Office of Flying Safety was fairly gushing about its efforts and 
successes.
11
 
At other times, the actions of the Army Air Forces staff leave the impression that they 
were deliberately trying to obfuscate the number of training fatalities. The best example is from 
the Army Air Forces Statistical Digest. Published in December 1945, the digest details every 
facet of operations that could be quantified, from number of missions flown to the number of .50 
caliber machine gun rounds expended by theater, in one table after another. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, the Statistical Digest combines training fatalities and eliminations in one entry.
12
 
One callous interpretation of this conflation of these two experiences that had radically different 
effects on the cadets is that in either case, fatality or elimination, they were all the same — a loss 
to the Army Air Forces. Another possibility is that the actual number of training fatalities was 
potentially embarrassing to the USAAF. Death in combat is tragic but can be justified, and 
sometimes even honored; death in training is tragic as well but raises the question: Why? The 
perception of training, among most participants, is that it is a "safe" or at least a controlled 
environment where accidents occur but where steps are taken to reduce them. In this light, the 
                                                 
10
 United States Army Air Forces, Office of Statistical Control, Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II 
(Washington DC: Office of Statistical Control, 1945), 308. 
11
 History of the AAF Office of Flying Safety for the Month of December 1943. 
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Army Air Forces safety program not only expanded, it also, in the process, became more 
bureaucratic. For example, by the end of the war, the procedures for reporting and investigating 
accidents had become codified in stricter regulations, multi-form reports and numerous safety 
inspections.  
Flight training and safety in the Army Air Forces during World War Two is a relatively 
open topic. Most secondary studies of the interwar Air Corps and the wartime Army Air Forces 
focus on combat operations, development of doctrine, or personalities. Those about flight 
training and safety are very few. The most recent study is Training to Fly, Military Flight 
Training, 1907–1945 by Rebecca Hancock Cameron. Published by the Air Force History 
Museums Program in 1999, Cameron’s work discusses much of the bureaucracy and politics of 
flight training during the period and even delves into the mechanics of training and selection. 
However, there is not much analysis. More recently, in 2006, Anthony Mireles published a three-
volume compilation of every accident report involving a fatality from 1941through 1945.
13
 This 
monumental work is an outstanding one-source reference for the who, what, when and where of 
flight accidents. However, once again, there is not much analysis.  
There are a few sources on one of the more controversial flight training programs, the 
Civilian Pilot Training Program. The CPTP was a New Deal program intended to provide a pool 
of ready pilots for the Army and Navy and to give a boost to the civilian light aviation industry. 
General Arnold, as Chief of the Army Air Forces, never truly embraced the program. The most 
recent works on this topic are To Fill the Skies with Planes: The Civilian Pilot Training 
Program, 1939–46 and Embry–Riddle at War: Aviation Training during WWII. The former is a 
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  Anthony J. Mireles, Fatal Army Air Forces Aviation Accidents in the United States, 1941-1945 (Jefferson NC: 
McFarland, 2006), 1306. 
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general history of the CPTP program while the latter focuses on one contractor, albeit the largest 
and most successful, for primary flight training. An older source is a Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) booklet, The Putt-Putt Air Force, first published in 1971. However, these 
works, the latter in particular, do not delve deeply into the effect of accidents, fatalities, and 
safety on the Army Air Forces flight-training program and the aircrews undergoing flight 
training.  
On the other hand, there are numerous biographies and memoirs by the cadets, the 
instructors, and the senior officers involved in the flight-training program. These works, such as 
Eugene Fletcher’s Mister: The Training of an Aviation Cadet in World War II and Charles A. 
Watry’s Washout! The Aviation Cadet Story recall the personal experiences of those undergoing 
training and shed light on the effect of Army Air Forces’ policies at the individual level. In 
addition, these recollections are invaluable for assessing the attitude of the participants to flight 
safety and specifically the effect of fatalities on those who survived. For instance, Chuck Yeager 
in Yeager: An Autobiography believed the process merely weeded out the “weak sisters.” 14 In 
addition, during the 1960s and 1970s the Air Force began an oral history program to capture the 
experiences of the general officers who began their careers during the period under study in this 
work. Of course, memories fade, nor can these interviews be any better than the questions of the 
interviewer, but they are still a valuable source for gaining the perspective and opinions of the 
participants.  
The United States Army Air Forces went from a small close-knit “club,” in the words of 
Curtis LeMay, accustomed to forty-eight fatalities a year, to a safety conscious organization that 
averaged forty-eight fatalities in five days of training. This study will be an attempt to analyze 
                                                 
14
 Yeager, Chuck and Leo Janos, Yeager: An Autobiography, (New York: Bantam Books, 1986), 15. 
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the process of flight training as the Army Air Force transitioned from a culture of risk to one of 
safety.  
1 
 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
If sufficient experience could have been gained prior to wartime 
expansion, therefore, it is conceivable that accident rates could have 
been reduced sooner, thereby eliminating many of the accidents 
occurring in the early months of trial and error.
15
  
   Safety as a Factor in the Future of Aviation. 
  
 On 1 September 1939, the Air Corps consisted of 26,500 men and 2,200 aircraft.
16
 At its 
peak in July 1944, the USAAF possessed nearly 80,000 aircraft and ended the war with a 
personnel strength of 2,250,000 (Tables 1 and 2).
17
 Between 1939 and 1945, nearly 200,000 
pilots graduated from the Army Air Forces flight-training program.
18
 The program reached its 
peak in December 1943 with over 74,000 students in various stages of flight training.
19
 During 
the same period, 124,000 or almost 40 percent of those who entered training failed to earn their 
wings.
20
 This number includes the fatalities that resulted from training accidents. As was to be 
expected, the accident rate went down as cadets progressed through primary, basic, and advanced 
flight training. Paradoxically, the fatality rate went up; 439 cadets were killed during primary 
flight training, over 1,100 during basic flight training, and nearly 2,000 during advanced flight 
                                                 
15
  United States Army Air Forces, Office of Flying Safety, Safety as a Factor in the Future of Aviation (Washington 
DC: Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, 1946), 17. 
16
  Maurer Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939 (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, U.S. Air 
Force, 1987), 446. 
17
  United States Army Air Forces, Office of Statistical Control, Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II 
(Washington DC: Office of Statistical Control, 1945), 46-47. 
18
  Ibid., 46-47. 
19
 Ibid., 46-47. 
20
 Ibid., 46-47. 
2 
 
training.
21
 This difference can be attributed to various factors such as overconfidence on the part 
of the pilots as they became more proficient or, in other cases, because they were flying faster 
and more complex aircraft by the end of their training.   
 Fatalities and accidents were not unknown in the prewar Army Air Corps; however, the 
expansion in 1939 brought the issue to the forefront. As General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the 
Army Air Forces during World War Two, noted in his 1945 annual report to the Secretary of 
War:  
Twenty years’ accumulation of experience, by a comparatively small 
and fixed group of men, brought the AAF accident rate down to 51 
per 100,000 hours in 1940. Expansion introduced a new and 
enormous block of inexperience, which would tend to reproduce the 
situation of the early ’Twenties. Vigorous preventive measures were 
taken against the expected rise. The degree of success can be 
measured by the fact that the accident rate has been held down and 
new all-time lows attained.
22
 
 
The “vigorous preventative measures” Arnold referred to resulted from the prewar Army Air 
Corps transitioning from a “small and fixed group of men” comfortable with a more open 
approach to training and accidents to the rigid bureaucratic organization that the Army Air 
Forces became as a result of its wartime experience.    
It is often stated that militaries reflect the societies that produce them and the Air Corps 
was no different. In particular, there were changes in American society that affected attitudes 
                                                 
21
  Anthony J. Mireles, Fatal Army Air Forces Aviation Accidents in the United States, 1941-1945 (Jefferson NC: 
McFarland, 2006), xi. 
22
  United States Army Air Forces and Henry Harley Arnold, Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air 
Forces to the Secretary of War (Washington DC: US GPO, 1944). 
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toward safety and concerns over risk. For the first three decades of the twentieth century, much 
of the social change in society was driven by new technologies, such as the automobile. As more 
and more cars took to the roads, there was an increase in the awareness of issues affecting safety 
and a call for standardization in equipment and procedures from the public and the politicians. 
For example, in 1923 the governor of New York, in light of “the alarming increase of 
automobile accidents,” lent his endorsement to the goals of the newly established Safety First 
League.
23
 The purpose of the league was to make people aware of the increasing accident rate 
and to prescribe measures to address the problem. The governor further attributed the increase in 
accidents “to the careless operation of automobiles and a lack of central control and supervision 
of licensing and regulation of automobile traffic.”24 The next year a National Safety Conference 
was held in Washington DC.
25
 Meanwhile, in New York, 400,000 drivers signed pledges to 
“observe courtesy and carefulness” while driving.26 In addition, the Committee on Traffic 
Control drew up “concrete resolutions as standard rules governing the conduct of travelers on 
the highway; uniform speed regulation, aimed primarily at reckless driving, and examination 
and licensing of all motor vehicle operators . . . .”27 On the other hand, the Air Service and Air 
Corps faced different challenges than the population in general. The average driver was not 
expected to personally test out any advance in automobile technology but that was exactly what 
was expected of the average Air Corps pilot. However, by the end of World War Two, the Army 
Air Forces would use many of the same measures as had been proposed by the public safety 
advocates in discussing automobiles and their use.  
                                                 
23
 New York Times, 16 April 1923. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 New York Times, 23 November 1924. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
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 The Air Corps pilots did not shrink from their responsibilities and, in many cases, they 
sought out the challenges presented in the early days of aviation. In the process of testing and 
advancing the boundaries of aviation, many of these pilots set altitude, distance, and speed 
records and accomplished numerous “firsts” in the field of aviation. At the same time, the 
interwar pilots were establishing the cultural norms for the Air Corps. Even though the pilots of 
the interwar Air Corps accepted the risks inherent in flying, they were not reckless men. They 
took the precautions necessary to make their flights as safe as possible; however, they did not let 
those factors stop them from trying. On the other hand, they were not above attempting stunts, 
such as wing walking, because they could attempt them and, usually, without fear of 
recrimination.  
 Because of their exploits, the pilots began to see themselves as part of an exclusive club 
made even more exclusive because they were few in number. Their “club” was kept small by 
both funding and the strict requirements set for acceptance into pilot training. The biggest 
obstacle was the education requirement. Each applicant had to have at least two years of college 
education. Then the prospective pilot had to pass a demanding physical exam. Having passed 
through those gates the new aviation cadet still faced the daunting task of making it through 
flight training. Between 1923 and 1938, only 10 percent of qualified applicants graduated from 
pilot training and earned their wings.
28
 This situation would change in 1939 as the Air Corps 
began to expand with many politicians and military leaders anticipating the United States 
entering World War II. 
                                                 
28
  United States Army Air Forces, Office of Statistical Control, Army Air Forces Statistical Digest: World War II 
(Washington DC: Office of Statistical Control, 1945), 313. 
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 Faced with the challenge of rapidly expanding the Air Corps, the senior leaders, such as 
Arnold, believed that the selection process would have to be streamlined. By 1941, despite his 
misgivings, Arnold had agreed to forego the college requirement for a standardized test to 
screen applicants. In addition, the Air Staff understood that not everyone would complete the 
rigorous training, so they had to recruit with attrition in mind. For example, a 1943 report from 
Air Training Command to the Commanding General Army Air Forces concluded:  
. . . to meet training requirements for heavy bomber crew production, 
it [the Air Staff] anticipated elimination rates in pilot training would 
be 31 percent in primary, 13 percent in basic, and 2 percent in 
advanced. The elimination rate in navigation would be approximately 
15 percent, and in bombardiers, 20 percent.
29
 
 
This estimate was not far off the final numbers. The official history recorded that the “washout” 
rate for pilots was 40 percent, 20 percent for navigators, and 12 percent for bombardiers.
30
 The 
problem for the Air Corps was how to select only the best for flight training knowing that nearly 
half would not complete training. 
 By replacing the college requirement with a standardized test, the Air Corps gave a 
number of young men who could not afford college the opportunity to become pilots. In 
addition, the Air Corps expanded its program of recruiting enlisted men to be pilots, Chuck 
                                                 
29
 Report from Headquarters Army Air Force Training Command to Commanding General Army Air Forces, 5 Oct 
1943. Quoted in Rebecca Hancock Cameron, Training to Fly: Military Flight Training, 1907-1945 (Washington 
DC: Air Force History and Museums Programs, 1999), 667. 
30
  Wesley Frank Craven et al., The Army Air Forces in World War II (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 
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faded away.” Samuel Lynn Hynes, Flights of Passage: Reflections of a World War II Aviator (Annapolis MD: F.C. 
Beil; Naval Institute Press, 1988), 16. 
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Yeager being one of the most notable to make this transition. Many of the pilots and the public 
in general welcomed this change, noting that education was not necessarily a good indicator of 
flying ability. For example, the New York Daily News ran an editorial under the heading 
“Rickenbacker Didn’t Go To College.”31 The editorial concluded: 
The possibility that we may pick up some pilots who don’t know a 
cosine for a dodecahedron . . . is of minor importance. We bet there 
are a lot of taxicab drivers who could be turned into swell combat 
pilots.
32
 
On the other hand, the primary reason for washing out, particularly in the preflight phase of 
training, was academics. To remedy this deficiency the Air Corps began sending cadets who had 
passed the initial screening exam but were still weak in some areas to colleges and universities 
for classes to make up for these deficiencies. For example, one cadet noted that the test showed 
him to be weak in physics, English, and history, and he was sent, along with a group of others, 
to a small university for remedial classes.
33
 
 The one area on which the Air Corps refused to bend was physical condition. For 
example, even though the Air Corps agreed to accept cadets from the Civilian Pilot Training 
Program (CPTP), the Air Staff insisted that CPTP candidates had to pass the standard Air Corps 
physical. The majority of applicants for flight training, regardless of source, were rejected 
because they could not pass the physical. Many of those who completed flight training have 
noted in their postwar memoirs that the physical exam was the toughest part of the screening 
process. Most of the applicants had never endured such a thorough examination. One also noted 
that, as he was being poked and probed, it was one of the “most humiliating experiences” of his 
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life.
34
 On the other hand, physical fitness, such as running, was not tested. However, motor skills 
were tested. This test consisted of various challenges in manual dexterity and problem solving. 
Most of the cadets noted that portions of this test were both difficult and baffling. One cadet 
insisted that these “diabolical” tests were designed so that no one could ever get a perfect 
score.
35
 
 The psychological evaluation, according to the pilots, was the next hardest part of the 
screening process. Most noted that they could accept being rejected for failing the written or 
physical exams, but they believed it would be unfair to be denied the opportunity to become 
pilots because they gave the wrong answer to some trick question. For example, Eugene Fletcher 
stated after the war:  
They [the motor skills tests] were fun because it was man against the 
machine or the mechanical elements, but the mental tests were a little 
scary. After all, who wants to tell some sinister stranger what he sees 
in ink blobs . . . . We all wanted to fly and we surely didn’t want to 
lose this opportunity just because an ink blob might look like spilled 
ink, a naked lady, or some other screwy imagined image or 
hallucination.
36
  
 
 After nine weeks of being tested, examined, and indoctrinated to army life, the cadets 
were ready to begin flight training. Ahead of them, the cadets faced 30 to 40 weeks of intense 
instruction both on the ground and in the air. Accompanying them was the fear that any mistake 
could lead to them being washed out. 
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 In primary flight training, the cadet was introduced to flying, typically, in a light civilian 
aircraft such as a Piper Cub. Because the Army could not provide enough aircraft or instructors, 
the cadet underwent flight training at a civilian flight school contracted by the Army, the Embry-
Riddle school in Florida being the most notable. The contract instructors were of varying 
backgrounds and qualifications to be flight instructors. Some were former military pilots; others 
were itinerant barnstormers. Regardless of their background the majority made the transition to 
military flight instructor and earned the respect of their charges. In nearly every memoir, the 
former cadets praised their primary flight instructors for encouraging them and setting them up 
for success in their subsequent flying career. For example, after the war, one cadet said of his 
first instructor, “My new instructor was just out of flying school and a swell guy. We 
immediately developed a good rapport . . . [and] he was determined to prove that he was a good 
instructor, just as I was trying to prove that I could be a good student.”37 On the other hand, 
there were cadets who were not impressed with their instructors and questioned if they should 
have been near cadets. Such was the experience of one cadet who, after the war, recalled his 
instructor, who was a veteran of the Doolittle raid: “[i]t may be that his harrowing experiences 
on that raid caused him to be jumpy, and maybe he should have been doing some other kind of 
flying other than instructing green cadets.”38 
 The Air Corps was also short of ground instructors who were to present not only the 
theoretical aspects of flying but also the practical skills, such as navigation and meteorology, 
necessary to fly an airplane. The majority of these instructors were recruited from colleges and 
universities, men such as Professor Alfred R. Lindesmith, a sociologist at Indiana University, 
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who was a pioneer in the study and treatment of addictions. However, it was not always easy for 
these instructors to transition from the open academic environment of the university to the often-
rigid model of military instruction. Lindesmith, in a postwar article, complained that he felt that 
these instructors had been underutilized.
39
 
 Basic and advanced flight training were run entirely by the Army Air Forces. In these 
phases, the cadet was introduced to a faster and more complex airplane and some cadets could 
not make the transition and were eliminated. For the rest the training became more intense 
involving such training as long-distance flights at night that challenged the cadet’s skill at 
navigation. The cadets were also introduced to more sophisticated aerial maneuvers that would 
become critical to their survival in combat.  
The instructors in basic and advanced flight training were all Army Air Forces pilots of 
varying levels of experience. Often, in the early part of the war, the instructors were themselves 
recent graduates of the flight program. Later, the majority of them were combat veterans. This 
situation brought its own set of problems as many of the returning pilots were not necessarily 
suited to teach others how to fly. This was a problem the Army Air Force had not anticipated 
and was not rectified until the Air Staff established criteria for screening returning pilots before 
assigning them to duty as flight instructors.  
Prior to the war, the Air Corps had not given much thought to the training of navigators, 
bombardiers, or aerial gunners. It was the policy in the Air Corps that these were additional 
skills that a trained pilot or mechanic could pick up on the job. However, as the Air Corps 
expanded, the Air Staff came to realize that these positions would require specialized training. 
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Initially, the Air Corps assigned “washed-out” pilots to navigator or bombardier school. 
However, this presented a morale problem for the Air Corps as the washed-out pilots often 
resented being reclassified to what was assumed to be a lesser position. As it gathered more data 
on the validity of its screening criteria, the Air Corps eventually refined its testing methods to 
screen for those applicants who would make better navigators or bombardiers than pilots.  
At the completion of advanced flight training, the cadet, regardless of his specialty, 
received both his wings and his commission as a Second Lieutenant in the Army Air Forces. 
The new pilot’s final phase of flight training was his transition to the plane he would fly in 
combat. These aircraft were the fastest and most complex aircraft in the Army Air Forces. This 
was also the phase in which the pilot was at his peak in training and confidence. He had 
survived a very grueling process and was about to become a combat pilot. By the time he 
reached this point in his training the cadet had seen up to nearly half of the class that began 
flight training with him eliminated through academic failure, lack of flying ability, or death. For 
example, Class 44B, Charles Watry’s class, began with 4,931 cadets in preflight, and 2,966 
completed advanced flight training.
40
 
Accidents have always been part of the Air Force experience. However, the senior 
officers of the Army Air Forces had never experienced the level of accidents as they witnessed 
during World War Two. Prompted by both external and internal pressure the Army Air Forces 
began an extensive program to investigate not only the causes of these accidents but also what 
steps could be taken to prevent similar accidents in the future.   
The causes of the accidents ranged from poor aircraft design to pilot error. The former 
also included innovative design. Often, the aircraft were too advanced for the experience level of 
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the pilot, such as the B-26 Marauder medium bomber, or they pushed the state of aircraft 
technology, as was the case with the B-29 Superfortress heavy bomber. The B-26 gained a 
reputation as a dangerous airplane to be avoided and was nicknamed “The Widowmaker” by the 
crews. Only after an intensive public relations campaign, with support from the crews flying it 
in combat, was the reputation of the B-26 redeemed. In the case of the B-29, the Army Air 
Forces had invested too much time and money into the design to write it off. In order to 
demonstrate that the B-29 was a safe plane the Air Staff selected two Women AirForce Service 
Pilots to tour B-29 bases in order to demonstrate to the male pilots that the plane was safe 
enough for a woman to fly.
41
  
The Office of Flying Safety attributed over half of all accidents in the continental United 
States to pilot error.
42
 This was a wide-ranging category covering everything from lack of 
familiarity with an aircraft to a pilot with more confidence than ability. The former usually 
occurred during transition between phases of training and the latter during the later phases of 
training when a pilot believed there was nothing he could not do. Attributing the majority of 
accidents to pilot error also fit the narrative of the interwar pilots.    
Some of the other causes for flight accidents included instructor error, mechanical error, 
and supervisory error. With the rapid expansion of the Army Air Forces there were bound to be 
some instructors who were not quite up to the task and during the first half of 1944 over 1,100 
accidents in the official accident reports were attributed to instructor error.
43
 Mechanical error 
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could be the result of a defective component or could be the result of a mistake by the ground 
crew responsible for the maintenance of the aircraft. The last category was primarily the 
responsibility of the officers who supervised the operation and maintenance of the airfields. 
These accidents could be the result of anything from airfields being poorly lit to the clearance of 
aircraft for flight status that clearly should have been grounded but were cleared in order to 
maintain the pace of training.  
The Army Air Forces took many steps to address the increasing number of accidents. 
The first was to establish the Office of Flying Safety in 1942. This office was the umbrella 
headquarters for safety procedures, education, and training. Although the Office was initially 
undermanned and underfunded, its staff almost immediately began issuing guidance for the 
investigation of accidents. The primary purpose of these investigations was to determine the 
cause of the accident. However, the Office of Flying Safety began collating the data in order to 
begin prescribing steps to prevent or mitigate future accidents. The next logical step was to 
educate the Army Air Forces about safety.  
To spread the word about safety the office began producing posters to hang up around 
barracks and hangars. The Office of Flying Safety also published handbooks and pamphlets on 
safety to be issued to every pilot and crew. One of the most successful and popular methods was 
the adoption of animated short films to emphasize various aspects of safety. In addition, the 
Office of Flying Safety periodically issued press releases to reassure the public about the state of 
safety in the Army Air Force. One press release, issued in 1943, referred to a “force of field 
officers” sent out to assist squadron and group commanders as “missionaries of flying safety.”44 
As the war progressed, the word “safety” became more prevalent throughout the training 
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literature. For example, a 1943 2
nd
 Air Force flight-training directive stated that repetition in 
training was being eliminated between the phases of flight training except for “information or 
safety.”45 The result of the Army Air Forces’ wartime experience was a standardization and 
awareness of safety that was not present before the war.  
After 1947, this emphasis on safety became part of the Air Force’s campaign to enhance 
its image as a professional force. In a postwar study, Safety as a Factor in the Future of 
Aviation, the authors emphasized the Army Air Forces’ wartime experience with accidents as 
the driving force behind stricter standards in safety. In addition, the study noted that flight safety 
had also become an issue of national security as a means of reassuring the public about the 
professionalism of the newly independent Air Force. On the other hand, combat flying was still 
a dangerous business and, in that respect, the Air Force needed pilots whose attitude was not that 
much different from that of the prewar pilots. What had changed was the overall culture of the 
Air Force as it transitioned from the prewar “club like” organization, as Curtis LeMay described 
it, to a professional force with a major role in national defense.  
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Chapter 2 - Culture of Risk 
 
During the airmail crisis, one Air Service area commander admonished 
a group commander via telegram, “THERE WILL BE NO MORE 
ACCIDENTS” to which the group commander replied, “THERE WILL 
BE NO MORE FLYING.”46 
1934 telegram exchange. The Men 
and Events that Shaped the Development of 
U.S. Air Power. 
 
The beginning of the age of flight coincided with a time when concern over workplace 
safety was on the rise in the United States. In the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
progressive organizations such as the American Association for Labor Legislation and the 
National Consumers League, made great strides in cleaning up workplace conditions and 
enacting policies to ensure worker safety.
47
 For example, in 1922, the Safety Institute of America 
inaugurated a “Safety Week” in New York with the slogan “Don’t Get Hurt.”48 The press release 
boasted that the week-long rally was going to use wartime methods, such as “four-minute men,” 
to instruct the public on safety.
49
 As reported in the New York Times, “[t]he immediate goal of 
Safety Week is to save the lives of the seventy persons who would be killed by accident during 
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this week in the ordinary course of events.”50 Six years later, the Building Trades Employers’ 
Association ran a “Safety Poster Contest.”51 The entrants were offered cash prizes for identifying 
the safety violations in the poster and submitting “. . . in his own words . . . how the jobs they 
recently worked on could have been made safer.”52 This emphasis on safety reached down into 
the schools. In 1926, 100,000 parents attended safety rallies across New York. The meetings 
were intended “to curb the killing and injuring of children in the streets.”53 The children prepared 
posters to support the goals of the rallies and the speakers encouraged the parents and teachers to 
develop “safety creed[s]” for the children and to pledge their commitment to safety.54  
At the same time, it was also an era of great change, particularly after World War One. 
Despite President Harding’s exhortations about a “return to normalcy,” there was vibrancy and a 
yearning for greater achievements. Two examples were the skyscrapers reaching ever higher 
defining the skylines of the major cities, and a growing “airmindedness” among the postwar 
generation.
55
 Much of this “airmindedness” was the result of the glamor associated with the 
aerial combat of World War One but also of the exploits of aviation pioneers such as Charles 
Lindbergh. However, less than six months after Lindbergh’s solo crossing of the Atlantic flight, 
the issue of trans-Atlantic flights became a topic for discussion at the annual convention of the 
Eastern District Evangelical Lutheran Synod of Ohio, and, as reported in the New York Times,  
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“The latest transatlantic flights and risks are against the theological 
principle of endangering one’s life unnecessarily,” declared the Rev. 
W. E. Schaam of Butler, Pa. 
 The Rev. C. G. Wolf said that he questioned “the advisability of 
encouraging such risks as admirable feats of daring, such as our 
newspapers and editorial writers have done of late.”56 
 
     On the other hand, the next month the New York Times ran an article on a report by the 
Association of Life Insurance Medical Directors of America.
57
 In the report the Association 
declared 
…that the accident companies, in line with the reduction of restrictions 
during the last two years, have changed their policy contracts to cover 
any loss caused by any hazard of aviation while the insured is riding as 
a passenger “in a licensed airplane operated by a licensed pilot over a 
regular passenger route between definitely established airports.” Travel 
by air as a passenger under these conditions is “reasonably safe,” the 
report said.
58
 
 
In addition, the article noted that one insurance company would also cover military pilots, for an 
additional premium.
59
 However, the article pointed out, without explanation, that this same 
company would not cover passengers.
60
 Regardless, the Lutheran ministers’ concerns aside, the 
insurance industry as a whole deemed flying to be a relative good risk for coverage. 
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Another example of an expression of reaching skyward, began on the ground with the 
building of skyscrapers.
61
 As the century progressed, builders of these skyscrapers vied with 
each other to build not only the tallest buildings; they also strove to put them up “with accuracy 
of measurement and precision of time.”62 The Empire State Building was completed ahead of 
schedule in little more than a year and with only five fatalities. Both accomplishments were the 
direct result of the skill of the workmen. The workers were not daredevils per se, but they did 
suggest a certain disregard for the risk involved as they casually walked along the narrow girders 
hundreds of feet in the air. Years later, a study on the psychodynamics of organizations 
discovered that many of the workers exhibited a calm demeanor as they went about their 
business because that was expected by the “group.”63 More importantly, if workers had any 
concerns about the risks inherent in the job, they were left with the impression that it was best if 
they kept “their worries to themselves.”64  
 It is an attitude best expressed by the American philosopher William James when he 
stated, “Refuse to express a passion, and it dies.”65 His corollary is, “if we wish to conquer 
undesirable emotional tendencies in ourselves, we must assiduously, and in the first instance 
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cold-bloodedly, go through the outward motions of those contrary dispositions we prefer to 
cultivate.”66 In James’ opinion,  
If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our 
consciousness of it all feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, 
we find we have nothing left behind, no “mind-stuff” out of which the 
emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of 
intellectual perception is all that remains.
67
 
 
These traits and attitudes began to define the culture of the Air Service and were cultivated 
during the Air Corps period and in the Army Air Forces throughout World War Two. 
Throughout the first three decades of the 20
th
 Century, new aerial records were being set 
and broken on a regular basis. It was a new frontier that required risk takers to test the limits of 
what was possible with new machines and concepts. Moreover, with each accomplishment, the 
pilots became heroes to the public, the adulation encouraging them to greater feats of daring. It 
was in this environment that the early pilots of the Army earned their wings and were not only 
pushing the limits of flight but also looking to define the parameters of “airpower.” The culture 
of the early Air Service evolved into one where taking risks was not only acceptable but 
expected in order to meet the challenges of flying. Moreover, they grew up in a society that 
cheered their risk taking. This chapter will analyze the experiences of these early pilots in 
defining the culture of both the early Army Air Service and the Army Air Corps.   
The Air Service’s experience with risk and accidents began when Lieutenant Thomas 
Selfridge strapped into the seat next to Orville Wright on 17 September 1908 for a demonstration 
flight. The ensuing flight ended when Orville crashed the plane, severely injuring himself and 
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killing Lieutenant Selfridge. Undeterred, the Army was still interested in pursuing aviation. 
However, the risk involved in this unproven technology was readily apparent. As airpower 
historian Dewitt Copp notes, the Army’s first pilots laid their lives on the line every time “they 
sat down in a wicker chair between flimsy, cloth-covered wings and grasped the control 
levers.”68 Two years after the accident in which Lieutenant Selfridge died, Lieutenant Benjamin 
Foulois was sent to Fort Sam Houston with the Army’s only airplane under orders to teach 
himself to fly.
69
 Foulois accomplished this task mostly by corresponding with the Wright 
brothers.
70
 After each mishap, Foulois would write to Orville and Wilbur for advice, and he 
would then wait for their reply before going back up to put their advice into practice.
71
 While 
waiting for a reply from the Wrights may have been prudent, it still took a certain amount of 
courage for Foulois to go back and put their written advice into practice. Foulois survived the 
experience and became not only the first pilot licensed by the U. S. Army but also the only 
person thought to have learned to fly by correspondence.
72
 Foulois continued to correspond with 
the Wrights after he left Fort Sam Houston. For example, in 1912, while at Fort Leavenworth 
training with Arnold, Foulois forwarded a list of specific technical questions concerning the 
Wright C airplane.
73
 However, as the effort to establish a military air service proceeded, many 
others in the Army were not as fortunate. Arnold recalled that by the start of World War One, ten 
of 30 rated pilots had died in accidents; twelve quit flying, of their own accord, within a few 
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months of earning their wings; two quit after they “flew themselves out” and four died of natural 
causes.
74
 
Many of the early pilots developed an almost fatalistic outlook about flying and accepted 
that accidents were inevitable given the fledgling if not primitive nature of aviation technology. 
In a post-World War Two study, the Air Force noted that “The design of military aircraft has 
been predicated on many factors other than safety.”75 In the same postwar study an aircraft 
manufacturer pointed out, “It is not possible to make the plane foolproof, but only fool-
resistant,” the implication being that pilots do foolish things that cannot be prevented. 76 
However, that is an unfair assessment of pilots who often had to find out what worked through 
trial and error. Arnold described how he saw the situation in the early days of aviation: “As is 
usually the case in advances that are taking place daily in aeronautics, there were no precedents 
to follow.”77 As will be discussed later, often in the early days of aviation, testing the limits of 
flight was a less a matter of being foolish and more about doing what was necessary.   
Arnold also concluded that the problem of flying accidents appeared bigger because the 
scarcity of airplanes made every crash a front-page story.
78
 At the same time, the pilots did not 
believe flying accidents were anything unusual. Ira Eaker noted in his biography that the 
occasional “crack up” was to be expected.79 In fact, it was not until 1924 that the Air Service 
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required the appointment of an “accident investigating officer” at all airfields.80 Even then, it was 
a very informal appointment that could be handled by the senior officer on the flight or by the 
“first Air Service officer to visit the scene….”81 All of this created a kind of “cultural 
dissonance.” While one segment of society, the uninformed civilians, might read the reports of 
aircraft accidents and view them as disastrous, the pilots, with firsthand experience, viewed them 
as a common occurrence, albeit a common enough occurrence to be the deciding factor for many 
to give up flying. In 1913 alone, five of the fourteen rated pilots quit.
82
 On the other hand, there 
were enough volunteers to make up the difference so that there were eighteen rated pilots by 
1914.
83
 In addition, advances in aviation technology, such as faster engines, were occurring at 
such a rapid rate that safety regulations and practices could not keep up. It also created an 
atmosphere best summed up by Billy Mitchell’s comment to Hap Arnold as he walked away 
from a “crack up”: “It’s all in a day’s work.”84 
Contributing to this atmosphere was a general attitude that flying was mostly a hands-on, 
“learn by doing” affair, Benjamin Foulois’ experience with correspondence flight training being 
an extreme example.
85
 Most received some number of hours of flight training, but there was 
neither an established curriculum nor a fixed amount of flight time. In Spring 1911, Arnold 
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became one of the Army’s two qualified aviators when he soloed after two-and-a-half hours of 
flight training and received his wings after an additional one hour and eighteen minutes of flight 
time.
86
 This total represented 28 individual flights each averaging eight minutes.
87
 Future Air 
Force Chief of Staff Carl Spaatz soloed after 55 minutes, an hour fewer than was typical for the 
time, though there was not a minimum number of required flight hours.
88
 Spaatz acknowledged 
that ground school instruction was limited, consisting mainly of assembly and disassembly of the 
engine and very little on the theory of flight.
89
 Ira Eaker soloed after four hours of dual 
instruction and eventually went on to command Eighth Air Force during World War Two.
90
 This 
experience left the early pilots with an extreme amount of confidence in their ability to handle 
any situation that might arise during a flight. Arnold concluded that this created an atmosphere of 
“seat of the pants flying” and made the pilots “hostile to technical innovation” fearing that the 
instruments would make them “mechanical” pilots.91 After the war, Arnold stated, the “‘seat of 
the pants’ flying tradition [continued] much longer than it should have.”92 It should be noted that 
the only instrument on the airplane Arnold learned to fly was a piece of string to let the pilot 
know if he was in a skid, or an uncoordinated turn.
93
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As one among only a handful of pilots, Arnold had other duties related to establishing 
aviation in the US Army. Among these was overseeing the assembly of new aircraft and working 
with mechanics to insure that they understood how to maintain the aircraft.
94
 He was also a flight 
instructor passing on is skill and knowledge to the other aspiring pilots. However, as an aviation 
pioneer in his own right Arnold understood the stress inherent in attempting to set new records. 
For example, Arnold set several altitude records, and he was the first pilot to take a member of 
Congress up in an airplane.
95
 These experiences would stand Arnold in good stead when it came 
time to oversee the expansion of the Air Corps. 
Nonetheless, despite being an accomplished and respected pilot, Arnold had doubts about 
“the flying game,” as he called it in the title of a book he co-wrote with Ira Eaker in 1936. In a 
letter to his wife dated 20 June 1913, Arnold, in spite of his declarations about “pilot error” being 
the primary cause of flying accidents, began to question flight in general. He wondered if “an 
unseen hand reaches out and turns the machines over in the air for there have been so many 
accidents that have never been explained.”96 These doubts began in 1912 when two events shook 
up Arnold so much that he gave up flying. The first was the death of one of his instructors; the 
other was a near fatal crash of his own in November 1912.
97
 Arnold was so shaken that he 
requested to be taken off flight status and a fellow officer noted, “Lieut[enant] Arnold has 
become so nervous as a result that he has not flown since, and perhaps will never 
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again.”98Arnold was eventually enticed back to flying but his experience is indicative of the 
experiences of the early pilots. 
Nonetheless, much of this hands on, learn-as-you-go training and “seat of the pants” 
flying was the result of these early pilots being more like test pilots as they grappled with not 
only the practical aspects of flying but also the theoretical side of adapting this new technology 
to warfare. For example, in 1913 Orville Wright attributed 90 percent of all airplanes accidents 
to the plane losing speed and stalling.
99
 In a letter to the Army’s chief of aeronautics he wrote, 
“Many of these dives [caused by the stall] would not result seriously if the aviator had but the 
courage to cause the machine to make an even more fearful dive till it recovers its normal 
speed….100 In another example, Hoyt Vandenberg, as a young pilot with the 90th Attack 
Squadron, witnessed four of his fellow pilots die testing out new maneuvers proposed by Billy 
Mitchell.
101
 As Philip Meilinger summarized in his biography of Vandenberg, “Air power at that 
time [the late 1920s] was ‘sensed’ rather than demonstrated.”102 In other words, this early testing 
and experimentation was necessary in order to develop, not only the correct use of airpower, but 
also how best to safely fly airplanes.    
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One early pilot, Byron Quimby Jones, attempted to figure out how to recover from a 
tailspin; up until Jones’ flight, no one ever had successfully recovered from a spin.103 Based on 
his understanding of aerodynamics, Jones studied the problem and came up with what he hoped 
would be the solution.
104
 There was one way to find out. Jones, without a parachute because 
there were none, took his plane up to its maximum altitude and deliberately put it into a spin. 
Applying his solution Jones recovered from the spin. He did it several more times before he 
assured himself that he had found the answer.
105
 
 Many safety features such as seat belts and goggles were discovered by accident — both 
literally and figuratively. One of Arnold’s contributions to flight safety came after he was hit in 
the eye by a bug and he suggested that goggles would be helpful.
106
 Before that, a pilot simply 
prepared for flight by turning his hat around.
107
 Neither rank nor assignment hampered this 
attitude of experimentation. During his tour as Chief of the Air Service, Major General James 
Fechet wanted to try out a parachute. His plan was to lie on the wing of a plane and after it was 
at a sufficient altitude, slide off, and pull the ripcord.
108
 The example of the Chief of Staff lying 
on the wing of a plane in order to test a parachute was bound to set the tone for the culture within 
the organization.  
The next challenge for the Air Service and the pilots came in combat over France. When 
the United States declared war in April 1917, the Air Service consisted of fifty-two officers and 
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eleven hundred enlisted men.
109
 Of the 130 rated pilots, Arnold believed “only 26 were really 
qualified.”110 In addition, the Air Service had only 55 aircraft.111 None of them were combat 
types, and, according to Arnold, 51were obsolete.
112
 The Air Service would be forced to rely 
upon the allies for aircraft; however, the need for aircrew was even greater. As one member of 
the AEF (American Expeditionary Forces) Training Section advised the Division of Military 
Aeronautics Observation Section: 
We desired 200 artillery observers with aerial gunnery, but stated that 
the full number called for was desired even if all had not such training. 
You will have to make every effort to send us fully trained men at the 
earliest possible date, as the facilities in the AEF will not permit of 
giving anything more than a refresher course. . . . If fully trained 
material is not available, make up the requested number by the best 
partially trained men available.
113
 
 
Among the “best partially trained men available” was future general and 5th Air Force 
commander George C. Kenney. In 1917, Lieutenant Kenney was sent to France with fewer than 
twenty hours of flight training.
114
 To make up for the deficiency in stateside training the AEF 
established a large training facility at Issodun, France in order to give the new pilots the benefit 
of French instructors with combat experience. Despite these shortcomings in training, the Air 
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Service produced many good pilots. For instance, Kenney went on to shoot down two German 
planes and earned the Distinguished Service Cross and Silver Star.
115
 
 Stateside training was not only short but also dangerous. On top of the attrition 
through eliminations, training fatalities added to the number. In fact, training was more 
dangerous than combat. In 1918, the Secretary of War reported that for every aviator lost in 
combat two aviators lost their lives in training.
116
 In total, aviators were 49 times more likely to 
die in accidents than the average of the Army as a whole.
117
 In the Final Report of the United 
States Air Service, published in 1921, the Air Service reported that in the AEF 218 pilots and 
observers were killed in training, which amounted to an average of one fatality for every 
eighteen graduates.
118
 
 Those who survived the rigors of combat and training were a very confident 
group of flyers. Referring to a group of pilots after World War One, Arnold recalled: “They were 
typical of the entire group of war pilots, cocky even in their disregard of instruments and maps. 
Why worry? They could fly anywhere, anytime.”119 On one occasion, a mechanic told Ira Eaker 
that the engine on the plane he was about to fly did not sound right and that he should not fly it. 
Eaker ignored the mechanic and, after twenty minutes in the air, Eaker was forced to ditch his 
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plane in San Diego Bay. The lesson Eaker took from the incident was to check his ego and 
always heed the advice of a mechanic.
120
 In a display of pure bravado, future Medal of Honor 
recipient James Doolittle, on nothing more than a bet, sat between the wheels of an airplane as it 
landed.
121
 The base commander, Hap Arnold, grounded him for one month.
122
 For a pilot like 
Doolittle this was far worse than any other punishment Arnold could have given him. 
Another series of events also set the tone for the organizational culture of the early Air 
Force. During the early days of flight, aviation records and “firsts” were being set at a 
remarkable pace and many of these records were set and broken by Air Corps pilots. It was in 
this atmosphere that the men who would lead the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) 
during World War Two came of age. It also set them apart from those who would come later and 
added to the camaraderie and a “club-like” feeling in the interwar Air Corps. However, in some 
cases their attitude and zealotry in pressing the cause of airpower led to friction between 
themselves and their more ground-minded peers. Later in life, looking back on this period, Ira 
Eaker would bemoan the loss of that atmosphere. He noted that the overriding skill that the early 
flyers had used to define themselves was flying, and according to Eaker they had had unlimited 
opportunities:  “We had something that is impossible now: we could take planes and go on cross 
country flights of our own volition, between cities and stations.”123 Another early flyer, James 
Doolittle took advantage of these unlimited opportunities to sharpen his cross-country flying 
skills. At one station, he had memorized the countryside so well that, even in bad weather, he 
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could orient himself merely by glimpsing a familiar barn or terrain feature.
124
 However, this 
daring and initiative were not always appreciated. Doolittle admitted that he had at times been 
irresponsible – “quite a few actually,” he once told his wife.125 However, he never doubted his 
ability and was very upset when he was told by his base commander that he did not “have 
enough sense to be a good airplane pilot” for flying in weather that would keep “rational men on 
the ground.”126 
Some of the records set by the Air Corps aviators were individual firsts such as Arnold’s 
early altitude records or Eaker’s instrument-only transcontinental flight in 1936.127 Others were 
collective efforts such as the first aerial circumnavigation of the world in 1924. Another example 
was a duration flight given the name “Question Mark” to test the feasibility of air-to-air refueling 
and to set a new endurance record. The idea came up during a card game among Eaker, Elwood 
“Pete” Quesada, and Fechet. Quesada broached the idea and Fechet, the Chief of the Air Corps, 
replied, “Not a bad thought.”128 As simply as that, the planning for the flight began. Nonetheless, 
all of these attempts, successful or not, went far to establishing a “can do” spirit that any obstacle 
could be overcome by the perseverance and ingenuity of the pilot. These experiences also 
contributed to a building esprit among the pilots that drew them closer together within their 
“club.” For example, during the refueling and endurance test flight of the Question Mark — a tri-
motor Atlantic-Fokker C-2A fitted out for the experiment in the project of the same name — 
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Spaatz was drenched with aviation gas. He immediately stripped off his clothes and the rest of 
the crew rubbed him down with oil-soaked rags to prevent the fuel from burning his skin. He 
spent the rest of the refueling wearing only a parachute and a light coat of oil.
129
 Spaatz refused 
to abort the mission and eventually clothes were transferred to his plane. At one point during a 
long-distance flight, the landing gear on a plane was stuck in the raised position. The plan to 
lower it was for one of the crew to go out on the wing to stand on the stuck gear, using his 
weight to force it down. The crew, all having experience with “wing-walking” during training 
flights, not as a matter of policy but as a personal challenge, knew this would work.
130
 Not every 
experiment or test ended in success and many ended tragically. Nonetheless, each death 
reinforced the fact that flying was an inherently risky business, even as the aircraft improved.  
 As the aircraft improved with each advancement there was developing among the pilots a 
mien Tom Wolfe would later call “the right stuff.”131 Even if they did not discuss it, these pilots 
were exhibiting William James’ previously discussed philosophy on emotions and their physical 
manifestation. By demonstrating that they could control their emotions in any situation they were 
outwardly exhibiting that they could physically control the situation as well. This attitude 
manifested itself in an air of confidence the pilot projected concerning his own abilities. 
Therefore, if a pilot died in an accident it must have been the result of “pilot error”, something 
that would never happen if the pilot had “the right stuff.” In Global Mission, Arnold noted that 
after every crash, despite the state of early aviation technology, “almost always the pilot was 
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blamed for being in error.”132 As will be discussed in later chapters, the majority of flying 
accidents during World War Two were attributed to pilot error. According to Arnold, he and his 
peers would discuss a fellow pilot’s crash and conclude that “He must have done something that 
you would never do.”133 In other words, “[h]e,” the dead pilot, obviously was not as good a pilot 
as the survivors; otherwise, he would not have died. 
At the same time, the early Air Corps pilots were setting the standards for personal 
bravery. In 1935, two pilots were awarded the Soldier’s Medal for their bravery while attempting 
to rescue the crew of a crashed plane.
134
 Ironically, however, one of the pilots died in another 
crash before President Roosevelt could award him the medal.
135
 On the other hand, bravery, in 
some instances, had a personal meaning more closely related to the image the pilots wanted to 
project. For example, some pilots considered something logical, from a safety point of view, 
such as the parachute, as an affront to their personal bravery. In fact, the issue over the use 
parachutes developed into an impassioned debate in the early 1920s. Many pilots believed that 
parachutes should be banned, and one made his claim in a letter in the Air Service News. He 
claimed that his view was shared “by a majority if not all, the older pilots at his station.”136 He 
went on to declare that wearing parachutes would “encourage faintheartedness.”137  
Pilots also accepted that, even under the best conditions, theirs was a particularly 
hazardous profession and that death was a possibility any time they flew. As a result, each 
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developed his own internal coping mechanisms. For example, Carl Spaatz observed after one of 
his classmates died in a training accident:  
My mind must be case hardened, since my reactions in these cases are 
not severe, a few thoughts as to whether it is worthwhile and an attempt 
to follow the reason for being worried or afraid of lesser affairs when I 
am not worried or afraid of death and then back to the normal existence 
of eating, sleeping and occasionally some thinking.
138
 
 
He went on: “A crash always does make one slightly apprehensive and a little more cautious for 
a more or less extended period.”139 Spaatz concluded: “It may be ridiculous for an aviator to 
worry about old age….”140 Arnold later stated that in 1912 he had quit flying because he was 
about to be married, and, in those days, “you didn’t plan to continue flying after you were 
married—unless you were an optimist.”141 
 However, there was a downside to this sense of bravado and courage. This attitude 
contributed to accumulating approximately 300 accidents per year.
142
 These 300 accidents 
resulted in the deaths of one in twenty pilots or five percent of the force.
143
 Despite requests for 
more funding, the Air Service, at its lowest point in 1924, possessed 1,364 aircraft of which only 
754 were considered first-line.
144
  Between 1926 and 1930, the Air Corps (the Army Air Service 
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became the Army Air Corps in 1926) lost approximately 121 aircraft annually.
145
 For 1930, this 
accounted for eight percent of the total aircraft the Air Corps possessed.
146
 Moreover, the rate of 
fatalities averaged 27 per 100,000 hours of flight. This rate was three times higher than during 
the 1930s.
147
 At one point, in 1934, Carl Spaatz as Chief of Training and Operations noted that 
the shortage of aircraft was hindering flight training, adding that the number of aircraft to be 
procured in 1935 would not make up for the losses in 1934.
148
 
Attrition in training was not much better with nearly 40 percent of those accepted into 
training being washed out or dying in accidents.
149
 In 1923, nearly half of Vandenberg’s class 
was eliminated for academics or lack of flight proficiency and another six were killed in 
accidents.
150
 This contributed to the fatalistic attitude developed by many of the pilots. For 
example, Brigadier General Noel Parrish summed the situation up best during a 1974 interview, 
recalling the postwar World War One years when he was a young pilot. He commented: “with 
the casualty rates we had . . . you [were] in combat against nature, ignorance and other factors 
practically all the time. The weather, gravitation, and so on were your enemy constantly.”151 It 
should be noted that the Air Corps kept meticulous records of all of its activities. For example, 
the Air Corps tracked rates of fuel consumption, hours flown, and ammunition expended. 
However, when it came to deaths and eliminations in training, the Air Corps merged the data into 
one data point. The merging of these two data points continued throughout World War Two. In 
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addition, as aviation historian Rebecca Cameron noted in Training to Fly, the Air Force has 
never been forthcoming about fatalities.
152
 
 On the other hand, those in the Air Corps led a leisurely life in the interwar period. The 
pilots usually reported for duty at 0730. They began flying at 0800, and stopped at 1130 for 
lunch at the officers club until 1330. The duty day typically ended at 1530. Typically, their 
weekends were free along with a half day off on Wednesdays, and “almost no one worked at 
night.”153 Curtis LeMay, future commander of the 20th Air Force in the Pacific during World 
War Two, claimed that the interwar Air Corps “…was more like a flying club than a military 
organization.”154 LeMay added: “It was almost like a public relations outfit; that’s what it 
amounted to, throughout the air force.”155 In fact, as airpower historian John Shiner noted in 
Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, “The combination of 
pioneer and publicist found in [Billy] Mitchell was common among Air Service officers.”156  
 While the official purpose of these public relations efforts was to promote the Air Cops 
and airpower, they also reinforced the notion among the pilots that they were part of a unique 
fraternity, a fraternity that was defined by flying skill and daring. Early in his career, Arnold 
recalled that pilots were allowed to “moonlight” as stunt flyers in movies in order to promote 
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aviation.
157
 In 1926, Hoyt Vandenberg was selected to be the stunt pilot for the lead character in 
the movie Wings.
158
 For two weeks, Vandenberg would take off, then duck inside the fuselage 
during filming, and then pop back up to land the plane.
159
 A more bizarre example of efforts to 
stimulate public interest in Army aviation occurred when Arnold challenged a group of homing 
pigeons to a race from Portland, Oregon to San Francisco. Despite some mechanical problems, 
Arnold won.
160Arnold’s efforts and his success at selling the Air Service were rewarded by his 
being appointed the first director of the Air Service Information Section. The section handled all 
publicity matters for the Air Service.
161
 The job of the Far West Flying Circus, commanded by 
Spaatz, was to generate public interest in Army Aviation by putting on exhibitions of stunt flying 
and mock dogfights.
162
  
Spaatz’ experience was not unique and some commanders thought that these publicity 
stunts were often done to the detriment of training for war.
163
 For example, Benjamin Foulois 
bemoaned the fact that his attempts to “whip his [group] into a combat-ready force” were 
occasionally derailed by publicity taskings.
164
 One such time was when his group was tasked to 
provide a plane so Babe Ruth could catch a ball dropped from the plane.
165
 The ball was dropped 
form 250 feet, and Foulois recalled that Ruth was “knocked flat” [to the ground] the first two 
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attempts.
166
 Regardless, the exercise had no value beyond the publicity it provided both parties. 
Nonetheless, the greater goal for the Air Corps was to generate interest among the American 
public in aviation and Army aviation in particular. As the official history put it, “the public in 
general was receptive to Air Corps publicity.”167 
 In 1934, the Air Corps faced its biggest challenge when President Roosevelt asked the 
Air Corps to take over the airmail routes. During the 78 days when the Air Corps was 
responsible for airmail operations, its pilots flew badly equipped aircraft over unfamiliar routes 
during one of the worst winters on record. This incident demonstrated, in a very tragic way, how 
woefully lacking the Air Force was in equipment and training. In the same year when the Air 
Corps assumed responsibility for flying the airmail, commercial airline pilots were averaging 
100 hours flight time a month and a considerable amount of night and instrument flying. At the 
same time, however, the Air Corps allocated only sixteen flight hours a month for squadron and 
group commanders and ten hours for all other tactical pilots.
168
 
The experience of Frank Andrews as the commander of the 1
st
 Pursuit Group is a good 
example of these shortcomings. When he took command of the group in 1933, Andrews realized 
that not many of his pilots had been trained to fly under instrument conditions.
169
 He also noted 
that not one of his aircraft possessed even the rudimentary equipment found on commercial 
aircraft for instrument flying.
170
 It was a vicious circle. The Air Corps did not possess the 
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equipment to fly at night or in inclement weather. Therefore the Air Corps developed doctrine 
that did not feature that type of flying, As a result, it was accepted that pursuit pilots did not fly 
in formation or engage in combat when visibility was limited.
171
 Moreover, the experience of the 
bomber pilots confirmed that it was difficult, at best, to locate or bomb targets under such 
conditions.
172
 The primary reason the Air Corps did not have the equipment was that it was 
expensive. This was the state of training and equipment when President Roosevelt put the Army 
Air Corps at risk by calling upon it to assume responsibility for delivering airmail in February 
1934.  
 That month, the President cancelled the airlines’ contracts to carry mail in order to clear 
up some “contractual irregularities.”173 He then asked representatives for the Post Office 
Department to check with the Chief of the Air Corps, Major General Benjamin Foulois, on the 
feasibility of the Air Corps taking over the airmail routes. After a brief three-hour meeting with 
his staff, General Foulois assured the President that the Air Corps would be ready to fly the mail 
routes within ten days. Foulois was convinced that flying the mail would be no more perilous 
than “normal peacetime training.”174 He thought this despite the fact that, in the six months 
leading up to the airmail operation, the Air Corps had lost 23 pilots in flying accidents,
175
 not to 
mention that flying the mail required skills his pilots lacked or were not very proficient in such 
as instrument and night flying.
176
 Some of the group and squadron commanders, such as Major 
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Hugh Knerr in command of Field Services at Wright Field, voiced their concerns about the lack 
of equipment and the proficiency of their pilots. On the other hand, the pilots, according to 
Lieutenant Elwood “Pete” Quesada, showed little concern for the weather, since they were 
young and did not lack for confidence in their own abilities.
177
 On 12 March 1934, Arnold 
voiced his opinion about the pilots in a letter to his wife:  
We didn’t have enough experienced pilots to carry on and had to use 
inexperienced flyers who lacked the mature judgment, who were afraid 
to turn back, who did not know when they were getting into trouble, 
and had too high an opinion of their own capabilities.
178
 
 
If the pilots were convinced that they could handle whatever challenge came their way, the 
planes, on the other hand, were another matter.  
Foulois ordered that the latest navigation equipment, such as directional compasses and 
artificial horizons, be installed on all mail-carrying aircraft.
179
 Unfortunately, the Air Corps did 
not have the resources to execute his order. At the beginning of 1934, the Air Corps had 274 
directional compasses and 460 artificial horizons on hand in the various depots. They were being 
held for new aircraft the Air Corps planned on procuring.
180
 What radios the Air Corps possessed 
were of limited range when compared with the 400-mile range of the then current commercial 
aircraft radios.
181
 The problem was compounded by the mechanics who installed the equipment. 
They often placed the equipment where it was convenient for installation but not readily 
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observable by the pilot.
182
 For their part, the pilots were not always comfortable with the new 
equipment, because they had had little time to train with it, and also preferred to rely on the “seat 
of their pants” when they found themselves in bad situations.183  
At times, the Air Corps staff’s solutions to the problem of these accidents only further 
exasperated the pilots and crews. For example, at one point, the staff ordered that one of the few 
planes that was properly instrumented for the airmail mission be grounded. The reason given was 
that the crew could not bail out of the plane quickly in an emergency. One of the pilots pointed 
out that it was the one plane the crews would not have to bail out of because it was properly 
equipped for instrument flying. Instead, he urged that the order should be reversed and that all 
the other planes should be grounded. The order was eventually rescinded, however, the other 
planes were not grounded either.
184
 
Unfortunately, despite the Air Corps’ attempts to insure the safety of the pilots and 
planes, its overall safety record during the airmail disaster was abysmal. The majority of the 
pilots had fewer than two years of flight experience and even fewer had more than 50 hours of 
night flying, let alone flying in bad weather.
185
 In the first three weeks of airmail operations, the 
Air Corps lost ten pilots, four on one day.
186
 Throughout the operation there were 66 crashes 
resulting in twelve deaths. The public’s faith in the Air Corps was shaken by this tragedy and the 
public outcry was led by such aviation luminaries such as World War One ace Eddie 
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Rickenbacker. Rickenbacker referred to the order authorizing the Air Corps to carry the mail as 
“legalized murder.”187 In order to curb the accident rate and manage the public uproar, Roosevelt 
ordered Foulois to reduce the number of routes and to ground his least experienced pilots.
188
 By 
spring, the Air Corps was beginning to adjust to this mission and the accident rate was going 
down. However, by that time, the political impasse between President and the airlines has been 
resolved and new contracts were let to the commercial airlines. Much to the chagrin of Foulois 
and the Air Corps, it was relieved of the mail delivery mission in June 1934.  
One result of the airmail of the fiasco was the establishment of the Baker Board.  
Appointed by Secretary of War George H. Dern, former Secretary of War Newton D. Baker was 
charged with investigating the airmail fiasco and the readiness of the Air Corps in general. At its 
first meeting, Dern gave the board its mandate: “Many of our citizens are bewildered. They do 
not know whether we have a good military air force or not. If we have, the public ought to know 
it and be reassured. If, on the other hand, we are deficient in equipment, personnel, or training we 
want your best judgment as to what should be done to bring us up to a satisfactory standard.”189 
Future Medal of Honor recipient Leon K. Johnson, while a student at the War College, best 
summed up the Air Corps’ frustration when he wrote: “Many people are prone to judge our 
possibilities in time of war by limitations which peacetime operations impose upon us….”190 
Johnson was voicing the frustration of many in the Air Corps over the meager budgets during the 
interwar years and the effect of those budgets on training and equipment.   
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Among the board’s recommendations was that the Air Force require at least ten hours of 
flight time per pilot per month.
191
 The board also recommended that the War Department should 
establish a means for determining if the Army’s pilots were qualified for flying duty. The War 
Department established the standard for pilot certification at 100 hours per year, which was to 
include 35 hours in navigation, ten hours at night and ten hours on instruments.
192
 The Air Corps 
also began to place more emphasis on instrument and cross-country flying.
193
 
Internally, the morale of the Air Corps was shaken by the airmail fiasco. The same Major 
Hugh Knerr who had voiced his concerns later wrote: “This arbitrary assignment to an 
impractible task was inexcusable. We had neither the personnel nor the modern aircraft for an 
operation the Air Mail had taken years to develop. No one paid any heed to our warning of 
disaster.”194 In defending Foulois, Arnold noted that, given a general “willingness to accept any 
and all challenges,” he believed that any Air Corps officer would have made the same decision 
as Foulois.
195
 The pilots themselves were disappointed because they believed that they had been 
found wanting and had failed a critical test.
196
 Regardless, the Air Corps took the lessons to heart 
and set about addressing them. 
Multi-engine aircraft pilots received particular attention. Most pilots had a minimum of 
750 flight hours before being assigned to a bombardment squadron.
197
 If it was a B-17 or B-18 
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squadron, the pilot had to fly fifty hours as a co-pilot before being rated as a pilot; but, even then, 
he would not be assigned as an airplane commander until he had seven years’ experience and 
2,000 hours as a rated pilot.
198
  
During the interwar period it was assumed that a good pilot was also a good bombardier 
and vice versa. In order to insure proficiency, there was much cross training between positions, 
including navigators and gunners. For example, the 19
th
 Bomb Group commander set a very high 
standard for his crews. A crew was not fully trained until every officer was qualified as pilot or 
co-pilot, celestial navigator, expert bombardier, and expert gunner.
199
 In addition, all enlisted 
crew members had to qualify in their specialties — engineer, armorer, or radio operator — but 
also to become expert as gunners.
200
 The overall effect was to create well-balanced crews, but 
also to inculcate in the culture the idea that any task could be mastered by any and all. However, 
the standard in the 19
th
 Bomb Group was the personal choice of the commander.  
By the end of the 1930s, the Air Corps was a combat force without enough equipment or 
enough skilled technicians and with little emphasis on combat skills. LeMay observed: “True, we 
had a little bit of gunnery here and there, but day-to-day we had no emphasis on tactics or 
preparing to fight an air war.”201 It should be noted, LeMay’s concerns aside, the Air Corps was 
preparing the doctrine to fight an air war at the Air Corps Tactical School. The efficacy of that 
doctrine is outside the scope of this study. Nevertheless, over the course of the 1930s, the Air 
Corps was making progress in standardizing training and becoming more professional, but it 
would be hard to shed the “club-like” atmosphere that LeMay had noted. This was about to 
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change in 1939 when President Roosevelt directed the air staff to begin planning for an 
expansion of the Air Corps to 50,000 men, nearly doubling it in size.
202
 
The Air Corps Act of 1926 had authorized 1,630 commissioned officers for the Air 
Corps, but for budgetary reasons the Air Corps had consistently kept the number at 
approximately 1,250.
203
 This was just enough to accommodate applicants from the United States 
Military Academy who had priority over all others.
204
 However, by the 1930s the number of 
aviation cadets entering flight training had been steadily increasing. Between 1937 and 1939, the 
number of aviation cadets increased from 340 to 872, from all sources.
205
 Before the expansion 
program, training was conducted at a relatively slow pace. Three times a year, a new class would 
begin at each training center.
206
 The training consisted of three sequential phases — primary, 
basic, and advanced.
207
 The cadets moved through the phases based on performance before 
moving on to a tactical unit to complete their training.
208
 As the official history of the Training 
Command concluded, the system, before the expansion program, produced a small number of 
highly qualified pilots and officers.
209
 Beginning in July 1939, the Air Corps began classes every 
six weeks with 400 students, expecting half to wash out.
210
 
Before 1939, procurement of qualified candidates had been the responsibility of each of 
the nine corps area and the success of the recruiting was usually the result of the emphasis the 
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corps area commander placed on the program.
211
 Each corps area was assigned a quota of cadets 
based not only on the needs of the Air Corps but also on the “extent of the population.”212 The 
Air Corps, as discussed previously, had always been conscious of the need to develop good 
public relations in order to convince the American people on the potential of airpower. With the 
expansion program, the Air Corps turned this effort to recruiting and, according to the official 
history on aircrew procurement; publicity was the cornerstone of this recruiting effort.
213
 Local 
publicity was the responsibility of the corps area commanders and consisted of recruiting posters, 
literature, and the occasional radio announcement.
214
 Another tool for the corps areas was 
publishing articles in local newspapers about the flight training of local boys.
215
 National 
publicity was handled through the War Department Bureau of Public Relations in cooperation 
with the Air Corps and included radio spots, magazine articles, and films.
216
 One of the most 
popular was the 1941 full-length movie “I Wanted Wings.” Based on the book of the same name 
by Lieutenant Beirne Lay, Jr., the movie follows three young men as they undergo flight training 
at Kelly Field. In 1942, Jimmy Stewart made a seventeen-minute short titled “Winning Your 
Wings.” In the film, Stewart describes what a prospective cadet could expect during training.217 
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The public relations efforts would pay off during the war for the Army Air Force both in 
recruiting and in reporting accidents.  
In conjunction with the recruiting campaign, Arnold established five traveling examining 
boards in 1938 to cover the nine corps areas.
218
 Each board consisted of a pilot, a flight surgeon, 
and two assistants.
219
 The purpose of the boards was to examine applicants on the spot. In the 
first year, the boards visited sixty-three colleges and universities; the result of these board visits 
was the addition of 388 qualified candidates for flight training.
220
 In the second year, the boards 
administered 2,369 exams, and 406 candidates passed.
221
  
As Chief of the Air Corps in 1940, Arnold was trying to balance training for these 
candidates with having aircraft for them to fly. The politicians were focusing on producing 
airplanes. In his memoirs, he recalled meetings with members of the Roosevelt administration in 
1940 in which he was “still having a hard time convincing the people in the upper brackets that 
our training program must expand evenly and be coordinated with our airplane strength.”222 
From Arnold’s perspective, “it was just as essential to have a balanced production of trained 
combat and maintenance crews as it was to have planes.”223 Behind his arguments lay the 
certainty, based on the Air Service’s experience during World War One, of the extraordinarily 
time-and manpower-consuming nature of flight training.
224
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As early as 1936, the first chief of General Headquarters Air Force (GHQAF), Major 
General Frank Andrews, voiced his opinion on the readiness and training of the Air Corps in a 
letter to a friend. He noted: “I am also afraid this shortage of experienced officers is affecting our 
accident rate, particularly with the pressure of additional training which we are facing in all our 
wings.”225 In 1936, the Air Corps was coming off one its worst five-year periods. Between 1931 
and 1935, the Air Corps averaged 436 accidents per year resulting in 45 fatalities per year.
226
 At 
the same time, Arnold, as commander of the 1
st
 Wing was becoming frustrated with his accident 
rate and vented some of his frustration in a letter to Andrews:  
Airplane accidents have me at my wit’s end….As far as I can see, the 
only way to stop accidents is to keep all the planes on the ground. 
Starting with the cadet who, with the whole of March Field to land in, 
strikes a wing tip against a boundary light.
227
  
 
Later, Andrews would relate to Arnold that he believed the days of walking away from a wreck 
being a badge of honor were probably over and that the pilots would have to assume more 
responsibility for their actions.
228
 
Such was the situation for the Air Force during the 1920s and 1930s. With changes in 
aviation technology coming so rapidly, the organization created procedures as it went along. For 
the men involved, experience such as Foulois teaching himself to fly made it seem that 
throughout most of the interwar period the most effective way to learn was by doing. Even after 
standardized procedures were developed, the training of pilots was, according to Arnold, more 
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along the lines of a guild.
229
 Throughout the interwar period, the Air Force trained pilots at a 
pace that, if not leisurely, was surely not rushed.
230
 At the same time, the prewar Air Corps was 
not devoid of concern for safety, but the nature of flying ensured that the pilots, while not 
reckless, accepted a level of risk as being inherent in their profession. General Noel Parrish, a 
prewar pilot and wartime instructor, summed it up as a “very risky life.”231 Nonetheless, in 1939, 
the Air Corps was on the cusp of an expansion program that would require a massive 
bureaucracy to train tens of thousands of pilots and aircrews for World War Two. As Arnold 
concluded after the United States entered the war, "we may not have had a powerful air force but 
we knew that we soon would have one. We had the plans, and our organization was growing 
every hour."
232
 Because of their interwar experience, the men of the Air Corps accepted that 
accidents and fatalities would be inevitable as the Air Corps expanded. However, what they 
would not be able to accept was the scale of the accidents and fatalities.  
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Chapter 3 - Selecting the Aircrews 
.  
We must know that any applicant will develop into the type of man we 
would like to associate with for the remainder of our military service as 
brother officers.
233
  
Medical examiner on the purpose of the oral interview.  This 
Flying Game. 
 
On 28 September 1938, President Roosevelt called a meeting of the Secretary of the 
Army, Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary 
of the Treasury and Hap Arnold as acting Chief of the Air Corps to discuss events in Europe. 
The purpose of the meeting was how best to prepare for the likelihood that America would get 
involved in a war in Europe. During the meeting, Roosevelt informed Arnold that he wanted to 
expand the Air Corps by 10,000 planes at a time when the Air Corps budgeted for only 178 
planes in FY 1940.
234
 Over the coming months the 10,000 number would grow as the president 
demanded more of the aircraft industry; the number would peak in 1944 when over 90,000 
aircraft of all types were produced. However, that was in the future. Arnold’s immediate concern 
was how to expand the Air Corps in 1938.  
As pleased as he was with the increased number of aircraft the president had authorized, 
Arnold was concerned that neither the president nor the public understood the infrastructure that 
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would be necessary to support such an expansion.
235
 Arnold recalled in his memoirs that he was 
“having a hard time convincing the people in the upper brackets that our training program must 
expand evenly and be coordinated with our airplane strength.”236 Some officers in the Air Corps 
anticipated that matching up planes and pilots might be a problem. However, in 1934, Carl 
Spaatz, as the chief of the Training and Operations Division, believed the problem would be too 
few airplanes and too many pilots. He predicted that the training of pilots could commence upon 
mobilization, but there would be a gap between trained pilots and a sufficient number of aircraft 
for “probably more than a year.”237 Nonetheless, he also intimated that producing a good pilot 
was time consuming and costly.
238
 Arnold was of the same opinion. Writing in This Flying 
Game, he estimated that “The making of a first-class flying man takes at least two years of 
instruction and requires an outlay of at least four thousand dollars.”239 He also testified before 
Congress, as a young lieutenant, that it did not take long to learn to fly, but it did take a long time 
to make a “military aviator.”240 In 1939, during a tour of Air Corps installations with General 
George C. Marshall, Major General Frank Andrews the Chief of General Headquarters Air Force 
told Marshall that it took “a year to build an airplane and up to three years to train the crews to 
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operate and maintain that airplane…particularly where aeronautical advancement in types is as 
rapid as it is today.”241  
To meet the initial 1939 goal of 24 groups would require the Air Corps to graduate 1,200 
pilots by the end of 1940. Based on its peacetime selection and training experience, the Air 
Corps would have to screen 12,000 applicants. Even then, only 2,200 applicants would be 
accepted into the training program and of these a little more than half would earn their wings. 
After the fall of France in 1940, the president raised the number of groups to be manned to 54 
with a proportional increase in the number of pilots needed.
242
  
By March 1941, the number of groups required had risen to 84 and the number of pilots 
required annually reached 30,000.
243
 These numbers were based on the projected annual 
production of 36,500 aircraft.
244
 In addition, Air Corps planners anticipated heavy losses among 
planes and crew in combat. In August 1941, the Air War Plans Division prepared a proposal for 
an extended air campaign against Germany. The plan designated as Air War Plans Division-1 
(AWPD-1) included estimates for the operational requirements for this campaign. The planners 
determined that the attrition rate would require the entire force to be replaced every five 
months.
245
 What they failed to consider was the effect such losses would have on the crews. The 
Air Staff planners failed to take into consideration not only the psychological effect these losses 
                                                 
241
 Frank Andrews quoted in John L. Frisbee, Makers of the United States Air Force (Washington DC: Office of Air 
Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1987), 45. 
242
  Ibid., 309. 
243
  Ibid., 309. 
244
  Ibid., 310. 
245
  Haywood S. Hansell, The Strategic Air War Against Germany and Japan: A Memoir (Washington DC: Office of 
Air Force History, U.S. Air Force, 1986), 37. 
51 
 
would have on the crews but also the physical effect on the training base.
246
 The Army Air 
Forces would need to alter its selection process in order to find enough men who were both 
physically and psychologically up to the test of aerial combat. However, the bigger challenge for 
the Army Air Forces would be to maintain the same level of quality while producing the 
requisite quantity. It would force the Army Air Forces to take a hard look at its selection and 
training process. 
Throughout the interwar period, the number of cadets in training never exceeded 500 for 
primary and 270 for advanced training.
247
 This was due in part to the high standards required for 
acceptance into flight training; these standards had always been rigorous. In 1925 alone, nearly 
one third of the total applicants failed the physical exam; of the remaining 1,288 applicants, only 
362 passed the written entrance examination.
248
 Even then, 254 of these men were turned away 
because there were not enough vacancies in the Air Service.
249
 Once a cadet entered training, the 
odds were still great that he would not earn his wings. During one three-year period, ending in 
1927, 1,235 began primary training and only 499 graduated to advanced training.
250
 General 
Noel F. Parrish recalled that of the 96 students in his class only half graduated and fifteen of 
those who did not graduate had died in accidents during training. 
251
  
A recent history of the Aviation Cadet Program noted that during World War I an 
applicant for flight training had to be “under the age of 25, have at least two years of college, 
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meet rigid physical standards, and be morally sound.”252 The attributes of “morally sound” were 
not listed; however, Arnold would later say that the Air Corps needed someone who is “honest, 
truthful, reliable . . . [and] possesses that sine qua non, courage.”253 The standard remained much 
the same throughout the interwar period. Describing the application and examination standards 
in 1936, Arnold used phrases such as “rigidly enforced,” “no exception,” or “absolutely barred” 
in discussing the standards for acceptance.
254
 Arnold noted that there were three phases in the 
examination process: educational, physical, and psychological. The entrance examination was 
waived for those who possessed a degree from a “reputable” institution. For those possessing the 
minimum two years of college education, there was a “stiff mental quiz” to eliminate those who 
did not have “two years of well-spent college training.”255 Arnold considered the eye 
examination the most severe test.
256
 The applicant had to have 20-20 vision without the aid of 
prescription lenses. However, Arnold stated it was the last phase, the psychological exam, that 
played the greatest role in the selection process.
257
 Nonetheless, the pressure of the war required 
even Arnold to reassess the entrance requirements.  
Three days after the attack on Pearl Harbor Arnold held a conference with his staff to 
determine what changes to the entrance qualifications would be necessary to meet the recruiting 
goals. After the conference, the following recommendations were recorded in a memorandum for 
Brigadier General Spaatz, Chief of the Air Staff:  
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1) increase the number of aviation cadet examining boards; 2) give 
wide publicity to the recruitment program; 3) decentralize power to 
accept or reject aviation cadet applicants by relegating it [the authority 
to accept or reject applicants] to examining boards and authorizing 
them to enlist qualified applicants immediately upon acceptance; 4) 
authorize, as a substitute for the college requirements, use by the 
examining boards of an examination designed to test intelligence and 
ability to absorb training center instructions; 5) remove the ban on 
married applicants for aviation cadet appointment; 6) enlist all 
successful applicants as aviation cadets and assign them to aircrew 
training; 7) decide the type of training to be given to each individual 
after his arrival at an Air Corps replacement training center. 
258
 
 
According to Mark K. Wells in Courage and Air Warfare: The Allied Aircrew 
Experience in the Second World War, all countries settled on some combination of physical and 
psychological standards in pilot selection. Wells also noted that “Eagerness to fly counted for 
much, as did youth, resolution, tenacity and a willingness to take risks.”259 One prewar instructor 
believed that newly inducted cadets made better pilots than those officers who were already in 
the Army “because they were young, uninhibited, [had] plenty of guts, and [had] no fear.”260 A 
postwar study on the traits found in successful fighter pilots supported both positions. The study 
noted the purpose of the flying schools was to “weed out the incompetent” and insure that the 
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new pilots have “measured up to a certain minimum standard of ability and adaptability.”261 In 
addition, according to the study, “The qualities of the leader are dependability, stamina, quick 
judgment, a ‘cool head,’ aggressiveness in the air, and usually superior flying ability. The most 
important of all these qualities is the ability to make quick judgments and keep a cool head.”262 
In conclusion, the author of the study suggested that “The qualities of the leader are held up as 
valuable attributes of personality. The man who can be cool and nonchalant in combat is admired 
and looked up to.”263 During a 1985 interview, Major General David Miller concurred that as a 
flight instructor he observed that a cadet with a more “laidback” personality made a better 
pilot.
264
  
  Wells also suggests that the Air Corps’ selection process reflected the American “faith 
in the scientific method of evaluating human capabilities.”265 For example, those selected as 
pilots performed well on tests associated with perception and physical reaction, as well the 
ability to predict mechanical movements and to discriminate among various objects.
266
 In 
addition, they showed an interest and knowledge of aviation before entering training.
267
 Not 
surprisingly, the official Army Air Forces postwar study noted that those selected to be 
navigators demonstrated proficiency in areas related to the duties required of that crew position, 
such as an ability to use chart and tables, quick comprehension, strong reasoning ability, and an 
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interest in science and math.
268
 Some appreciated this process. Retired General Noel Parrish 
believed in a “pragmatic” approach to selection and training rather than the “mysticism” that 
held that a pilot either had it or he did not, whatever “it” was.269 
Prior to 1941, once a candidate was accepted as a flying cadet he was generally able to 
select the type of training he wanted.
270
 With the expansion program, that selection became 
subject to the needs of the Air Corps and would be determined in a more bureaucratic manner.
271
 
The test to determine each candidate’s ability was a series of written, psychological and 
psychomotor tests known as the “classification battery.” A group of “expert professionals,” as 
they were called in the official history, was assembled to develop and validate this battery of 
tests.
272
  
According to the history of the Army Air Forces Training Command (AAFTC), the first 
step was a massive analysis of the three key positions, namely, pilot, navigator, and 
bombardier.
273
 According to the official history, the Air Corps collected data from every 
available source to include “pilots, instructors, aviation cadets, flight surgeons, and others 
acquainted with aircrew activities and difficulties; and by making exhaustive studies of the 
ground-school courses which these men had to pass, of the planes they had to fly, and of the 
instruments and controls they had to read and manipulate.”274 The study included exit interviews 
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with 1,000 cadets who had been eliminated from training.
275
 The fact that a study of this 
magnitude had not been carried out before lends credence to LeMay’s assertion that the prewar 
Air Corps was more of a “flying club” than a professional organization. It would also address 
Parrish’s desire for a more “pragmatic” approach to pilot training and selection. 
Once the call went out, the Air Corps did not have a problem finding a sufficient number 
of applicants. In FY 1941 nearly three times as many men, 9,272, applied for pilot training as in 
the proceeding 18 years combined.
276
 However, the next year 60 times that number, over 
550,000, would apply for flight training.
277
 On the other hand, only 26 percent of the 1941 cohort 
was accepted compared with 52 percent of the 1942 cohort.
278
 As Arnold phrased it, the Air 
Corps was going into “mass-production” of flyers.279 The Air Corps’ recruiting manual took it a 
step further and compared the training regimen to an “assembly line.”280  
To oversee this “assembly line” after the war broke out, Arnold established a flying 
training command.
281
 This action suggests that Arnold understood that the scale of training the 
Air Corps was about to begin would require more systematic procedures to insure efficiency in 
every step of the assembly line. This command, under the supervision of a Major General, was to 
coordinate all training activities. Moreover, since the Air Corps’ ground personnel, from 
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mechanics to meteorologists, was going to expand proportionally with the rest of the force, the 
training of these specialties fell under the flying training command to insure uniformity on that 
assembly line, too. Initial studies indicated that in order to meet the new requirements, the three 
training centers would have to graduate “455 single-engine pilots, 808 twin engine pilots, 358 
cadet bombardiers, 100 observers, and 656 gunners every five weeks, and 133 cadet navigators 
every six weeks.”282 The Air Staff decided that it would be impossible for the three existing 
training centers to meet this output and recommended to Arnold that the Air Corps should 
establish twenty-eight primary flight, seven basic flight, and eleven advanced flight training 
centers.
283
 Civilian instructors under the supervision of the Air Corps would operate the primary 
schools. The basic and advanced schools would be operated by the Air Corps. Establishing 
training centers and producing aircraft were matters of money and will; it would take the 
expertise of physicians, psychologists, and experienced airmen to insure the Air Corps was 
selecting the right men.   
The Air Corps reported to the War Department that nearly half of its inductees lacked the 
intelligence required for technical training, and, if this situation was not addressed, its overall 
mission would be at risk.
284
 In order to rectify the problem, the Air Corps sought a ruling from 
the War Department that 75 percent of the Air Corps’ allotment should consist of men who 
scored 100, the median score, or better on their Army General Classification Test (AGCT).
285
 
Despite much debate within the Army over this policy, the Air Corps prevailed and maintained 
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its higher quota of recruits who scored above the median score on the AGCT.
286
 The Air Corps 
was aided in its recruiting efforts by local fraternal and patriotic organizations. While these 
organizations were not officially part of the recruiting effort, they acted out of patriotism and, in 
particular, to the benefit of the Air Corps. For example, the American Legion in New York City 
worked with the local draft boards to procure the names and addresses of the men classified as 1-
A and possessed the necessary educational requirements for flight training.
287
 These lists were 
then passed on to the local Air Corps recruiter.
288
  
In early 1941, thirty days prior to induction, the Selective Service System provided lists 
of qualified registrants to the recruiting headquarters in every state giving Air Corps recruiters 
time to advise these men of the advantages of becoming an Army Air Corps pilots.
289
 In addition, 
the Air Corps was actively seeking seventeen-year olds, encouraging them to join the Air Corps 
Enlisted Reserve, but assuring them that they would not be called up until they turned 
eighteen.
290
 Meanwhile, the Navy was seeking young men with the same qualifications to 
become Naval Aviators. In an effort to undercut the Navy, the Air Corps started a program that 
allowed local boys to form themselves into “flying cadet units” and remain together through 
training.
291
 However, the Air Corps, knowing that up to 50 percent of the boys would not 
complete the training, added a caveat that the candidates would remain together “insofar as 
possible through the later stages of training,” meaning that the Air Corps would do everything 
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possible to keep those in training together; however, if one of them was washed out he would be 
eligible for “other positions in the Air Corps.”292    
 The first gate was the physical examination. According to Arnold, only one in five passed 
the physical examination.
293
 Most of the candidates concurred with Arnold. In their opinion, the 
flight physical was the most stringent part of the selection process.
294
 Nevertheless, perhaps due 
to wartime demands, one cadet recalled that only twenty percent of his group was washed out by 
the end of the physical exam.
295
 Arnold claimed that there was no physical norm or ideal other 
than a “normal, healthy body, plus a normal, alert mind.” He emphasized that it was not 
necessarily the “athletic” type that the Air Corps was looking for “since the flying type is 
possessed of a particularly fine coordination of mind and muscle.”296 However, Arnold went on 
to say that “Few boys who are effeminate or unmanly get called.”297 Exactly who would 
determine who was “unmanly,” or how this was to be done, was not clear but was most likely up 
to the opinion of the review board.
298
  
Following the physical examination, the candidates faced a board of experienced flyers 
for a very subjective review. Arnold placed great faith in the abilities of these board members to 
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discern those qualified to be pilots. This was so much the case that he recalled one “old flying 
instructor” claiming, “I can observe a boy as he drives a car, plays tennis, or even as he walks 
across the street, and tell you whether he will make a flier!”299 At one point, the Air Corps briefly 
experimented with using the Merton Method of analyzing facial features to assess character to 
classify pilots.
300
 The Chief of the Air Corps allowed the Merton Method to be tested on one 
flight class in late 1939. The 40 cadets were examined by a Mr. Howard N. Cappel and, using the 
Merton Method, he would determine which cadets possessed the character traits to be a pilot. 
None of the cadets were eliminated based on Mr. Cappel’s assessment. However, the cadets were 
tracked through their training and, after graduation, a final report was issued to the Chief of the 
Air Corps. The findings included the following: 
2. It will be noted that of six selected as unsuitable by Mr. Cappel [the 
examining official], three were actually eliminated, of four placed on the 
fence, two were actually eliminated, and of three selected as not likely to 
qualify, none were eliminated. Eleven students were eliminated for failure 
in flying. 
3. The results obtained indicate that the test is definitely of no value as far 
better results have been obtained at the Air Corps Training Center.
301
 
 
Nonetheless, the scale of the number of cadets required for the war meant that changes would 
have to be made, even if not approved officially.
302
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Whatever the official policy, many times the physical requirements were reduced in 
practice. For example, John Comer had been rejected by the Air Corps before the war for 
defective depth perception. When he volunteered in 1941, the examining officer told him that his 
results were “close enough” and he was accepted into aerial gunner training.303 In another 
instance, a prospect was found to be five pounds under weight. The surgeon suggested that the 
young man eat five pounds of bananas and come right back.
304
 After gorging on bananas, the 
candidate passed the physical and was soon on his way to the classification center for more 
testing. 
Having cleared the hurdle of the physical, the candidate moved on to the Army Air 
Forces Qualification Examination. The qualification exam was instituted on 15 January 1942 to 
replace the requirement of two years of college study.
305
 This requirement came into effect in 
1927; before that, an applicant needed to be only a high school graduate.
306
 The education 
requirement had been an effective tool for screening and managing the number and quality of 
aircrew training candidates prior to the war.
307
 In one instance, the college requirement had an 
interesting effect. The requirement for two years of college meant that an even more elite group 
was being selected from among African-Americans. Roscoe Brown a Tuskegee pilot, recalled, 
“The Tuskegee Airmen were probably the most talented group of African-American men ever 
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brought together in one place.”308 Nonetheless, the number of men, of any race, who could meet 
that standard, would not have been sufficient to fill the rapidly expanding Air Corps. In order to 
recruit enough candidates, the requirement could be waved with an acceptable score on the 
qualification exam.  
The Qualification Exam was constructed using three techniques: 1) job analysis, 2) 
surveying experienced pilots, bombardiers, and navigators, and 3) correlation studies, regression 
procedures, and factorial analyses.
309
 The questions on the Qualification Exam were based on 
actual training manuals and thus on the skills that would be needed by the aircrews.
310
 The intent 
was to create a situation for the applicant to answer practical questions at his own pace.
311
 The 
first exam consisted of the following areas: 
I. General vocabulary 
II. Reading comprehension 
III. Practical judgment 
IV. Mathematics 
V. Contemporary affairs in aviation and the war 
VI. Mechanical comprehension 
 
The qualifying test judged the applicant’s ability to comprehend directions, and to follow 
instructions, comprehension of reading and mathematics, knowledge of principles for operating 
aircraft, problem-solving abilities, and, finally, leadership potential. As one candidate, in a slight 
understatement, reported, it was “[q]uite an order for a paper and pencil test, but it worked.”312 In 
other words, based on his observations, the test did a good job of selecting the best candidates for 
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flight training. According to another candidate, Eugene Fletcher, after the qualification and 
physical examinations, the applicants waited an additional three weeks for the results.
313
 Two of 
those weeks were spent in quarantine because one of the cadets had contacted red measles.
314
 
Fletcher recalled that those not selected for flight training were classified for various ground 
duties such as photography, meteorology, and communications; and some were even reclassified 
as enlisted personnel and became mechanics.
315
 
However, the exam itself came under scrutiny from the Chief of the Air Staff. In 
November 1941, Brigadier General Carl Spaatz expressed his belief that the Amy Air Forces
316
 
would have to change its testing methods.
317
 He believed that the education requirement was 
“archaic” and placed "too much emphasis on formal education which may mean nothing and . . . 
no emphasis on native intelligence which may mean everything."
318
 He directed that the 
examination be structured in order to find "such youth of the country as may not have had a full 
two years of formal education at college, but whose intelligence and background (training, 
experience and otherwise) indicate that they can meet the requirements of a pilot officer in the 
Air Forces."
319
 In addition, many newspapers, such as the New York Daily News, ran editorials 
questioning whether the two years of college ensured that trainees would have the skills needed 
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by a combat pilot.
320
 Many in the Army Air Forces were of the same opinion. David V. Miller, a 
flying instructor, did not rate education as an indicator of aptitude for flying and singled out 
Chuck Yeager as an example of a talented pilot the Army Air Forces would have lost just 
because he did not meet the educational requirements.
321
 However, he did believe that 
intelligence was essential along with a good memory.
322
  
Regardless of perceived or real shortcomings, the Army Air Forces determined the 
qualification examination to be an effective screening tool. For example, the examiners 
discovered correlation between the reading comprehension score and the success or failure of a 
cadet in pilot training.
323
 The higher the score, the more likely the cadet was to complete the 
training and earn his wings. After several iterations, in order to verify the validity of the test, an 
entire group was permitted to continue on to flight training regardless of the individual score on 
the qualification examination.
324
 Only 11 percent of those who failed the exam went on to 
complete flight training compared with nearly 35 percent of those who passed the exam.
325
 
Nonetheless, the Army Air Forces was constantly trying to refine the accuracy of the test, and the 
exam went through seventeen revisions between January 1942 and the end of the war.
326
 As a 
1947 study put it, “Broadly speaking, the major function of the Qualifying Examination was to 
select men sufficiently literate to become officers and sufficiently endowed with certain aptitudes 
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to graduate from flying training, especially flying training.”327 Over one million men took the 
qualification exam and nearly one third failed.
328
 
However, as always, there were exceptions. An airline pilot could receive a reserve 
commission without undergoing any Army Air Forces training if he had 400 hours of flight time, 
passed the physical examination, demonstrated flying proficiency, and passed a written test.
329
 
West Point cadets were a special case. Any cadet who requested flight training and could pass 
the physical examination was accepted into the program.
330
 Initially, these West Point cadets 
fared poorly compared with the Aviation Cadets. The remedy was to administer the qualification 
exam to West Point cadets as well and accept only those who made a passing grade. From that 
point on the West Point cadets’ success was on a par with the aviation cadets. 331 The result was 
also an unintended validation of the qualification examination as a predictor of success in flight 
training. Nonetheless, one instructor recalled having a low opinion of the West Point graduates 
because “They weren’t quite as responsive [to the flight instructors orders].”332 However, he was 
quick to add that he did not perceive any bias among the instructors towards the West Point 
cadets.
333
 A final exception was made for exceptionally gifted enlisted personnel. Chuck Yeager 
                                                 
327
  Davis, The AAF Qualifying Examination, 3. 
328
  Ibid. 
329
  Maurer, Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939, 432. 
330
  United States Army Air Forces, Office of the Air Surgeon, Stanines: Selection and Classification for Air Crew 
Duty, [58], 36. 
331
  Ibid., 38-39. 
332
  Miller, interview by James C. Hasdorff, 13. 
333
  Ibid., 13. 
66 
 
was probably the most famous and successful beneficiary of this program. He originally joined 
as a mechanic, but he learned to fly through the “Flying Sergeants” program.334  
After meeting the minimum requirements, aircrew candidates reported to classification 
centers for an average of three more weeks of testing.
335
 They would also face more cuts; 15 
percent would be eliminated for physical or other deficiencies.
336
 It was also at the classification 
center that the candidates learned whether they would go on to pilot, navigator, or bombardier 
training. Between the testing and waiting, the stress was hard on the candidates and the 
classification centers went out of their way to reassure the candidates why the process was 
necessary. They were also assured that the process was a means of protecting the interests of the 
trainees themselves as well as those of the government.
337
 However, the cadets were cautioned 
that all parts of the test, including the psychological examination, were critical to their ultimate 
classification.
338
  
The purpose of the Aircrew Classification Battery, as opposed to the Qualification 
Examination, was to differentiate among men best suited for training as pilots, bombardiers, 
navigators, and gunners.
339
 It was, in effect, designed to test aptitude for crew positions. For 
example, the official history of the selection program noted that an applicant who was “careful, 
accurate, and mathematically inclined might make an excellent navigator but fail to make the 
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grade as a pilot.”340 The components of this battery were a written exam, a psychomotor test, and 
a psychological evaluation.  
In Summer 1941, the medical division of the Army Air Forces established an 
experimental program to develop psychological testing instruments that could be used to screen 
candidates for the desired characteristics.
341
 The results of this experiment would become part of 
the Aircrew Classification Battery. This experimental test was administered to cadets at the 
replacement centers in order to collect data on the students and to improve the content of the 
psychological test before it was accepted for use on all applicants.
342
 The purpose of this 
experimental testing was the “development of means [written, verbal, and psychomotor tests] for 
measuring those aptitudes, special abilities, and psychological characteristics associated with 
subsequent success or failure of cadets in flight training.”343 A 1943 bulletin about psychology 
noted that after each class completed training a thorough analysis of the test instrument was 
conducted to “determine which tests should be retained as predictive devices for the selection 
and classification of future classes.”344 Based on this limited testing, on 8 December 1941, 
Arnold directed the medical division to begin using these new testing procedures — the written, 
verbal, and psychomotor tests — to screen candidates.345 Not all of the tests had been validated, 
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but the medical officers believed that enough data had been collected to “permit early conversion 
from a peacetime and experimental project to a wartime classification system.”346  
The psychomotor test, according to the official history, “sought to measure such 
characteristics as steadiness, balance and equilibrium, reaction time, and ability to think clearly 
and read directions under conditions of confusion.”347 The testing involved jigsaw puzzles and 
various mechanical devices that were manufactured for the sole purpose of carrying out this 
testing.
348
 However, delays in the production of psychomotor testing equipment along with the 
very large number of men to be tested forced many classification centers to improvise what 
historian Mark Wells later called “locally devised tests of questionable value.”349 Moreover, 
some candidates doubted the efficacy of at least a few of these locally generated stopgaps.  
In recounting his experience as an aviation cadet in Washout, Charles Watry goes into 
detail about one particular test. In the test, he was told to hold a pencil-thin rod inside a hole in a 
metal plate without touching the sides of the hole. Unfortunately, there was a universal joint in 
the middle of the rod that caused the rod to twist and bend making it impossible to hold the rod 
without touching the sides. Whenever the rod touched the side, it would complete a circuit and a 
green light would come on. Watry recalled that the lights were positioned so that the cadet was 
aware of how many errors he had made.
350
 The examiner then tallied the number of times the 
light came on for a final score and sent the cadet on to the next, in Watry’s words, “demonic 
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psychomotor test.”351 Watry noted that if the test itself was not stressful enough, the examiners 
induced their own form of stress. As Watry recalled, one of the examiners was constantly 
berating, cajoling, or harassing the cadet throughout the test.
352
  
On the other hand, the examiner was not always an expert and in some instances had no 
more experience that the candidates. These examiners were often hard pressed to process the 
number of candidates coming through the classification centers. One examiner, Private A. Jack 
Jernigan, was pulled from his basic training class and became a psychomotor test administrator 
because he had a bachelor’s degree in education.353 Jernigan was assigned to the testing unit on a 
Tuesday and was expected to begin administering the test on Friday. By his own admission, he 
did not fully understand the tests, but he dutifully administered them.
354
 In addition, at times he 
felt overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task. Jernigan recalled testing, on average, over five 
hundred men every day.
355
 During a five-week period in late 1943, nearly 14,000 enlisted men 
were administered the psychomotor exam at the testing center in Miami.
356
 Of the 14,000 men 
tested, nearly 6,000 were disqualified or failed some portion of the exam.
357
 The number and 
pace apparently took its toll on Jernigan himself. In a letter home he lamented, “I’m tired of 
sitting here seeing these young kids come through preparing to fight.”358  Nonetheless, he 
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pragmatically concluded, “I would like to fight, but I would hate to be killed. Guess I will stay 
here.”359 
After the physical exam, the psychological evaluation was the most critical factor in 
determining the suitability of an applicant. Approximately 10–15 percent of cadets failed the 
psychiatric interview.
360
 According to Arnold, the psychological exam was to determine if the 
“bewildered applicant” possessed a “normal, healthy mind, reflexes, aspirations, and 
inhibitions.”361 The applicant was asked a series of questions about his family history and he had 
to “know the history of each [family member] from birth to the present time.”362 A medical 
examiner summed up the purpose of the psychological evaluation this way: “We must know that 
any applicant will develop into the type of man we would like to associate with for the remainder 
of our military service as brother officers.”363 Moreover, in his official report to the Secretary of 
War, Arnold paid tribute to the program: 
The Aviation Psychology program paid off in time, lives, and money 
saved, and through its selection of the raw material has aided in the 
establishment of an effective combat air force. This has been done at a 
total cost of less than $5 per candidate tested.
364
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However, the official medical history of the US Army in World War Two concluded that 
the psychiatric testing could best be labeled “intuitive and haphazard.”365 
 Results from the Aircrew Classification Battery were weighted and combined in a 
manner to produce composite aptitude ratings.
366
 These were grouped into three categories 
designed to predict graduation or elimination from pilot, bombardier, or navigator training.
367
 
The test was accurate enough to determine the potential for success by score. An applicant who 
scored a nine on the test had only a four percent chance of washing out.
368
 On the other hand, an 
applicant who scored a one had a 77 percent chance of washing out.
369
 The scores became 
known as the “stanines,” a contraction of the words “Standard nine.”370 This score was very 
important to the Air Force as well as to the individual.  
Those who did not score well on the Aircrew Classification Battery were considered the 
“poorest investments” as aircrew. Based on their stanine scores these individuals were still 
considered assets to the Army Air Forces and were selected for other categories, such as 
mechanics, where the chances of “a good return on the investment were greater.”371 The scores 
also indicated a strong relationship between interest and success among pilot, bombardier, and 
navigator candidates.
372
 However, at times, the needs of the Army Air Forces came first and 
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some cadets whose stanine scores indicated that they would have been best suited for navigator 
or bombardier training were assigned to pilot training.
373
 Not surprisingly, they were eliminated 
from flight training at twice the rate of those whose scores indicated they were best suited for 
pilot training.
374
  
Even in operational training, the stanine continued to be a predictor of success and those 
with higher scores went on to be airplane commanders at disproportionately higher rates than 
those who had lower scores.
375
 However, data from the field indicated that performance there 
correlated less with predicted ability and more with the pilot’s passion for flying at the job at 
hand.
376
 The stanine score was also an indicator of a propensity for “pilot error” accidents. The 
higher the stanine score, the less likely a pilot would be involved in an accident attributable to 
“pilot error.”377 The study also indicated that the higher stanine scores translated into better 
gunnery scores as well.
378
  
By raising or lowering the minimum stanine score for each crew position, the Army Air 
Force could adjust the supply of aircrew and “meet the needs of the moment,” according to the 
official history.
379
 Early in the war, when the need for aircrews was critical, the minimum scores 
were lower. For example, in 1942, the minimum score for acceptance into pilot or bombardier 
training was three, but after 1944, when the need was less severe, the minimum score was raised 
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to six and in 1945 it was raised to eight for bombardiers.
380
 Prior to 1943, there were three other 
factors in aircrew training assignments; the priorities were aptitude, individual preference, and 
availability.
381
 After 1943, with smaller quotas to fill, the priority shifted to availability, aptitude, 
and individual preference.
382
  
On the other hand, reports from the field indicated that, at times, the screening might 
have been less than successful. In sixty individual cases studied by the Eighth Air Force medical 
staff, twenty were categorized as “psychological failures” before they flew only a single 
mission.
383
 The report went on to rebuke these individuals: “…it can be stated that these men 
were not highly motivated with regard to the war. These men let the instinct of self-preservation 
outweigh their sense of duty and by means of symptoms made a separate peace with the 
enemy.”384 In one example, it was an experienced pilot with 2,300 flying hours and had spent 
time as an instructor in the Royal Canadian Air Force before the United States entered the war. 
Nonetheless, he “broke” before his first mission. As noted in an Eighth Air Force report: 
Captain, Pilot, B-17. Chief complaint: “Scared to death.” The officer 
states that he never had any particular trouble until the time came for 
his first combat mission. On being alerted for this mission, he states 
that he became scared and frightened, began to tremble, felt like 
running away to hide, and he states that he realized the entire trouble 
was due to fear of being killed . . . No other family history of insanity 
or nervous breakdown . . . He stated that he realized this might be 
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considered as a court martial offense, but that he could not force 
himself to go on a combat mission and was ready to accept any 
consequences . . . .
385
 
 
The surgeon further noted that “No other . . . history of mental illness in his family.” The 
implication being that the Captain’s actions were indicative of some mental illness. This case 
was disposed of as follows:  
. . . Fear Reaction . . . may be considered as a “predisposed” individual. 
This officer was returned to his unit by the Central Medical Board as fit 
for full flying duties . . . the officer resigned his commission for the 
good of the service when he met the Theater Reclassification Board.
386
 
 
The Army Air Forces referred to this condition as “operational fatigue.”387 In evaluating an 
airman’s predisposition to succumb to operational fatigue, one of the indicators the Eighth Air 
Force surgeons determined was fear of physical dangers evidenced by “failure to participate in 
tough or ‘blood’ sports.”388  
What seems to have been the biggest difference in stress between those pilots in training 
and those engaged in combat operations was the focus of their fear. The memoirs of the trainees 
suggest that fear of being eliminated that was their overriding concern. Once in theater the fear 
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shifted to survival. There it affected each individual differently. A 1944 study of the Eighth Air 
Force’s first year in combat indicated three phases when fear and stress set in. For some the fear 
was greatest after arriving at their base and realizing that they were replacing men who had been 
lost in combat. The next was during the first five missions when the crew would have 
experienced most, if not all, of the hazards of flying bombing missions over Germany. For 
example after his fifth mission a navigator began showing signs of “operational fatigue.” 
Second Lieutenant, 412 Bombardment Squadron. This 29-year-old 
navigator had five combat missions. He was performing satisfactorily 
until he was wounded in the right arm when his plane was badly 
damaged on the fifth mission. He was hospitalized for three weeks, 
developed marked tension symptoms, was unable to perform his duties 
on subsequent practice missions and asked to be grounded. He was 
found to be tense, depressed and to show evidence of weight loss. He 
had an excellent record, went to college for two years, held good jobs, 
was well motivated towards flying and did well as a navigator.
389
 
 
The Lieutenant was eventually was dismissed from the service with an “other than honorable” 
discharge.
390
 The last phase was referred to as “operational fatigue” and typically set in between 
the twelfth and sixteenth missions.
391
  
The report concluded: “It seems doubtful if the natural stress of flying training and 
peacetime flying or if any artificial set of tests can be relied upon to eliminate the men who will 
have insufficient emotional tolerance to combat flying.”392 However, the Eighth Air Force 
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surgeons made two recommendations to weed out those unfit for combat flying before they 
began flight training. The first was to train all prospective candidates as air gunners and then 
deploy them to theater for five missions.
393
 Those who performed well would be sent back to the 
states for flight training.
394
 The other was to have the candidates make five parachute jumps to 
test their physical courage.
395
 However, the surgeons readily admitted that neither of these 
recommendations was practical nor effective.
396
  
 Despite the fact that these men— the pilots, navigators, bombardiers, and air gunners— 
had broken down mentally under the rigors of combat, the Eighth Air Force surgeons concluded 
that “They are usually vigorous, aggressive, persistent, and healthy in body.”397 In other words, 
the Army Air Forces had gotten exactly what it had screened for. What it could not predict was 
the reaction of these young men to the stresses of combat. Nor could this be replicated in 
training.
398
 
Before going on to flight training the candidate had undergone a trying experience during 
the qualification and classification process. It was an experience that did not exist before the war 
and one that only came about after the Army Air Forces staff determined that it needed a more 
effective and scientific method for selecting aircrews. In the end, the selection process worked 
very well. In 1942, John Steinbeck was commissioned by the Army Air Forces to write a book 
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on flight training, Bombs Away: The Story of a Bomber Team. In the book, Steinbeck noted that 
the Army Air Forces was recruiting “the best physical and mental specimens the country 
produces.”399 However, this was only the beginning, and the new cadet faced ever-increasing 
challenges during the next four phases of flight training. These challenges would not only test his 
ability but at times could cost him his life.  
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Chapter 4 - Training the Aircrews 
 
A fighter pilot is a combination of a mathematician and an athlete, a scientist and 
a sharpshooter. He’s got to know what goes on inside his plane. The heart of his 
fighter is steel and copper; its bloodstream is gas and oil. But its brain is the man 
who flies it.
400
 
   Captain Ronald Reagan, Wings for this Man 
 
Expediency dictated that peacetime perfection must give way to minimum 
standards of proficiency….401 
   Army Air Forces Historical Study, No. 18 
 
 Having selected the” best physical and mental specimens,” the Air Corps had to train 
these men for combat. The trade-off was to balance the rigors and structure necessary for 
precision flying with the personality types which the Air Corps had pursued. In general, as 
Rebecca Cameron note in Training to Fly, these men “tended to be cocky, individualistic, high-
spirited young men exhilarated by the drama and show.”402 However, the purpose of military 
training is to produce competent soldiers or, in this case, airmen, and this kind of training does 
not necessarily contain much “drama and show.” A postwar study on the adjustment of recruits 
to military life concluded: “The military service has reduced every phase of the training process 
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to its simplest elements and then standardized them.”403 The intent of this simplification was that 
the soldier could easily learn the elements of his technical skill and, even more importantly, so 
that the soldier could “then act in concert with others in its application.”404 Almost every phase 
of training during World War Two emphasized the importance of teamwork. According to the 
previously mentioned postwar study, if the “slowest learner cannot keep up with the group in the 
training process [,] he is soon eliminated as being inapt, incapable, or maladjusted.”405 However, 
as noted in the previous chapter, the Air Corps, through its rigorous selection process, believed it 
had eliminated the “inapt, incapable, or maladjusted” by the time the new cadets began training. 
Nonetheless, these “cocky, individualistic, high-spirited young men” were presented with 
a structured sequential method of instruction that had served the Air Corps well throughout the 
interwar period. The instructor would explain a maneuver, and then demonstrate it. Then the 
student would execute it while the instructor observed. After observing the student execute the 
maneuver to his satisfaction, the instructor would then let the student practice on his own.
406
 
Throughout the process, there would be periodic checks by supervisors and a final check at the 
end of the stage that “tested the ability of the student to operate the airplane under all required 
conditions.”407 However, Arnold cautioned that there was a brief period in flight training when a 
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cadet “becomes overconfident and knows more about flying than he will ever know again.”408 
Arnold considered this the most dangerous period in a pilot’s career, but was optimistic because 
“A crash or near crash usually brings him back to normal….”409 Perhaps this was an acceptable 
attitude during peacetime, but how many crashes to bring a pilot “back to normal” could the Air 
Corps afford when it had to produce a large number of pilots in a short amount of time? More 
importantly, could the Air Corps maintain that attitude when the nation had called for thousands 
of sons, brothers, and husbands to undergo flight training?   
In 1936, the program of instruction for flight training called for eight months in primary 
flight training followed by four months in advanced training. At the end of one year, the cadet 
would have accumulated 250 hours of flight time.
410
 In 1935, the Chief of Training and 
Operations, Lieutenant Colonel Carl Spaatz, recommended that the length of training be 
extended to sixteen months in order to produce a well-rounded pilot.
411
 From there he would 
undergo another year of training with a tactical squadron where he would acquire another 250–
300 hours of flight time to include flying at night and in inclement weather.
412
 Following this 
second year, if his squadron commander recommended him, the cadet would be offered a reserve 
commission and another year on active duty.
413
 Arnold referred to the third year of training as 
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the “postgraduate phase.”414 Arnold also believed that the two-year training program had both 
“educational and cultural value.”415 A postwar study emphasized the point about culture, noting 
that “The new member [of the squadron] must learn the elaborate terminology of flying and 
combat. Without this vocabulary one is not a bona fide member of the group.”416 Arnold went on 
to conclude: “[T]hose who survive [flight training] for two years emerge men.”417 With the 
expansion of the program in 1939, the Air Corps faced the problem of how to train and prepare 
pilots to “emerge [as] men” in a much shorter period. 
A training directive for 1939–1940 laid out the requirements for the expansion program. 
First priority was given to individual and specialized training over the training of collective 
units.
418
 General Frank Andrews, the commander of the General Headquarters Army Air Forces 
(GHQAAF), emphasized the priorities in training in late 1939 when he stated: “At this phase of 
the Air Corps expansion, unit tactical training has had to give precedence to individual training 
of pilots and mechanics. As soon as our training resources permit, we will return the emphasis to 
tactical combat training.”419 In addition, despite the loss of life and aircraft due to a lack 
proficiency in navigation and in flying in inclement weather just a few years earlier during the 
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airmail crisis, time for both was reduced “to that required to maintain individual proficiency.”420 
Even Arnold noted the difficulty in mastering flying by instruments. He stated that it took “from 
fifteen to thirty hours of instruction to impart to an old and well trained flier the essentials of this 
new method.”421 In addition, the length of the entire process of flight training was shortened to 
nine months from the previous twelve.
422
 While all phases of training were reduced, most of the 
cuts came from basic military training and ground school flight training.
423
 Nonetheless, 
eventually five hours were cut from primary flight training, the training phase that was the 
cadet’s first exposure to flying an airplane.424 More telling was the fact that initially the hours cut 
from both basic (the training phase after primary) and advanced flight training came from cross-
country navigation.
425
 These hours would be added back to the curriculum after reports from the 
field indicated that the pilots coming out of flight school were deficient in this skill. 
After 1 July 1939, new classes were entering training every six weeks to begin the new 
twelve-week primary course.
426
 However, as President Roosevelt kept increasing aircraft 
production and the size of the Air Corps, the training base had to reduce the training time if the 
production of aircrews was to keep up with the production of aircraft. In May 1940, the primary 
flight-training course was reduced to ten weeks and after America entered the war it was reduced 
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to nine weeks.
427
 Despite the cuts in total time for training, the number of flight hours required 
for graduation never dropped below 60.
428
 Instead, the time was taken from ground school. The 
number of hours devoted to ground school went from 225 in 1939 to 84 in mid-1942.
429
 At a 
later point in the war, in an effort to trim more time from the training program, the Army Air 
Force took graduates from the Civilian Pilot Training Program (CPTP) and advanced them to 
basic flight training, skipping primary. The CPTP was a New Deal program that was intended to 
boost the light aviation industry by encouraging young men and women to learn to fly. As an 
aviation cadet and a future general, David V. Miller was part of that experiment. In an interview 
in 1974, he stated that he believed that it had been a mistake for his class to skip primary 
training, and he also thought this had been the reason why 41 of his class of 52 had been washed 
out of basic flight training. What they had missed, in Miller’s opinion, was the enculturation 
process that took place during primary flight training.
430
 
It should be noted that within a two-year period, 1939-1941, the Air Corps expanded 
from two training facilities to 45; the number of available training aircraft then increased from 
400 to 2,700 at these facilities before the manufacturing base could produce more aircraft; and, 
in addition, the training personnel increased from 3,300 to 37,000.
431
 Moreover, the Air Corps 
expanded the scope of the training program. For example, for most of the interwar period, the 
training of bombardiers, navigators, and gunners had been the responsibility of the tactical 
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units.
432
 As part of the expansion program, Air Corps established specialized schools to teach 
these necessary skills.
433
 In addition, the Air Corps began training pilots from other countries. As 
the official history notes, “The Training and Operations Division had to provide additional 
facilities, equipment, and personnel for the British pilot-training program, which was itself four 
times the size of the entire Air Corps pilot-training program prior to 1939.”434 By 1942, to 
accommodate this influx of personnel, foreign and domestic, the Army Air Forces had eight new 
flying schools, two gunnery schools, and five cadet reception stations in operation.
435
 
In 1941, in a personal letter to the chief of the training division, the commander of 
Moffett Field bemoaned the fact that flight training had been reduced to 200 hours from the 
previous 325.
436
 However, beyond his concern over the reduction in training hours, he was more 
concerned that the Air Corps was not going to produce an equally proficient pilot or military 
officer in 30 weeks in what took a full year before the expansion program.
437
 The official history 
freely admits that under “wartime pressure to produce pilots” military training got short shrift.438 
One student also believed the accelerated pace of training deprived the Air Corps of some very 
capable pilots. The student concluded: “The reality of flight training in wartime was that some 
cadets who could have been taught to be perfectly competent pilots, if the instructors had 
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possessed the luxury of time to get through to them, were not afforded the chance.”439 One cadet 
undergoing training for the Women AirForce Service Pilots (WASP) program lamented, as late 
as 1944, that her class was being rushed through instrument training in four weeks rather than the 
standard five.
440
 The WASPs were established in August 1943 when the Army Air Force 
combined the Women’s Auxiliary Ferrying Squadron (WAFS) and the Women’s Flying Training 
Detachment (WFTD) into the new command.  
Another issue was the balance between making the cadets not only pilots but also Army 
officers. According to Craven and Cate in the official history of the Army Air Forces (AAF) in 
World War Two, the civilian-operated primary schools were not prepared to develop “rigid 
discipline,” and there was not time for military training during more advanced stages of flight 
training.
441
 In another instance, in late 1942, the commander of one preflight training center 
recommended that the schools reduce the emphasis on classroom instruction in favor of more 
military training. He was concerned about the “fighting spirit” of the cadets and suggested that 
bayonet training might be warranted to instill the spirit that they would need for combat.
442
 His 
suggestion did not bear fruit. Nevertheless, the level and intensity of physical training increased 
through all phases of training.
443
 As one instructor noted about physical training, “We could do 
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most anything with the cadets as long as we didn’t kill them and it’s a wonder we didn’t kill 
some in the beginning.”444 On the other hand, others believed that classroom instruction on 
flying related subjects should be expanded in order to produce a better pilot. In the crucible of 
combat, it quickly became apparent that skill as a pilot trumped military bearing; and classroom 
subjects such as sending and receiving code and navigation were expanded.
445
 
Nonetheless, there were problems to be worked out before the Air Corps could meet the 
goals of the expansion program. The two biggest hurdles the Air Corps faced were, first, finding 
enough qualified instructors and, second, finding enough airfields for training. The solution to 
the first problem was addressed by the Air Corps; the second was solved by the Civilian Pilot 
Training Program (CPTP).
446
  
As a New Deal program, the CPTP was presented by the Roosevelt administration to 
Congress not only as a means to stimulate the light aircraft industry; it would also benefit the 
Army and Navy by providing a group of partially trained pilots in the event of mobilization.
447
 
The director of the CPTP acknowledged that the purpose of the program was “To encourage and 
develop civil aeronautics in accord with the powers bestowed on the Civil Aeronautics 
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Administration (CAA) by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, and to select and train, in a 
preliminary way, civilian pilots who would be quickly available for national defense in an 
emergency.”448 The program consisted of 45 hours of ground instruction on regulations, 
navigation, and meteorology.
449
 In addition, each student received 50 hours of flight training in a 
light civilian general aviation aircraft, such as the Piper Cub.
450
 After the CPTP schools took 
over responsibly for primary flight training, they would use the same aircraft as the Army and 
Navy. However, the Army and Navy were not necessarily comfortable with turning their training 
over to civilians. When it came to flight training, Arnold cautioned: “There is no economy in 
employing poorly trained pilots….”451 For its part, the Air Corps insisted that, at a minimum, the 
CPTP applicants pass the same physical exam as the regular Air Corps cadets. The CPTP schools 
themselves were under constant scrutiny from the Air Corps. In any week, a school could be 
visited by inspectors from four different sections of the Air Corps staff and occasionally would 
see representatives from all four in the same week.
452
 While the Air Corps and the Navy were 
apprehensive about the program, the vast majority of Americans supported it; for example, a 
1939 Gallup Poll indicated that 87 percent of respondents approved of the program.
453
 The 
graduates, while appreciative of the opportunity to learn to fly, took a pragmatic approach to the 
ultimate benefit of the program. For instance, one graduate of the Tuskegee program noted that 
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being a graduate of the CPTP did not make one an Army pilot; it only meant the new pilot could 
fly light planes.
454
 
On 12 December 1941, the CPTP was renamed the War Time Service (WTS) to reflect 
its new wartime function.
455
 However, in June 1944, with more than enough pilots in training 
and a backlog of those awaiting training, the Army Air Force closed the WTS program. 
Nonetheless, during its five years of existence, the CPTP must be considered an overwhelming 
success.
456
 Even though he had not been an enthusiastic supporter of the program, Arnold paid 
tribute to the contribution of these primary flight schools to the war effort in his annual report to 
the Secretary of the Army in 1944. General Arnold concluded: “we could not possibly have 
trained so many airmen so quickly without these schools.”457 He credited the men trained in the 
WTS as a “valuable pool of personnel.”458 On the other hand, many in the Army Air Force, 
including Arnold, believed that, although the program was useful when the requirement was to 
produce pilots, it was not very good at producing a “well-rounded professional officer.”459 
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Another major obstacle facing the Air Corps was finding enough qualified instructors 
who, even if they could not produce a “well-rounded professional officer,” could at least produce 
a competent pilot. The mass production of pilots was a problem to which the Air Corps had 
given little thought before the war. Prior to the expansion program, the attitude among the pilots 
and senior leaders of the Army Air Force was that teaching did not require any special skills or 
knowledge and every qualified pilot was considered a qualified instructor.
460
 Even so, those 
training to be instructors were given some specialized instruction of their own. However, this 
was usually an informal course taught by the more senior instructors who happened to be at the 
local fields.
461
 In addition, according to the official history, much of the burden for mastering 
subjects in ground school fell to the students, “however imperfect the presentation might be.”462 
This method was viable in the small peacetime Air Corps when the squadron could bring a pilot 
along at his own pace. But it would not work to train the number of pilots required for the war 
effort.   
At the beginning of the expansion program in 1939, the Air Corps followed a policy of 
holding over some of the best new graduates of the advanced phase to be instructors in basic 
flight training.
463
 By 1940, the Air Corps developed a four-week, 140-hour instructor course.
464
 
One instructor assigned to Randolph Field noted: “As we expanded, of course, we began to take 
in graduates of the flying school, and we brought them right back as instructors. They were 
students one day, and the next day they were instructors. We gave them a ‘souped-up’ 
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instructors’ course at Randolph.”465 However, the official history noted that the results were 
mixed because not every pilot assigned to instructor duty, no matter how good a pilot he might 
have been, was well qualified to be an instructor.
466
 In some cases, the power went to their heads. 
For instance, one of the first holdovers, George Spencer Roberts, was placed in charge of the 
following class and introduced himself as, “Aviation Cadet George Spencer Roberts, My friends 
call me ‘Spanky.’ To you I’m ‘Mister Roberts.’ To me you are ‘Dummies.’”467 
In other cases, the instructor was overqualified. More than a few of the contract 
instructors, at the CPTP airfields, had been flying since the early days of aviation and had been 
instructors long before the Air Corps hired them. Now the instructors were asked not only to 
teach a man to fly, but they also had to impart precision to the cadet, something many had never 
considered necessary.
468
 One future instructor, C. V. Glines, recalled an incident during his 
“check-ride” before being certified as an instructor. He asked his check-ride pilot about two 
gauges they had never used, and the check-ride pilot cautioned Glines not to use them because 
they were for “airline pilots.”469 The gauges in question were necessary for flying at night and in 
inclement weather, skills the Air Corps would find essential during the war.  
The air staff was coming to see that instructing and teaching were specialized tasks that 
required specialized skills. According to the official history, “the AAF discovered that it was, of 
necessity, in the teacher-training business as well, since many of those who had been recruited as 
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instructors had to be ‘retooled’ to qualify for teaching the Air Corps curriculum.”470 To address 
this problem the Air Corps established a school for these contract instructors at Randolph Field 
to teach the Air Corps method of instruction.
471
 One instructor credited the establishment of a 
centralized instructor school at Randolph for reducing accidents in twin-engine flight training by 
standardizing instruction procedures.
472
 By the end of the war, the Army Air Force was able to 
procure enough planes and instructors to create a training program that they could take to the 
training airfields to not only check on the instructors but also to demonstrate how to teach.
473
 
Many of the squadron and group commanders, along with many of the pilots, never 
considered ground school important. It was the part of training that was most likely to be cut 
when there was a need to reduce hours in the program of instruction. In fact, a plan was proposed 
to graduate students from primary to basic on a proficiency basis. In other words, a cadet would 
advance as soon as he demonstrated proficiency in key tasks, rather than waiting until he had 
completed the curriculum. The Air Staff recommended to Arnold that the plan not be adopted 
because “all students should be required to complete the entire ground school course of the 
elementary schools.”474 Arnold concurred and cadets continued to graduate as a class. Despite 
the need perceived by Arnold and the Air Staff for all cadets to complete the ground school 
course, there was very little standardization in the curriculum, for each phase, from one school to 
the next, and, in many cases, there was much duplication between phases.
475
 The official history 
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noted that, over the course of the war, these two problems would be corrected when “a 
satisfactory integration was achieved by 1944 through more careful planning of the curriculum 
and frequent conferences between the teaching staffs of the air and ground departments.”476 
During ground school, the cadet learned the “why” and “how” of flight.477For one 
Embry-Riddle contract instructor, ground school went from a “necessary evil,” in his opinion, to 
an important aspect of training.
478
 It was in ground school that the cadet learned the inner 
workings and mechanics of his particular aircraft as well as the theory and principles of flight. 
For example, in primary there were 96 hours devoted to “aero-equipment, navigation, and 
principles of flight.”479 The aero-equipment course was devoted to the workings of the operating 
systems of aircraft in general and the cadet’s aircraft in particular. One the most critical courses 
was the navigation course, which emphasized cross-country flight planning for long-distance 
flights.
480
 Principles of flight covered applied physics with special attention to the aspect of the 
behavior of airplanes in flight.
481
 Most cadets mastered the ground school subjects without much 
trouble, but there was near unanimous agreement among all of the cadets that the most difficult 
part of ground school was learning Morse code.
482
 For their part, the instructors began to notice a 
correlation between academic performance in ground school and flying ability. As one Embry-
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Riddle instructor noted, “one who made poor grades usually did not last long on the flight line, 
his flying reflecting his academic record.”483 On the other hand, a postwar study noted that 
cadets were “seldom eliminated for ground school deficiencies.”484 The study went on to place 
some of the blame on the United States’ education system’s emphasis on the “practical” over the 
intellectual; the author of the study did not elaborate on what was meant by the difference 
between “practical” and “intellectual.”485 
The leaders of the Army Air Force realized that not only were they going to need more 
flight instructors, but also more ground school instructors. The Air Staff determined that these 
ground school courses did not require a rated pilot and turned to professional teachers to make up 
the needed instructors. While the Army Air Force did attract a large number of instructors with 
experience teaching in colleges or universities, the vast majority of them were high school 
teachers.
486
 The official history notes that the instructors were given a two-week course on drill 
and customs and courtesies and then left alone to develop the lessons for their particular ground 
school subject.
487
 In addition, unlike military instructors, they were given no additional duties, 
and so they could focus on teaching and grading.
488
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Professor Alfred Lindesmith, a sociology professor at Indiana University, was recruited 
to be a ground school instructor at the Aviation Cadet Center in San Antonio.
489
 He recalled 
being at a faculty meeting in late 1942 where it was announced that the Army Air Forces was in 
need of experienced teachers for its ground school subjects.
490
 At the meeting, Army Air Forces 
recruiters put on a hard sell. Lindesmith noted: “The recruiting officers conveyed the impression 
that there was a pressing need for persons with academic background, that they would receive 
the usual rewards and recognition, and certainly that they would not be discriminated against.”491 
Lindesmith bitterly recalled that none of these came to pass.
492
 On the other hand, Lindesmith 
and his colleagues were the victims of a recurring problem that the Army Air Forces recruiters 
faced wherever they went. The recruiters were in competition with the Navy for the same 
instructors and the recruiters felt pressured to undercut the Navy. As an Army Air Forces official 
history noted: “Undoubtedly, the men who did the field work, faced with vigorous competition 
[from the Navy], were tempted to make their own proposition somewhat more attractive than the 
facts warranted, particularly in regard to assurances concerning rank and promotions, not to 
mention assignments.”493 
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Nonetheless, Professor Lindesmith, and many others, answered the call. However, in 
many ways these instructors endured the same culture clash as the experienced flight instructors 
as they tried to adapt their teaching skills to a more rigid style of instruction.
494
 For example, at 
one school, instructors were evaluated on “voice, apportionment of time, speed, force, clarity and 
knowledge, discipline and interest, “all things that could be checked by an inspector during a 
classroom visit.”495 Lindesmith, in particular, seemed to be quite bitter over his treatment by the 
Army. He stated that a ground school instructor was assessed not so much on his teaching but on 
his ability as a “drill instructor.”496 Moreover, he recalled a general lack of respect if not outright 
contempt for himself and his peers.
497
 Even the official history noted the growing discontent 
among the instructors, especially among the later hires whose qualifications, in many cases, were 
superior to those of the persons for whom they were working.
498
 
The cadets themselves endured the training and indoctrination process in order to win 
their wings. Eugene Fletcher took flight training through the Martin School of Flying as part of 
the CPTP at Whitman College in Washington State.
499
While not happy about the harassment he 
received from his tactical officer, who was an active duty officer, he suggested that it allowed 
everyone to assess the “mettle of their peers.”500 Another cadet, Gordon Bennett Robertson, had 
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a similar opinion about the purpose of the harassment. He commented that the instructors were 
hard on the cadets, but it was accepted by the cadets because they understood that the Air Corps 
had to eliminate those who could not take the pressure “physically or psychologically.”501 For his 
part, Fletcher used the harassment to strengthen his resolve to finish the course, thinking to 
himself, “Degrade me all you want, I might be thrown out or wash out but I will never resign.”502 
On the other hand, Fletcher was enamored of the idea of flying. He admitted, after the war, that 
he had not given much thought to the fact that his job was going to be killing, not until Eddie 
Rickenbacker gave a speech to his class. Rickenbacker admitted to Fletcher’s class that he 
envied them and encouraged them “to kill, to have no pity.”503 
Those who were already involved in killing without pity were not always pleased with 
the pilots produced by the flight schools. Some were concerned with the level of training the 
cadets were receiving and others wanted the training to be theater-specific. However, the Air 
Corps considered the latter impractical given the global nature of the war.
504
 During the early 
years of the war, the perception of many commanders, such as Colonels Leon Johnson and Curtis 
LeMay, was that the groups and squadrons were getting un-trained or at best undertrained pilots 
and crews.
505
 Retired General David Burchinal commented on the “90 day wonders” as he called 
them. In Burchinal’s opinion, these “90 day wonders” went through the three phases of training, 
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earned their wings, and then it was “on your way.”506 As he recalled, ideally, it took 3000 hours 
flying time before a pilot qualified as a B-17 command pilot.
507
 LeMay claimed that he received 
pilots right from single-engine training with no multi-engine experience.
508
 LeMay was probably 
referring to an occurrence very early in the war when there was shortage of twin-engine aircraft 
and a group of pilots was graduated from advanced twin-engine training having flown only 
single-engine aircraft.
509
 In addition, other reports from the field indicated that the groups and 
squadrons considered that “it was more economical to suffer a few more accidents, including 
fatal ones, and lose a few more aircraft in the United States” than in theater.510 While this may 
have been the opinion from the field, the training base never lost sight of the fact that it had to 
balance the needs of the force with the safety and training of the pilots. Beginning with preflight, 
this balance was always foremost in every phase of training.  
In order to better acculturate the new cadets and to compensate for the lower educational 
requirement for admission into the Air Corps, a preflight phase of training was added. During 
preflight, the cadet learned both about both the Army and about being an officer. Guidance from 
the office of the Chief of the Air Corps directed that this phase of training would consist of 
"physical training, military training, supervised athletics and the complete processing of assigned 
students," as well as "additional instruction and training as may be practicable . . . to further 
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qualify trainees for instruction as pilots, bombardiers, or navigators.”511 The purpose of the four-
week course was to provide basic military indoctrination and to prepare the student for flight 
training.
512
 Fletcher recalled that a typical pre-flight day “consisted of two hours of classes, two 
hours of calisthenics or athletics, four hours of marching, and three hours off for breakfast, 
lunch, and dinner.”513 He added that it was here that he learned basic military training, such as 
the manual of arms, physical training, and guard duty.
514
 
A sample training schedule from 1940, for a four-week course, consisted of the following 
subjects: 
Subjects Hours 
Military courtesy 6 
Articles of War 4 
Personal hygiene and first aid 12 
Wearing of uniform 8 
Alpha and mathematics test 2 
School of the Soldier 127 
Interior guard duty 6 
Government insurance 3 
Miscellaneous 24 
TOTAL 192 
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With sixty percent of the time allocated to the “School of the Soldier,” it is apparent that the 
initial emphasis was on preparing the cadet to be a soldier first.
515
 However, unintentionally, pre-
flight became a screening process for those who were not only qualified to be officers and pilots 
but also had the desire to be both. Eugene Fletcher recalled that four enlisted men requested to be 
returned to their units because “a commission was not worth all the grind and hassle that they 
had been subjected to.”516 He noted that this process was often too much for the married cadets. 
Fifty percent of Fletcher’s preflight class were married. In his memoir, he described talking to 
two married cadets who had asked to be dropped. They told him that they would rather be 
enlisted men with, as they perceived it, regular hours and spend time with their wives. They told 
Fletcher that “[t]hey were tired of quarantine, tired of making love on paper in the form of letters 
to their wives, and tired of the constant hazing, putdowns, and the degrading cadet life.”517 He 
thought that they were crazy and he recalled that they thought the same of him.
518
 
In August 1941, the Chief of the Medical Division recommended that the preflight phase 
be increased to ten weeks in order to give the medical staff time to examine and treat the new 
cadets. The chief was politely told no; his staff would have to make do.
519
 Nonetheless, the 
course was lengthened in March 1942 to accommodate more specialized training for pilots and 
non-pilots or bombardiers and navigators. Non-pilot training placed a “greater emphasis upon 
mathematics, target identification, photography, and meteorology.”520 The instructors also 
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discovered that many of the cadets were deficient in basic math and science skills.
521
 To make up 
for this deficiency, the students spent up to five hours a day on these subjects.
522
 In addition, over 
the course of the war, the trend had been to emphasize the technical aspects of flying rather than 
military training.
523
 This emphasis on the technical side reflected supposed lessons from the First 
World War when the Air Service stressed technical training over military training at its 
mechanics schools, insisting that its personnel receive only enough military training to “permit 
them to move in a military manner from place to place.”524 Moreover, as the Army Air Force 
gained combat experience, the preflight course became more “practical” and the students spent 
more time on exercises such as cross-country flight planning.
525
 The official history concluded 
that this was a “logical response to the increasingly technical nature of air combat.”526 
Although many of the cadets were not thrilled with the ground school part of preflight 
training (after all, they had joined to fly planes — not go to school), they came to realize that 
preflight was another opportunity to “wash out.” Some saw it as a way to put cadets in a 
competitive frame of mind. For example, Eugene Fletcher recalled that there were numerous 
competitions pertaining to academics, drill, and inspections with the top unit receiving a streamer 
for their unit flag.
527
 Most of those who washed out during preflight were eliminated for 
academic, physical, or disciplinary deficiencies.
528
 During the period 1939–1945, the rate of 
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elimination varied from 1 to 15 percent depending on the needs of the AAF.
529
 Not surprisingly, 
by early 1944, with a lower demand for pilots, the standards went up for the remainder of the 
war, and there was a corresponding increase in the washout rate. Charles Watry’s experience was 
typical. He was assigned to Class 44B; classes were numbered by the year and month they would 
graduate, therefore, Class 44B graduated in February 1944. Watry recalled that 787 of the 4,931 
cadets in his class were dropped from the course during preflight training for a failure rate of 
sixteen percent.
530
 
Watry’s class was also part of an experiment that reduced preflight to four weeks. 
Courses such as math, physics, meteorology, and aircraft engines were eliminated, even though 
previous data had indicated the importance of these subjects. However, the AAF was trying to 
reduce training time for any reason; and the justification, for Watry’s class, was that the cadets 
had gone through the college training program and therefore could skip these basic courses.
531
 
This, according to Watry, was fine with him since it reduced the opportunities to wash out.
532
 
Most of the cadets viewed washing out as the ultimate shame. Despite the competition and drive 
to succeed, however, some did not view “washing out” as a crushing blow. In fact, some 
accepted it with a degree of relief. One cadet admitted that he was not a “gung-ho” pilot and had 
volunteered only for the flight pay. He said after the war: “I figured if I wasn’t going to be a 
good pilot, I didn’t want to be out there.”533 
One problem the Air Corps could not always control was the effect of so many men 
living together in confined quarters. There were persistent outbreaks of various diseases and 
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ailments. It is interesting that, in their memoirs, both Eugene Fletcher and Charles Watry 
repeatedly describe being quarantined for maladies such as pinkeye, meningitis, head colds, and 
the flu. What neither of them addressed was that these “quarantines” happened around the time 
they were about to graduate or had just arrived at a new base. Perhaps it was the Army’s way of 
maintaining control of these cadets as they were leaving a base or had just arrived at the next 
phase in their training. For example, during his initial sixteen weeks in the Army, Fletcher had 
received only one twelve-hour and two twenty-four hour passes; and on his arrival at primary 
flight training, his squadron was quarantined for two weeks.
534
 Regardless of the purpose of the 
quarantine, Fletcher’s arrival at primary flight training signaled the beginning of his military 
flight training.    
No one in the Air Corps doubted the importance of the primary phase of flight training. It 
was the cadet’s introduction to flying and was the most critical step in turning the cadets into 
military pilots. Arnold likened primary flight training to that of the “ancient gilds [sic]” 
consisting of an instructor, five students, and an airplane.
535
He added that those who did not 
demonstrate the “necessary degree of confidence and pilot skill are generally dropped from 
further instruction.”536 Arnold stressed that a pilot had to be able to divide his attention among 
many tasks to be an effective pilot. Otherwise, if he is “mentally inelastic…he is not the flying 
type and must be eliminated for his own protection.”537 The commander of Moffett Field was 
more direct in a memorandum to a member of the air staff. He believed, he said, that primary 
flight training was where the Air Corps determined if a pilot had the skills and other attributes to 
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be a competent flyer.
538
 More to the point, he stated that primary flight training was “[t]o 
separate the sheep from the goats.…”539 
Not only was the primary phase the cadet’s introduction to flying, it was also the phase 
where he was most likely to be “washed out.” Of all the phases of flight training, primary had the 
highest elimination rate, averaging 27.5 percent.
540
 According to a history of the CPTP, “The 
figures confirmed that getting through primary training posed the biggest hurdle to attaining 
pilot’s wings. A cadet’s future was most at risk during primary training, when the AAF had the 
least financial investment and when training was the least dangerous.”541 It was at times a harsh 
and unforgiving system. One cadet noted that those who “washed out might have been good 
pilots had they been given a little extra time, but this was wartime and pilots were needed 
immediately. Those who learned the quickest would succeed.”542 Not being privy to the changes 
the Army Air Forces had made to increase eligibility for training, Eugene Fletcher believed that 
eliminating students early in the process was driven, in part, by a shortage of instructors and by 
the Army Air Forces’ effort to lower the number of students to a more manageable level.543 The 
standard student-teacher ratio set by the Army Air Force was one instructor for every five cadets 
and one airplane for every three.
544
 Fletcher recalled that, occasionally, a cadet might be held 
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back one class rather than eliminated. He noted that this was usually done in cases when the 
cadet had been held back for medical reasons.
545
 
Primary flight training was strictly under the purview of the contract schools such as 
Embry-Riddle in Miami, Florida. The instruction at these schools was adapted from the Air 
Corps curriculum formerly taught at Randolph Field.
546
 Although the ground school portion had 
been reduced to nine weeks, flying hours were only reduced from 65 to 60 in March 1942 and 
would remain at 60 for the duration of the war.
547
 Fletcher recalled that the amount of flight time 
required to graduate was not an estimate — it was “accurate right to the minute.”548 On the day 
he was supposed to graduate from primary flight training, Fletcher’s instructor notified him that 
he was eleven minutes short of the required 65 hours. The squadron commander told Fletcher to 
get into his flight gear and meet his instructor on the flight line. Fletcher’s instructor had a plane 
ready to go. Fletcher took off  flew around the field for eleven minutes, landed, changed back 
into his dress uniform and went to graduation.
549
 
Most of the cadets were glad to have preflight behind them. Fletcher wrote to his wife 
that primary flight school was a step up from preflight. The cadets lived in three-person cottages 
rather than barracks, slept on real beds, and were exempt from mundane duties such as “kitchen 
police” (KP) and guard duty.550 Apparently, these comforts and exemptions from additional 
duties depended on the airfield to which one was assigned. A cadet assigned to a different field 
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was not as impressed as Fletcher was with the level of comfort or amenities at his flight 
school.
551
 Fletcher described a typical duty day as running from 0600 until 1930 and as being full 
of flying, classes, physical training, and drill.
552
 The welcome speech Fletcher and his classmates 
received was from a World War One veteran and accomplished Air Corps pilot. Fletcher recalled 
the speech left him feeling “a sense of pride in ourselves and a feeling we could control our 
destiny.
553
 However, that destiny was also going to be in the hands of their instructors and the 
senior cadet cadre. 
Upon arriving at primary flight training school, Fletcher and his classmates were marched 
around the parade field by the senior cadet cadre. Before being shown to their quarters, the new 
arrivals were directed by the senior cadets to remove their aviation cadet brass. They were told 
they would get it back after they soloed; until then, the senior cadet cadre would refer to them as 
“dodos.”554 The mark of a “dodo” or a cadet not flight-qualified varied from station to station. At 
one station, it might be wearing the flight helmet with flaps down; at another, it might be 
wearing goggles around the neck rather than on top of the flight helmet.
555
 Regardless of the 
manner, the meaning was the same: to insure that the cadet knew his place in the squadron. In an 
odd twist, rather than assign the men to squadrons alphabetically, Fletcher noted that the cadets 
were assigned to squadrons by height.
556
 He never asked why and no one bothered to tell him.  
The cadets were next introduced to the most important man in their lives for the next nine 
weeks: their instructor. One cadet, Phillip Ardery, who went on to be a bomber pilot, described 
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his instructor as an “old-time barnstormer.”557 Fletcher’s instructor was a former Navy pilot as 
was his squadron commander.
558According to Fletcher, “The instructors’ job was not an easy one 
and I’m sure they questioned their own sanity for applying for the job on more than one 
occasion.”559 The instructors themselves understood the risks. They understood that, at times, 
they might have pushed their students harder than they should have. As one of the early 
instructors recalled after the war: 
There were a lot of accidents. A lot people were killed. A lot of my 
instructor friends were killed and of course many students. Especially 
right after the war started in December 1941. We started really flying 
intensely. Sometimes I think probably without sufficient supervision. 
Letting the students get out at night when the weather wasn’t too good. 
They would come back to Kelly Field with a 200-foot ceiling. They 
couldn’t hack it. They weren’t capable of coming into a 200-foot 
ceiling. We instructors didn’t have any problem. We could come in 
there and get under the scud, which we’d done many times.560 
 
Once combat crews began completing their tours of duty, they returned to the United States to 
become instructors where they could pass on their experience. However, the use of returning 
combat veterans as instructors brought its own set of challenges. As the official history noted, 
“Many of the returnees were lacking in background and maturity.”561 For example, one instructor 
recalled betting a fellow instructor a round of Cokes that his pilots could stop shorter on landing. 
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The other instructor, in exhorting his cadets over the radio, rattled one of them so badly that the 
cadet raised his landing gear upon touching down.
562
 
 The official history also observed that many of the returning aircrew missed the 
excitement of combat and “found it difficult to acquire the painstaking and sympathetic attitude 
necessary for good instruction.”563 In one instance, a veteran B-24 pilot was reassigned to a 
gunnery school. After getting bored with flying circuits for the gunners, he decided to see if he 
could fly his B-24 with all four engines feathered. The resulting crash killed the pilot and several 
of the gunnery cadets.
564
 The Army Air Force eventually established a program to insure that 
only those best suited to be instructors were accepted; the rest were returned to combat.
565
 Not 
surprisingly, by March 1945, 90 percent of instructors were combat veterans.
566
 
The Army Air Force, in an effort to help the instructor and to standardize grading and 
performance requirements finally published, for the first time in December 1943, an instructor’s 
manual for primary flight training. The semi-annual report for the Office of Flying Safety 
referred to the publication of this manual as “one of the most valuable projects ever undertaken” 
by that office.
567
 The introduction to the 1944 edition stated in bold print that the manual was an 
“ILLUSTRATED CHECK LIST FOR FLYING INSTRUCTORS.”568 The introduction closed 
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with the guidance that the instructors should, “Above all, make sure that they [the students] learn 
how to fly an airplane, with confidence and consistent proficiency.”569 The manual emphasized 
that the instructor should not strive for perfection in maneuvers but “good, solid, basic flying 
techniques.”570 The cadets were graded in four categories: judgment, attitude, progress, and 
technique and given a letter grade of A through F.
571
 However, instructors were cautioned not to 
give “F’s” lightly. They should “be sure that, as far as you are concerned, the student is a 
dangerous risk. He will not make a military pilot.”572 To give every cadet a fair chance, there 
were military pilots assigned to every contract field to perform check rides and insure 
standardization in training by the civilian instructors. They gave check rides to students who 
were having problems; riding in the backseat, they would decide if the student had the potential 
to continue with the program or should be washed out.
573
 On the other hand, Royal Air Force 
(RAF) officials criticized the Army Air Forces’ training methods. They believed they were too 
rigid with too much emphasis on precision and not enough on forced landings, aerobatics, cross-
country flying, and map reading.
574
 However, they did concede that the speed and scope of the 
program pushed the capabilities of the instructors, not to mention the wear and tear on the 
aircraft.
575
 
The Army Air Forces issued a companion manual for the cadets so they would 
understand the standard that would be used to judge their performance. The student’s primary 
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flight manual was full of safety tips and pointers on what the instructor would be looking for in 
each maneuver.
576
 In addition, the instructor’s manual had the same list of pointers the instructor 
should look for in the cadet.
577
 Charles Watry recalled that his flight training was divided into 
four phases — pre-solo, precision maneuvers, accuracy, and acrobatic — with his instructor 
observing, coaching and mentoring along the way.
578
 Fletcher recounted how his instructor 
would yell and jerk the controls every time he set up for a landing making his life so miserable 
that he began to doubt himself.
579
 His instructor eventually explained to him that the harassment 
was only meant to test him in stressful situations.
580
 Another instructor required his students to 
place their hands on their heads when he was demonstrating various maneuvers so that their 
hands would not “freeze” on the control column in case they panicked.581 One Tuskegee cadet 
recalled that he “damn near killed [his] instructor” because he, the cadet, was doing everything 
by “rote” and he did not have a “feel” for the plane.582 Nonetheless, Fletcher later recalled 
watching a particularly suspenseful solo attempt by a fellow cadet. After the cadet successfully 
landed, Fletcher saw the cadet’s “misty-eyed instructor” climb up to the cockpit to congratulate 
the cadet.
583
 He thought at the time “that the instructors cared more for the welfare of the 
students than they were willing to admit.”584 
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Despite how much concern the instructor may have had, mistakes were going to happen. 
For small infractions, Fletcher recalled, students had to wear a red armband to signify “that he 
was an accident ready to happen, so beware.”585 For a major infraction, the cadet was forced to 
wear a cowbell around his neck.
586
 He noted that, in time, these became badges of honor and 
were worn with a somewhat “false” pride.587 However, he was also quick to point out that he 
never wore the armband or cowbell because, if a cadet earned enough of these questionable 
“badges of honor,” he would eventually would be washed out.588 
Charles Watry noted there was a 16 percent washout rate in his primary class.
589
 This was 
comparable to Fletcher’s experience of losing 12 percent of his class.590 Watry identified two 
groups that appeared to have a higher washout rate: those with civilian flying experience; and 
student officers.
591
 The former, he believed, could not adjust to flying the “Army way” while the 
latter did not appear to apply themselves to the task.
592
 Perhaps because of the different 
expectations in flight training, as noted previously, nearly half of the first RAF class at Embry-
Riddle washed out. The schools themselves had no fixed policy and no quota; they could 
graduate as many or as few they wanted as long as the graduates were, in the opinion of the flight 
instructors, “the best.”593 
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The accident rate in preliminary flight training was about average for the entire training 
command at 50 per 100,000 flight hours.
594
 However, the rate for fatal accidents was below the 
average at two per 100,000 flight hours.
595
 A postwar study noted that the most dangerous times 
in primary training were the first ten to fifteen hours and the last fifteen hours.
596
 The former was 
the time when the cadet was just learning the aircraft, and the latter was when the cadet was not 
only flying solo more often but was also feeling more confident in his abilities. Instructors were 
advised to keep their hands on the controls and to insure that students understood the procedures 
for landing and recovery from “unintentional” spins before allowing them to solo.597 In an effort 
to keep down the accident rate and to track cadets with potential problems, the names of those 
students who had only met the minimum standards to pass primary flight training and might have 
trouble making it through basic were passed on to the basic school instructors.
598
 Those who 
survived primary flight training moved on to basic flight training where they would begin the 
process of becoming military flyers. That meant mastering more complex maneuvers in more 
powerful aircraft. 
Coming out of primary training, many of the new pilots had become very proficient in the 
slow and forgiving primary training aircraft. However, in basic flight training, they were 
confronted with a larger and faster airplane. Upon arrival at Randolph Field for basic flight 
training, Philip Ardery was introduced to his new aircraft, a North American BT-14. As Ardery 
described it, the BT-14s were “extremely complicated and powerful monsters” with “many 
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complexities entirely new to us.”599 Eugene Fletcher had a similar reaction when introduced to 
his new aircraft. His first impression of the BT-13, his basic flight instruction aircraft, was that it 
was an “AIRPLANE” (emphasis in original) unlike the “box kite with an engine” that he had 
flown in primary flight training.
600
 The sheer number of switches, dials, and gauges amazed him. 
He noted that the plane was so different that the instructor gave the cadets a few hours just to sit 
in the cockpit and familiarize themselves with the layout.
601
 Some cadets were so overwhelmed 
by their new plane that they “questioned whether they really had the skills to fly it.”602 Another 
cadet summed up what was probably in the back of every cadet’s mind when he considered his 
new aircraft “a very tricky airplane – a cadet killer.”603 At times, the instructors were no more 
familiar with the new planes than the cadets were. One cadet lamented that his instructors had 
had little time on the AT-6 and that “procedures were being changed every other day.” 604 
The mission of the basic schools was to graduate military pilots. Many senior Army Air 
Force leaders, to include Hap Arnold, did not believe that civilians could adequately impart those 
skills to the cadets. Therefore, except for a limited trial between 1941 and 1943, the schools were 
run entirely by Army Air Forces personnel.
605
 After a brief transition phase to familiarize him 
with his aircraft, the cadet moved on to the “diversified” phase of training. This phase included 
more advanced flying skills such as acrobatics, formation flying and an introduction to 
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instrument and flying at night.
606
 In 1939, this phase of training took nine weeks and the flying 
time was reduced from one hundred hours to seventy.
607
 This created a controversy over which 
phase should be cut — the transition phase, where the cadet learned to master the aircraft or the 
diversified phase, where the student learned to master advanced flying techniques.
608
 
In 1943, the Flight Training Command made the decision to reinforce the transition phase 
and reduce the diversified phase. This decision gave the cadets more time to become more 
familiar with their aircraft before moving on to the diversified phase. Nevertheless, reports from 
the field soon indicated that pilots were deficient in navigation and formation flying, two critical 
combat skills that were part of the diversified phase.
609
 These skills were added back into the 
program, but during the middle of the war, it was a zero sum game. Until 1944, in the years 
when there was a critical need for pilots, the AAF could not add hours to the program to produce 
proficient pilots, so the difference was made up by cutting other training in the transition 
phase.
610
 However, by 1944, as the need for pilots was not as critical, much of the training that 
had been cut earlier was restored and the course was extended to ten weeks.
611
 
The student-teacher ratio in basic flight training was one instructor per three-and-a-half 
students, and there was one airplane for each two students, and one Link simulator for every 25 
students.
612
 However, early in the war, when there was a shortage of instructors, the ratio was as 
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high as one instructor for seven cadets.
613
 All of the instructors were Army officers. Some had 
hundreds of hours of experience in flying, and others were newly commissioned pilots. This may 
account for the varying introductions the cadets received. One cadet received an unofficial test. 
As he recalled, the instructor would give control of the plane to a student and see how low to the 
ground or treetops the student would go.
614
 He found out later that the instructor wanted to find 
out if he was “ground shy.”615 Eugene Fletcher’s basic flight instructor informed the cadets that 
they would be tested on cockpit layout while blindfolded.
616
 In order to pass, the cadet was 
required to touch each gauge or lever as the instructor called them out.
617
 Fletcher also recalled 
asking for help with some particularly difficult maneuvers. His instructor refused to assist him. 
Instead, he insisted that the best way for Fletcher to learn was to practice the maneuver himself 
and cautioned Fletcher: “If you’re going to fly, either master all the arts of flying or forget it.”618 
However, Charles Watry suggested that this method of teaching and learning may not have 
always had the intended effect. He noted that some of his peers refused to practice maneuvers if 
they were flying solo. Instead, they would fly “straight and level for the entire flight period.”619 
He recalled that these cadets eventually “washed out.”620 
They were also introduced to two new methods of instruction —the “buddy ride” and the 
Link trainer. The “buddy ride” technique sent two cadets up together to train without an 
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instructor. Having the cadets train themselves was almost a necessity given the ratio of 
instructors and planes to students. However, it did occasionally lead to accidents. After one 
accident where Waltry was the co-pilot for a classmate, he laconically recalled: “he wasn’t all 
that swift as a pilot.”621 Eugene Fletcher’s major complaint with this method was that the cadet 
in the back seat did not always get to log flight time.
622
 
The Link trainer was an early flight simulator used to help the students master instrument 
flying. It consisted of a small replica of an airplane, complete with wings and a functional 
cockpit. The cadet sat inside the enclosed cockpit, and the “plane” moved in response to his 
control inputs. In addition, an instructor, sitting at a control panel, could induce various inputs to 
test the student. Crude by modern standards for simulators, many of the instructors in Flight 
Training Command considered it a terrific training device because it was safer, cheaper, and a 
marvel of technology. Nonetheless, the cadets, preferring actual flight to simulated flight, did not 
necessarily share this admiration. Charles Watry jokingly recalled that he and his peers did not 
hold the Link trainer in high regard and believed that “any resemblance to flying the Link trainer 
and flying an actual aircraft was pure coincidence.”623 Nevertheless, the cadets were required to 
spend 25 hours in the Link trainer. 
The two most critical and difficult portions of training were flying by instruments and 
flying at night. In late 1942 reports from the field requested that more instruction on these two 
critical skills be added to primary flight instruction.
624
 However, as noted in the official history, 
this attempt was “unsuccessful” because these skills were considered too advanced for pilots in 
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primary flight training.
625
 In addition, the Army Air Force’s accident data indicated that the 
accident rate for flying at night was two to four times greater than flying in daytime.
626
 There 
was an ongoing debate on what phase of flight training should address these two skills. For a 
time they were considered too difficult for cadets in basic flight training, the phase where the 
cadets moved into more advanced aircraft. However, the officers supervising the advanced flight 
training program, the last phase, argued that learning to fly instruments and flying at night were 
too critical to a pilots success in combat to leave to the last phase of pilot training.
627
 For Arnold 
the issue was where to assume the risk. Was it better to risk losing pilots in training or lose them 
in combat? According to Arnold:  
They must receive training which will enable them to undertake their 
combat missions safely, and to do this…their own safety requires that 
they be trained in night and bad weather flying, which of course, raises 
the accident rate here, but which tremendously reduces the combat 
losses abroad.
628
 
 
Instruction in flying by instruments and flying at night remained in the basic curriculum.  
Flying by instruments was essential to flying at night and was considered a critical skill 
for flying combat missions at any time and in any weather conditions. The Air Corps’ tragic 
experience flying the airmail in 1934 reinforced this idea that flying at night was a practical skill 
that was beneficial for any pilot. However, the groups and squadrons in the field did not believe 
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there was enough emphasis on instrument instruction in the basic phase.
629
 This was a position 
supported by some of the cadets. Charles Watry noted that many of his classmates did not 
believe that the instrument instruction they received had adequately prepared them for the flying 
they would do in theater.
630
 
The official history attributed this deficiency to three causes. The first was the attitude of 
the instructors. One cadet noted that most instructors considered teaching cadets to fly on 
instruments to be a boring chore. On a typical training flight, the cadet would usually flying 
straight and level and not engaged in “radical maneuvers,” making the instructor merely a 
passenger for the majority of the flight.
631
 Second were the training methods. At the beginning of 
the war, the training reflected the “traditional peace-time attitude of training officers who 
subordinated instrument work to conventional visual maneuvers.”632 Last was the time and 
equipment used in the training. Much of the responsibility for the preparation of the equipment 
and aircraft was placed on the cadets. Fletcher recalled that aircraft were assigned to different 
aspects of flight training based on their instrumentation. For instance, according to Fletcher, 
some had better navigation instrumentation and were used for instrument and cross-country 
flights; those with less advanced instrumentation were used for aerobatics.
633
 Regardless, it was 
the responsibility of the cadet to insure that he had the right aircraft for that day’s training.634 
The deficiency was also attributed to the reduction in training time. At the beginning of 
the war, until complaints came in from the squadrons and groups in the field, if something had to 
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be cut from the program of instruction, it would be instrument training. Some of the problem can 
attributed to the Army Air Force’s training methods. After the initial instruction on the ground 
and demonstration in the air by the instructor, the remaining training flights were conducted 
using the previously mentioned “buddy training.” One cadet rode in the backseat watching for 
other aircraft while the cadet pilot being trained flew the plane from the front seat. The cadet 
pilot wore a special hood that limited his vision to just the instrument panel.
635
 Without an 
instructor supervising the flight, the quality of the training would depend on the proficiency of 
the two cadets. In addition, the Army Air Force did not incorporate all of the instruments into the 
training. As the official history summed it up, “Gyroscopic instruments were practically 
ignored.” Some instructors did nothing to correct that deficiency.636 One cadet recalled being 
cautioned by his instructor not to “pay any attention to these newfangled instruments, they’re no 
good.”637 It was only in June 1943, after observing the Navy’s instrument training, that the Army 
Air Force updated its program of instruction.
638
 
Nonetheless, despite these shortcomings, the majority of pilots moved on to the advanced 
phase of training. For example, 87 percent of Philip Watry’s basic class moved on to the next 
phase of their flight training.
639
 This is comparable with the wartime average of 88 percent.
640
 
Eugene Fletcher ended basic with 36 hours and 20 minutes of dual instruction and 43 hours and 
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40 minutes of solo flight time. By the time he moved on to his advanced flying school he had 
145 hours of military flight instruction.
641
 
 Coming out of basic flight training, the cadets, based on a recommendation from their 
instructors, would be assigned to either advanced single-engine or twin-engine training. The 
objective for both, initially, was similar — “combat proficiency in a single-engine aircraft”642 or 
“combat proficiency in a twin-engine military aircraft.”643 The former goal was modified later to 
state that the graduate was qualified “to take the assignment of wingman in a tactical 
organization in any theater of operations.”644 The latter goal was modified to a focus on 
preparation “for assignment to multi-engine units” since the AAF operated various multi-engine 
airplanes in diverse organizations.
645
 The changes were made to reflect the role that the new pilot 
would play in the Army Air Force after graduation. Nonetheless, the number of hours was 
identical in both schools. The principal difference was a greater emphasis on instrument flying 
and the absence of acrobatics in the program of instruction for twin-engine flight training.
646
 
The ratio in advanced flight training, for both single- and twin-engine aircraft was one 
instructor for every four students, one airplane for every two students, one Link trainer for every 
25 students, and, for single-engine, one tow target airplane per twelve students.
647
 The number of 
flight hours remained constant throughout the war at 70 until 1944 when the course was 
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lengthened to ten weeks and nine more flight hours were added.
648
 However, based on reports 
from the squadrons and groups in the field parts of the program of instruction received more 
emphasis. For example, formation flying went from five hours in early 1943 to fourteen by the 
end of the year.
649
 
Ground school hours varied based on the needs of the force. Shortly after the war began, 
the hours were dropped from 80 to 67 and by 1943 were reduced further to 60.
650
 As the number 
of pilots needed decreased and as the course was lengthened, the hours were increased to 112.
651
 
That increase included more emphasis on navigation and weather training.
652
 However, ground 
school was valued no more highly in this phase than in the previous phases.
653
 Fletcher thought 
that the ground school instruction was rushed and there was no time for in-class discussions, just 
lecture after lecture.
654
 
For some of the cadets there was concern about starting the training process all over 
again. Many were anxious to finish their training and get into the war. One cadet recalled 
running into a friend who had washed out during primary pilot training. He was envious that his 
friend was wearing aerial gunner wings and was on his way to bombardier school. He was 
envious because his friend at least had wings while his own fate was still uncertain.
655
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There may have been some justification for his concern. Once again, the fate of the 
cadets was in the hands of their new instructors, and cadets had different reactions and 
experiences depending on which instructors they drew. For example Philip Ardery credited his 
instructor for instilling in him the attitude that “a pilot should have infinite coolness in 
emergencies, but also the caution to ensure that the only emergencies he ever meets are those not 
of his own making.”656 Charles Watry recalled that his instructor was a “slight man, thin, and 
nervous,” and that he smoked heavily.657 The rumor among the cadets was that the instructor had 
been on the Doolittle Raid.
658
 Watry thought that, if that was what caused him to be jumpy, then 
he should not have been instructing “green cadets.”659 One instructor informed his cadets that it 
was not his responsibility to teach them how to fly; they should have learned how to fly in 
primary and basic flight school. The purpose of advanced flight training was to hone their skills 
and teach them advanced techniques.
660
 Nevertheless, he did tell his cadets that he would help 
“as needed.”661 Fletcher recalled that his instructor informed them that, for the first two weeks, 
he would fly in the “right-hand” or co-pilot seat and for the rest of the course he would only be 
an observer.
662
 Otherwise, flying the plane was totally in the hands of the cadets.
663
 However, the 
specific approach to training varied from instructor to instructor. 
Philip Ardery was held over to be an instructor and took a different approach to his 
students, perhaps because he had recently been in their shoes. Being more tolerant of student 
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mistakes, Ardery was rewarded by being given other instructors’ “problem cadets” to “straighten 
out.”664 He said that the practice of giving more chances to pilots increased as the need for pilots 
became more acute.
665
 In addition, he said that cadets who would have been eliminated earlier 
were given second chances.
666
 However, these marginal pilots would come back to haunt the 
Army Air Force as the squadrons and groups in the field had to deal with them.
667
 Even before 
the cadets left the program, Ardery admitted, he sometimes found himself to be repeatedly 
correcting the same mistakes in each of his four students.
668
 Ardery recalled seeing his best 
friend and fellow instructor killed in a crash. He said that, at the time, “a lot of the fun went out 
of my flying… [but]…my attention to it was more intense….”669 In other cases it was the chain 
of command that was making life difficult for the instructors. For example, at an airfield that was 
responsible for training navigators, the base commander required all instructor pilots to pass an 
eight-page, 117 question exam before operating the AT-7 twin-engine plane.
670
 This was 
followed by a check ride with the results countersigned by a certified pilot.
671
 Only then was the 
instructor pilot deemed qualified to take navigator cadets up on training flights. 
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Wartime experience indicated that formation flying was a critical skill for multi-engine 
pilots; especially at high altitude, it was also one of the most difficult skills to master.
672
 The 
program of instruction required pilots to fly in a Vee formation (three aircraft) with 
approximately five feet of clearance between wingtips.
673
 This was a difficult task in clear skies; 
but at night, it was looked upon with dread.
674
 Watry noted that formation flying was a particular 
challenge as the pilots tried to maintain their proper spacing and altitude.
675
 He recalled that after 
a formation-flying lesson “even virile youngsters are physically drained.”676 
Another critical task for multi-engine pilots was the ability to fly on only one engine. 
However, a shortage of twin-engine trainers required some schools to make do with single-
engine planes until late 1942.
677
 Nevertheless, even in those schools with the proper aircraft, the 
necessity of this training was not apparent to every cadet. Watry questioned the amount of time 
spent on single-engine training in a twin-engine airplane. Time, he believed, could have been 
better spent on training in “more productive areas.”678 Despite Cadet Watry’s concern about the 
amount of time spent flying around on one engine in his twin-engine airplane, the Army Air 
Forces believed differently. Reports from the squadrons and groups indicated it was crucial that a 
                                                 
672
 USAF Historical Division, U. S. Air Force Historical Study no. 93: Development of AAF and USAF Training 
Concepts and Programs, 1941-1952 (Maxwell AFB AL: USAF Air University, 1953), 89. 
673
 Ibid., 93. 
674
 Ibid., 90. 
675
 Watry, Washout!: The Aviation Cadet Story, 118. 
676
 Ibid., 118. 
677
 USAF Historical Division, U. S. Air Force Historical Study No. 93: Development of AAF and USAF Training 
Concepts and Programs, 1941-1952 (Maxwell AFB AL: USAF Air University, 1953), 83. 
678
 Watry, Washout!: The Aviation Cadet Story, 114. 
124 
 
pilot learn how to maintain control of his aircraft after the loss of an engine, especially at low 
level, including landings and take-offs.
679
 
Advanced flying training was also a dangerous time for the cadets. The total number of 
accidents in advanced flight training was slightly more than basic and primary flight training 
combined. There were 13,511 accidents in advanced flight training aircraft and 13,137 in both 
primary and basic.
680
 This can be attributed to several factors. First, by the time the pilots 
reached this phase they had passed through a very brutal screening process and were feeling 
confident in their abilities. This was the phase in a pilot’s career when, as Arnold put it, he 
“becomes overconfident and knows more about flying than he will ever know again.”681 
Knowing that the long sought goal of earning their wings was only weeks away only contributed 
to this overconfidence. Finally, the cadets were transitioning to even more powerful and complex 
aircraft, especially for the twin-engine pilots. In one cadet’s opinion, the AT-17, a twin-engine 
trainer, was “quite a handful” for pilots with a little over 100 hours.682 In particular, the cadets 
had more instruments to monitor and retractable landing gear to keep in mind.
683
 Cadets at 
MacDill AFB in Florida had a pithy saying — “One a day in Tampa Bay” — that demonstrated a 
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pragmatic view of the accident rate.
684
 A 1943 study on accidents summed it up best: “The 
planes are powerful and the training period is short.”685 
Graduation from advanced flight training meant that the cadet had not only earned his 
wings and was a rated pilot, but he was also commissioned as a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. 
Army Air Force. Charles Watry recalled that the washout rate for his class during advanced 
training was 2.33% or 7 cadets.
686
 A postwar study bears out Watry’s statement. The study noted 
that through 31 December 1943 the elimination rate was 2.2 percent.
687
 However, the rate went 
up to 9 percent in 1944 when the Army Air Force could be more demanding as result of the 
decreased demand for pilots.
688
 Eugene Fletcher’s class had a slightly higher washout rate and 
graduated only 237 out of the 250 cadets who had started with him.
689
 The overall washout rate 
for Watry’s class from preflight to advanced flight training was nearly 40 per cent, which was 
below the anticipated norm of 50 percent.
690
 His class began with 4,931 in preflight and 
graduated 2,966 from advanced.
691
 Eugene Fletcher recalled that at the end of advanced flight 
training he had 26 hours and 30 minutes of dual instruction and 52 hours and 20 minutes of solo 
flight training plus another 48 hours as co-pilot (these did not count towards his training time) for 
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126 hours and 50 minutes in the AT-17.
692
 His total hours before moving on to transition were 
271 hours and 50 min. Transition training was the last phase before deploying to a combat unit. 
It was also the phase in which the pilot learned to fly the type of aircraft he would operate in 
combat. 
Following World War One and through most of the interwar period, transition training 
was primarily a function of the tactical units and was subject to the regulations established by the 
local commander.
693
 This changed in 1937 with the introduction of the B-17. For the first time 
the Air Corps prescribed procedures and qualifications before a pilot could fly a particular 
aircraft.
694
 However, this decision did not result from a sudden concern for the pilot’s proficiency 
or safety, but was due to the expense of the plane.
695
 The Air Corps could not afford to lose any 
of these expensive aircraft. Moreover, the immediate effect was the establishment of standards 
for all classes of aircraft.
696
 Nonetheless, the local commanders were still granted some latitude. 
The official history summed up transition training, after the beginning of the expansion program, 
this way: “It still retained some of its informal characteristics of the prewar period, but the 
greater number and lower experience of the trainees required more definite procedures.”697 
During each phase of training the cadet was allowed a period of time to become familiar 
with his new aircraft. However, in transition flight training, this was a more difficult undertaking. 
It was also the phase in which a pilot was less likely to be washed out and most likely to be 
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killed. In 1944, the New York Times reported, that the prewar fatality rate of 145 for every 
1,000,000 flying hours during this phase of training had increased to 521.
698
 Pilots were not only 
introduced to a more complex aircraft, especially for the four-engine pilots, but they also had to 
master new flying techniques and procedures to prepare themselves to fly as a members of a 
squadron or group. As Philip Ardery understood it, the purpose of transition training was not to 
teach tactics but to acquaint the pilot and crew with the aircraft they would take into combat.
699
 
For Eugene Fletcher the enormity of the task came home after his first introduction to the B-17. 
The first thing he noticed apart from the size was the great increase in horsepower, which was 
ten times greater in the B-17 than in the AT-17 trainers he had flown earlier.
700
 To say that he 
was overwhelmed, he added, “would be a gross understatement.”701 He also remembered the 
pressure of realizing that he needed to have a working knowledge of every system on his 
plane.
702
 
To fly its single-seat fighter planes, the Army Air Force wanted aggressive pilots. A 
postwar study noted: “Aggressiveness…must be developed to a high degree…. Once committed 
to the attack timidity or hesitancy in driving it home to point-blank range will surely produce 
disastrous results.”703 In a postwar history, author Oliver La Farge, commented on fighter 
aircraft: “As a class they are the most dangerous of all planes to fly….”704  The men who flew 
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them, he noted, should be “collectively reckless men.”705 On the other hand, multi-engine pilots 
were selected more for their leadership ability, since they would be responsible for not only 
themselves but also, depending on the type of aircraft, up to nine other men. However, the multi-
engine instructors did not necessarily discourage aggressiveness. Eugene Fletcher, after 
performing an unauthorized maneuver, was told by his instructor: “We don’t usually use or teach 
that maneuver, but you’re going to a combat theater where you will have to use every maneuver 
you know in order to survive. That is the sole purpose of your training.”706 
The transition to single-seat fighters presented a unique challenge. Because of the lack of 
two-seat tactical combat fighters, a single-engine pilot’s first transition flight was by necessity a 
solo flight. Moreover, the instruction usually consisted of an experienced pilot leaning into the 
cockpit and explaining the procedures before the new pilot took off. To mitigate this problem, 
single-engine transition instruction consisted of an intensive period of ground indoctrination to 
include testing the pilot, sometimes blindfolded, on the location and operation of controls, before 
being certified for his first flight.
707
 However, as the official history noted, sometimes a new pilot 
was given so much information to assimilate in a short period that it instilled more alarm than 
confidence in the pilot.
708
 
At the beginning of the war, the Army Air Force required 60 hours of flight time in 
transition for single-engine pilots. However, a shortage of aircraft along with a pressing need for 
pilots forced this requirement to be reduced to 40 hours to meet the demand for pilots. For 
example, in late 1943, despite a shortage of training aircraft, the required quota of 1,200 P-40 
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pilots per transition class was met by reducing the amount of transition flight time.
709
 As the 
emergency passed, the hours were increased to between 60 and 110.
710
 For multi-engine pilots, 
transition was a two-stage process: first was learning to operate the new plane and second was 
picking up his crew. Lasting from four to eight weeks, this latter step gave the crew time to work 
together and become a team before deployment.
711
 
Because this was the last phase of training before combat, there were times during 
transition training when there was a deliberate compromise between safety and realism. For 
instance, during single-engine transition, these “collectively reckless men,” as La Farge referred 
to them, were not allowed to engage in simulated dogfights with live ammunition, certainly a 
prudent measure by any standard.
712
 On the other hand, one base commander, in order to keep 
down his accident rate, sent his pilots along a well-lit cross-country course; certainly, accidents 
were fewer but it was perhaps not the best way to prepare pilots for the blackout conditions they 
would encounter overseas.
713
 In 2
nd
 Air Force, the amount of flying time in a 24-hour period was 
monitored to insure crew safety. During transition training for bomber crews this was limited by 
phase. In the first phase, a crew could fly no more than five hours in twenty-four; the crew was 
permitted eight hours in the next phase and ten hours in the final phase.
714
 Oddly enough, the 
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official history labeled one four-engine transition school as too safety conscious while in the next 
sentence the authors criticized the same school for not emphasizing emergency procedures.
715
 
Nevertheless, this training was not without its lighter moments. One training directive 
required crews to practice bailout procedures once a week. While in flight, the crews moved to 
their bailout stations and remained there until the plane landed and the props had stopped 
spinning. The pilot rang the bailout bell and the crew exited the plane through their directed exits 
wearing their parachutes. The directive concluded with the admonition that crews “will not pull 
ripcords of parachutes.”716 It is not too hard to imagine some hapless crewmember dutifully 
jumping out his plane, as it sat on the ground, and pulling the ripcord as he had been trained to 
do. 
After coming together after their individual training, bomber crews underwent an 
additional transition phase. This phase lasted from four to eight weeks depending on the time of 
the war.
717
 During the wartime expansion, the Army Air Forces was learning as it went along. By 
1943, it was taking a very systematic approach to training by laying out tasks, conditions, and 
standards with checklists for the evaluators to use to log the progress of the crew throughout the 
process.
718
 The Army Air Forces also relied on much of the preflight testing to help in forming 
bomber crews. Eugene Fletcher recalled that, in an effort to minimize personality clashes, 
bomber crews were formed based on the preflight psychological test.
719
 In contrast, the RAF 
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formed crews by placing a group of crewmembers in a large hangar telling them to “sort 
themselves out into crews.”720 The RAF believed that the airmen would naturally form into 
teams of similar likes and dislikes.
721
 Fletcher further noted that one member of the crew had to 
be blood type O as a universal donor and no more than two members of the crew could be from 
the same state.
722
 Fletcher’s crew ranged in age from eighteen to twenty-eight and only his flight 
engineer, as the senior non-commissioned officer, had any previous experience with the B-17.
723
 
In his previously mentioned book, Bombs Away: The Story of a Bomber Team, Steinbeck 
not only acquainted readers with the life of a bomber crew but he also emphasized the teamwork 
required to operate a bomber. In addition, Steinbeck gave the bomber the archetypical “All 
American” crew. For example, the pilot was a big farm boy from South Carolina, the tail gunner 
was a “slender, short, wiry young man with stringy muscles, a deadly eye, and no nerves,” and 
the crew chief was a natural mechanic found “in nearly every small town in America.”724 
However, before Steinbeck’s fictional crew or Fletcher’s real crew formed up to become a team 
each member had undergone intensive training of his own. 
Prior to the war, the Air Corps placed little or no emphasis on bombardier or navigator 
training. In 1933, the Air Corps established two schools for navigation and instrument training. 
However, these were closed during the airmail operation. One of the schools briefly reopened in 
1934 before it was shut down again at the behest of Brigadier General Frank Andrews, the 
commander of GHQ Air Force. In place of a centralized school, Frank directed that a twelve-
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week, 246-hour course be developed that could be exported down to the groups to use for 
training.
725
 
It was much the same for bombardier training. The senior leaders of the Air Corps 
believed that accurate bombing required coordination between the pilot and bombardier. 
Therefore, they surmised, a good pilot would make a good bombardier and vice versa. However, 
the squadrons and groups always emphasized pilot training; and, as noted in the Army Air 
Forces’ official history, bombardier training “was performed ‘coincidently’ [and] there was 
neither standardized instruction nor a complete manual to follow.”726 Another history stated: 
“This type of training interfered with the accomplishment of the essential function of these units, 
and the individual training was frequently neglected.”727 It is somewhat surprising that the Air 
Corps was so cavalier about bombardier training given the emphasis it placed on precision 
bombing as its raison d‘etre. The official history noted that the first bombardier school was not 
opened until May 1941 and it took an additional nine months for it to become operational.
728
 
Flexible gunnery was even more of an afterthought or, as one Air Force history noted, 
“The [gunnery] training [1919 – 1940] was apparently somewhat superficial and not highly 
specialized.”729 Curtis LeMay would recall after the war that “Another weakness of ours right 
from the start was our horrible gunnery. Gunnery was pretty low on the totem pole in 
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peacetime.”730 Within the Air Corps, there was more interest and experimentation in types of 
mounts and calibers than in how best to train the gunner.
731
 For these reasons, but mainly 
because of a lack of funds, the Air Corps did not establish a specialized flexible gunnery school 
until late 1940.  
Nonetheless, it was still the responsibility of the tactical groups to train people in these 
specialties and often the standards were left up to the group commander. For instance, in the 19th 
Bomb Group the commander set a very high standard for his crews. He did not consider a crew 
fully trained until every officer was qualified as pilot or co-pilot, celestial navigator, expert 
bombardier, and expert gunner.
732
 All enlisted crew members had to first qualify in their 
specialties — engineer, armorer, or radio operator — and then were required to become expert 
gunners.
733
 
 With the start of the expansion program in 1939, selection of personnel for these 
positions was reconsidered. During World War One, the Air Service policy had been to offer 
washed out pilots, or those “not at ease in the work [of flying],” the opportunity to become 
bombardiers or artillery observers.
734
 The Air Corps believed that this policy would once again 
provide sufficient numbers of bombardiers and navigators. Unfortunately, the Air Corps failed to 
heed its own history. During World War One, the perception among those in the Air Service was 
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that bombardiers were “Second Grade Men” in relation to the pilots.735 Once the Air Corps 
began transferring or offering washed out pilots the opportunity to become bombardiers or 
navigators, the same phenomenon took place. The washed out cadet faced two humiliations: first, 
he had failed to become a pilot and, second, everyone on the crew knew it as well. In addition, 
the dropouts were initially recycled through preflight training where they, as one instructor 
noted, were “unduly alarming the cadets in the replacement center [and, because they were 
sharing their experiences,] were further destroying morale by causing cadets to come to primary 
school apprehensive and nervous.”736 On the other hand, some actually chose to be aircrew rather 
than pilots. Ralph Nutter joined to be a fighter pilot the day after Pearl Harbor, but after arriving 
at the training facility at Montgomery, Alabama and being told to go home and wait to be called, 
he elected to transfer to navigator training because he could begin it immediately.
737
 This 
problem became less pronounced after the Army Air Forces developed selection criteria for 
bombardiers and navigators.  
The instructors and staff at both the bombardier and navigator schools argued that they 
should get cadets with the skills necessary for their respective specialties. However, the 
counterargument from the Army Air Forces Staff was that, with the washout, the schools were 
receiving a trainee who had already gone through two screenings for educational ability and was 
already familiar with the military customs and courtesies.
738
 The argument based on skill 
eventually won out as the Army Air Force refined the selection process and gained more 
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experience and confidence in the Standard Nine classification system discussed in Chapter 3. 
However, washouts were still permitted to reclassify and, as one pilot noted, it was not unusual 
to find several members of a bomber crew who were former pilot cadets.
739
 
Specialized bombardier training did not begin in earnest until after Pearl Harbor. The 
amount of time allotted to training gradually increased over the course of the war from twelve to 
24 weeks and dropped briefly to ten weeks in 1942.
740
 The course was divided into two phases: 
the ground phase and the air phase. Much like pilot training, ground training emphasized the 
physics and theory behind dropping bombs from an airplane.
741
 Air training put the theory into 
practice and made up the majority of the time, almost three quarters of the time during the 
twelve-week course.
742
 The eighteen-week course included 425 hours of ground instruction 
including time on the A2 trainer, a bombing simulator. After three weeks on the ground, the 
student began training in the air. Over the course of his training, the bombardier would drop 
between 155 and 200 bombs from various altitudes and conditions. For qualification, he would 
fly seven bomb runs, four in daytime and three at night, and had to place his bombs within 230 
feet of the aim point to be considered qualified.
743
 
Of the three positions — pilot, bombardier, and navigator — navigators required the 
highest stanine score because of the math skills required for navigation. The navigator’s course 
began in July 1940 as a ten-week course; however, one year later it was increased to fifteen 
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weeks.
744
 In 1943, it was reduced to twelve weeks to meet the wartime demand and remained at 
twelve weeks for the duration of the war.
745
 Nonetheless, in 1943 Arnold wanted to reduce the 
time even more. After the war, General O.P. Weyland recounted that Arnold had told him to cut 
the training time in half to “turn them out faster.”746 However, there was a limit to how much 
could be cut from the course and still produce a proficient navigator. Each cadet received 500 
ground hours and 100 air hours of instruction. Cadets flew 20 navigation flights, rotating 
between primary navigator and merely plotting the course as the training flight progressed.
747
 To 
earn their navigator’s wings, they had to be able to navigate with no more than a one-and-a-half 
degree course error and no more than one-and-a-half minutes of error per flight hour. At night, 
students had to arrive within fifteen miles of their objectives.
748
 In addition, they received six 
weeks of gunnery training, if the gunnery school had space.
749
 
Aerial gunnery training began as a five-week course and was increased to six weeks over 
the course of the war as the demand for gunners decreased.
750
 At first, the Army Air Forces 
relied on volunteers; however, when this did not meet the demand, they lowered the standards 
and turned to compulsory selection.
751
 The Army Air Forces’ leaders were initially concerned 
about the effect of this action; the Air Staff expected a washout rate of at least 35%.
752
 Their 
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fears were never realized, and the new recruits began to perform as well as the volunteers.
753
 
This was largely the result of an intensive campaign to sell aerial gunnery. These efforts included 
the 1943 training film, “The Rear Gunner” that referred to the gunners as “aviation’s mightiest 
little men,” perhaps building on Steinbeck’s characterization of them.  
However, to train the aircrew, the Army Air Force also had to divert pilots and planes to 
these training centers. The ratio for navigators was one airplane per ten students and one 
instructor per twelve students. For bombardiers it was one airplane per four students with one 
instructor per six students, and one bomb trainer per 7.7 students. For gunnery training, the ratio 
was one gunnery airplane per ten students as well as one tow target airplane per ten students, and 
one instructor per 20 students.
754
 However, no matter how important it was to fly these cadets 
around so they could perfect their skills, it was not always a duty that the pilots necessarily found 
desirable. Nor was it necessarily a safe assignment for pilots, either. One pilot assigned to that 
duty out of flight school recalled that three out of the 22 pilots who had reported in with him died 
in crashes and one was discharged with stomach ulcers.
755
 
The units in the field continually sent advice and criticisms to the air staff about the 
quality of the aircrew they were receiving from the training centers. The combat squadrons and 
groups were concerned about the amount of time they had to spend training the incoming 
personnel. Depending on the phase of the war, they would have to devote up to six weeks in 
training and preparing a new pilot or crew before allowing them to fly operationally.
756
 The 
major complaint about fighter pilots was the inadequacy of gunnery and high-altitude training. In 
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early 1942, Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, the commander of the 5th Air Force, reported 
that only four of 29 replacement pilots had flown a combat aircraft in training.
757
 Of course, this 
was early in the war when the Army Air Forces was still trying to determine the balance between 
meeting the demands of the field and training pilots. In another instance, a combat crew 
reception center in England reported, in 1943, that the crews coming through the center were 
“seriously deficient” in gunnery, formation flying, and “coordination between pilots and 
bombardiers.”758 As for the crews themselves, many were asked to fill out questionnaires about 
their training, and their answers supported the opinion of the overseas commanders about the 
deficiencies in training.
759
Some of these men obviously voiced these concerns to their families. 
For example, the family of a P-47 pilot with the 56
th
 Fighter Group are still dismayed that this 
young man was sent to war with only six weeks of flight training and believe this contributed to 
his death in July 1944.
760
 Further research revealed that he had received the full amount of flight 
training and the six weeks they referred to was his transition time in the P-47, and, at the time of 
his training, in all likelihood, he had received 60 hours of flight time. It has been noted 
previously that 60 hours was above the average for transition training. However, as the official 
history observed, “These criticisms [from the squadrons and groups]…in time became less 
sweeping in nature…for as the pressure of the first hectic year passed, Headquarters, AAF and 
the subordinate air forces were able to evolve more successful programs for both fighter and 
bomber training.”761 Nonetheless, no matter how successful these programs were in producing 
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proficient pilots and crews, flying accidents were still an unpleasant fact for those in the Army 
Air Forces. 
 
140 
 
Chapter 5 - The Accidents: Causes and Prevention 
 
 
Let us not gloss over the fact that the combat flying is a grim and dangerous 
business . . . From the outset, the Army Air Forces have taught the men at home 
the maneuvers that they would execute in combat abroad. In these maneuvers a 
few are bound to be injured or killed, but the overwhelming proportion of the men 
are better prepared to defeat the enemy.” 762 
    General Henry “Hap” Arnold 
    Report of the Commanding General of the 
 Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War 
 
A gruesome weeding out process was taking place. Those who were killed in 
Nevada were likely to have been the first killed in combat.
763
 
      Charles “Chuck” Yeager 
      Yeager, An Autobiography 
 
 
 Both “Hap” Arnold and “Chuck” Yeager attested to the danger inherent in flying both in 
combat and in training. In addition, both suggested that, however unfortunate, airmen were going 
to be killed in training. Nevertheless, the payoff for those losses would be a large group of pilots 
better prepared to meet the rigors of combat and, in Yeager’s opinion, it was better that the 
“weak sisters,” as he referred to them, were killed in training than in combat.764 Late in the war, 
Arnold noted in his annual report to the Secretary of War: 
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Twenty years’ accumulation of experience, by a comparatively small 
and fixed group of men, brought the AAF accident rate down to 51 
per 100,000 hours in 1940. Expansion introduced a new and 
enormous block of inexperience, which would tend to reproduce the 
situation of the early Twenties. Vigorous preventive measures were 
taken against the expected rise. The degree of success can be 
measured by the fact that the accident rate has been held down and 
new all-time lows attained.
765
 
 
He further noted, in the same report, that accidents had risen, but not out of proportion to the 
increased volume of cadets in training.
766
 Arnold went on to add that the Army Air Force was 
flying higher performance aircraft and carrying more personnel and, as a result, the rate of fatal 
accidents went up from .077 to .083 per one thousand.
767
 Nonetheless, Arnold concluded his 
report in a positive manner claiming that 95 of every 100 pilots in training “can be expected to 
fly through the next twelve months without a scratch.”768 In a New York Times article, Arnold 
suggested that accidents in training were inevitable and were part of the cost to prepare for war. 
He stated: “They [the trainees] must receive training which will enable them to undertake their 
combat missions safely, and to do this…their own safety requires that they be trained in night 
and bad weather flying, which, of course, raises the accident rate here, but which tremendously 
reduces the combat losses abroad.”769 He went on to add, “It would be short-sighted and 
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unfair…to sacrifice men and equipment in combat for the sake of making an apparent reduction 
in aircraft accidents.”770 
Nevertheless, the Army Air Forces, led by Arnold, would be beset with a number of 
accidents that, while equal or lower than the prewar rate, were on a scale the Air Corps had never 
before had to endure (Table 4). For example, during the first 32 months of the war, the Army Air 
Forces lost 3,300 more planes in accidents in the continental United States than in combat.
771
 In 
late 1944, the New York Times reported that, since the start of the war, 11,000 flyers had been 
killed in 5,600 accidents in the United States alone.
772
 On the other hand, the prewar Air Corps 
might suffer 50 fatalities in a year while the wartime Army Air Force could suffer that many 
fatalities during five days of training. A postwar report on flying safety further suggested that the 
prewar Air Corps might not have been attuned to safety as well as he Army Air Forces became. 
The report stated: “If sufficient experience could have been gained prior to wartime expansion, 
therefore, it is conceivable that accident rates could have been reduced sooner, thereby 
eliminating many of the accidents occurring in the early months of trial and error.”773Arnold 
stated in a New York Times interview that “he was constantly reviewing accident problems and 
that he took prompt action against any air force personnel who failed to follow safety 
instructions or to maintain the new standards of discipline and efficiency necessary for safe 
operation.”774 It is unclear if the “new” standards Arnold referred to were recent additions or 
                                                 
770
 Ibid. 
771
 United States Army Air Forces. Office of Flying Safety, Safety as a Factor in the Future of Aviation 
(Washington DC: Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, 1946), 4. 
772
 New York Times, 5 October 1944. 
773
 Ibid., 17. 
774
 New York Times, 30 October 1943. 
143 
 
changes to prewar standards. In either case, the Air Force was becoming more safety conscious 
as it searched for responses to the accident rate.  
“Accident prevention is a lofty goal,” the introduction to the 1943 edition of Accident 
Facts declared.
775
 Accident Facts was a collection of accident data published jointly by the 
Research and Statistic Division and the Safety Education Division. Both were subordinate 
organizations within the Office of Flying Safety. The author of the introduction went on to 
inform the reader: “It is your job. It is the job of every officer in the Army Air Forces to see that 
accidents are reduced; if possible, eliminated.”776 This led, at times, to some interesting 
reactions. Charles Watry, a cadet at La Junta Army Air Field, recalled that La Junta was known 
as a “beno” field, as in “There will ‘beno’ flying under bridges,” or “There will ‘beno’ buzzing,” 
and most important of all, “There will ‘beno’ accidents.”777 Nevertheless, as to be expected, 
despite such admonishments, the accidents continued. 
In February 1941, the Air Corps reported that more flyers, 27, had died in flying 
accidents in 1940, than in the previous year.
778
 A spokesman for the Air Corps told the New York 
Times that an intense investigation was underway.
779
 However, just the day before the Air Corps 
had reported that the accident rate had been decreasing as a result of “the higher physical and 
mental standards of pilot material, the excellence of the Army training system and the quality of 
aircraft.”780 A year later, with the country at war, the Air Corps was still trying to balance the 
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accident rate with the quality of cadets. In a February 1942 press release, the War Department 
referred to the increase in aircraft accidents and fatalities since the start of the war noting,  
…that the accident rate has been steadily decreasing over a period of 
years, but with greatly increased volume of training and operations 
the actual number of accidents increases proportionally, while the rate 
remains the same. The lowering rate of accidents is due to the higher 
physical and mental standards of pilot material, the excellence of the 
Army training system and the quality of aircraft. All of these 
standards must be maintained in order to protect the flying personnel 
in the face of the increased pressure on training and the greater speeds 
and performance of modern aircraft.
781
 
 
A few months later Secretary of War Henry Stimson reported to the New York Times that the 
Army Air Forces accident rate was ten percent lower than the average between 1930 and 1940, 
adding that the Army Air Forces was emphasizing to the pilots that it was “their duty is to kill 
the enemy and not themselves.”782 
Even at the time, many commentators understood it to be inevitable that in flight training 
cadets would continue to kill themselves throughout the war. Before the United States entered 
the war, Brigadier General Herbert A. Dargue, in a Time magazine article, stated: “Let us face 
this situation with a calm realization that preparation for war takes its toll as well as war itself 
and that there is no more hazardous profession at arms than that which the combat flier has 
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elected to follow.”783 For the young cadets, the “calm realization” was that death was now a very 
real possibility. One cadet, Samuel Hynes, recalled in his memoirs: 
The reality of death comes to you in stages. First, it is an idea – all 
men are mortal, as in the syllogism. Then it is something that happens 
to strangers, then to persons you know, but somewhere else, and at 
last it enters your presence, and you see death, on a runway or in a 
field, in a cloud of dust and a column of smoke. . . .  At that moment, 
the life of flying changed.
784
 
 
In mid-1942, within two weeks of beginning operations as a basic flight school, Pecos Army 
Airfield suffered its first casualties.
785
 In June 1943, Pecos airfield reported the deaths of 25 
cadets in “weekly crashes.”786 At Randolph Field, near San Antonio, Texas (sometimes referred 
to as the “West Point of the Air” by the Air Corps), during a two-month period, in mid-1945, 
there were 27 accidents, two of them fatal resulting in nine fatalities. Fifteen of these accidents 
were directly attributed to pilot error and another seven were probably due to it as well.
787
 These 
two months were a particularly tough time for Randolph as half of the accidents and over half of 
the fatalities Randolph Field experienced in the first half of 1945 were during those same 
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months.
788
 However, as one Tuskegee airman pragmatically pointed out, after his class suffered 
its first fatality, “the pace of training seldom paused when such tragedies occurred.”789 
A 1943 War Department press release, prepared by the Office of Flying Safety, noted that 
during the first nine months of 1942 the fatality rate was only seventeen per 100,000 flying 
hours.
790
 That number sounds reasonable and more acceptable than the actual number of 
fatalities for that period, which was 1,279.
791
 However, the press release overlooked the fact that 
the total training fatalities for the first four months of 1943 was approaching 1,800, exceeding 
the final nine-month total for 1942 by nearly 500.
792
 In October 1943, Arnold suggested that one 
reason for the increase in fatalities was the increased number of heavy bombers and troop-
carrying aircraft and the fact that they carried larger crews and more passengers resulting in more 
fatalities whenever one of these aircraft went down.
793
 In addition, a memorandum on accident 
rates for 1943 and 1945 concluded that during that period the Army Air Forces was flying more 
hours in tactical aircraft (in the advanced and transitional phases of flight training) than trainers 
and therefore an increase in accidents was to be expected.
794
 The report concluded that the 
accident rate did not increase as much as anticipated.
795
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 It should be noted that the Women AirForce Service Pilots (WASP) compiled an 
admirable accident record during the war. The official history of the Office of Flying Safety 
noted that the accident rate for female pilots, “despite concerns to the contrary, was comparable 
to the men and for some months was better.”796 In 1944, the New York Times reported that the 
overall fatality rate for WASP pilots, which ran at .05 fatal accidents per 1,000 flight hours, was 
lower than the overall rate of .07 per 1,000 hours of flight time for the entire Army Air Force.
797
 
 The accident rate for men fluctuated over the course of the war, depending on the pace of 
training and the demand for pilots in the field. In one example from later in the war, the Army 
Air Forces Medical Office reported that fatalities in training had declined during most of 1944, 
but they showed a marked increase for the month of December.
798
 The Medical Office also 
reported that the fatality rate during first two months of 1945 was continuing to increase.
799
 This 
was unusual because the trend had been a decrease in accidents during the winter months when 
there was less flying being done due to the weather. To illustrate the Medical Office’s assertion: 
On the east coast, the 1
st
 Air Force suffered a total of 31 accidents in January 1945, which 
resulted in eleven fatalities.
800
 In February, the number of accidents was reduced to 24, and only 
seven of these were fatal. However, these seven accidents produced 31 fatalities.
801
 March was 
even worse for 1
st
 Air Force. During that month, there were 36 fatalities as the result of 35 
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accidents.
802
 Overall, 1
st
 Air Force averaged ten accidents and one fatality a day during the first 
three months of 1945. 
 Along with the human cost, there was the financial cost. In nearly 98 percent of all 
accidents that ended in a fatality, the airplane was a total loss.
803
 On the other hand, not every 
accident where the airplane was a total loss resulted in a fatality. For example, in the last six 
months of 1943, the Army Air Forces lost over 3,000 men and 10,000 aircraft in accidents.
804
 
However, it should be noted that for that same period, the Army Air Forces had over 100,000 
pilots in training and the United States produced over 40,000 aircraft of all types.
805
 The Office 
of Flying Safety estimated the financial cost in lost aircraft and equipment for that period at over 
$425,000,000.
806
 During the first six months of 1944, the trend in fatalities was on the rise, but 
the Army Air Forces lost only 2,600 aircraft in accidents, nearly a 9 percent reduction in 
accidents over the last six months of 1943.
807
 In noting this reduction, the Office of Flying safety 
projected the financial cost for 1944 “at merely a billion dollars.”808 
 In addition, a shortage of both aircraft and fuel contributed to the accident rate and 
reduced training time for pilots and crews. In 1942, 3
rd
Air Force reported that it was short 55 
percent of its heavy bombers for training and had to reduce flight time by 25 percent.
809
 As the 
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official history noted: “In the main . . . [airplane shortages] could not fail to affect training 
adversely either by delaying the completion of training of groups and crews or by limiting the 
extent of that training.
810
 For example, the P-38 training program in 1942 and 1943 was seriously 
affected by the shortage of both P-38’s and the lack of a trainer with dual controls. The P-38 was 
a complex and powerful twin-engine fighter, and the lack of a dual-control two-seat training 
version to help new pilots transition made the P-38 a difficult airplane to master.
811
 The AAF 
eventually developed a two-seat model for transition training, but not before there were 
numerous accidents and a lowering of morale in the P-38 training groups.
812
 Another concern 
was the shortage of high-octane fuel. The official history stated that this shortage was most 
critical in 1943 and that for the month of October alone the shortage of high-octane fuel caused 
the loss of 5,558 flying hours and the reduction in output of 60 pilots and 29 bomber 
crews.
813
This problem was not corrected until mid-1944, when sufficient refineries were 
operational.
814
 
 As noted previously, it was in primary flight training that a cadet was more likely to be 
eliminated for academic deficiency or lack of flying proficiency than he was to be killed in an 
accident. In fact, the rate for fatalities in primary flight training was below the Training 
Command average of two per 100,000 flight hours.
815
 One cadet attributed the lower rate for 
primary flight training to the type of aircraft used and to the fact that they flew strictly in daytime 
and good weather. By contrast, in basic and advanced flight training, the plane that the cadets 
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flew was more powerful and complex.
816
 The cadets were also required to master risky flight 
maneuvers in all conditions.
817
 Football star Tom Harmon recalled, after the war, that his class 
did not lose a member in training until they transitioned to basic flight training.
818
 
After primary flight training, however, the overall elimination rate went down, but the 
fatality rate went up. The accident rate for primary flight training was 48 per 100,000 flight 
hours, and 27 per 100,000 flight hours during basic flight training, but the number doubled to 55 
per 100,000 flight hours for advanced flight training (Table 5).
819
 In one three-month period in 
late 1944, 64 percent of the fatalities in flight training overall occurred during the advanced 
phase.
820
 Charles Watry recalled that during advanced training there was a rush to get in the 
required flight hours before graduation and that “as the paced quickened so did the accidents.”821 
A 1943 press release reporting on high-performance aircraft noted: “Planes of this type can never 
be safe; they are dangerous weapons of war in the hands of youngsters, comparatively 
inexperienced according to peacetime standards.”822 Cadets were welcomed to basic flight at 
Gunter Field, Alabama, with the following words: 
You will grow to like the BT-13s. They can act very smoothly, and 
they almost land themselves… [however] you may believe you are 
Hot Stuff, after learning snap, slow rolls, and everything else in a 
primary trainer; however, remember these planes [BT-13s] have a 
different feel—they are bigger, heavier, containing more gadgets 
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(flaps, 2 fuel tanks, stabilizer and rudder trim tabs, radio, etc.) and 
have different reference points than the primary [trainer]….823 
 
This admonition must have worked because there were only two American fatalities in the first 
two years of flight training at Gunter.
824
International officers were another matter that will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
 The Army Air Forces categorized accidents in three groups. Group I included 
accidents or damage: “1) Resulting in complete destruction or complete wreck of an 
aircraft; (2) As a result of collision in the air; (3) As a result of structural failure in the air 
of the aircraft, engine or propeller; (4) Resulting in the use of parachutes; (5) Resulting in 
fatalities or major injuries; (6) Involving important or distinguished personages; (7) 
Resulting in major damage to private property; (8) Resulting from aircraft becoming lost; 
(9) Involving civil aircraft. “Group II included [a]ll other aircraft accidents not listed 
above,” while Group III covered [a]ll other aircraft damages not listed above.825 
Army Air Force Regulation 62-14,“Reporting and Investigation of Aircraft Accidents”, 
required all Group I accidents be reported not only to the commanding officer of the owning 
command but also to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, General Henry “Hap” 
Arnold.
826
 Accidents in Groups II and III did not require a preliminary report to be forwarded to 
Headquarters Army Air Forces.
827
 Nonetheless, based on the criteria for Group I accidents, most 
accidents were reported directly to General Arnold. In addition, the regulation stipulated that for 
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Group I accidents a committee of three of the most experienced pilots in the command would be 
appointed to investigate the accident.
828
 For incidents in Groups II and III, only one officer 
would be appointed to investigate the accident.
829
 In May 1943, an intelligence officer was added 
to the team to assess if sabotage may have been involved. By 1945, the Army Air Force had 
formalized the investigative process to the extent that medical officers were part of the 
investigating team in order to assess physiological issues. It was at this same time that the Army 
Air Force Medical Office began publishing its own bulletin to acquaint medical officers with 
accident investigations.
830
 
During the first half of 1945, accidents in the Army Air Forces were divided into the 
following categories: landing, in-flight, taxiing, takeoff, and parked. Forty-one percent of 
accidents during this period occurred during landing, 35 percent in-flight, 12 percent while 
taxiing, 10 percent during takeoff, and 2 percent while the aircraft was parked. The Army Air 
Forces further subdivided these categories into types of accidents. For example, the category 
“landings,” which had the highest percentage of accidents, was broken down as follows: 31 
percent of landing accidents were “ground loops,” 18 percent were the result of a “wheels-up 
landing,” 9 percent “spins and stalls,” 8 percent due to a “hard landing,” 7 percent “inadvertent 
gear retraction,” 7 percent “under or over shooting the runway,” 7 percent from “collisions,” 6 
percent “nose-ups or nose-overs,” and 7 percent resulted from the nebulous “other.”831 
In-flight accidents formed the next largest category of accidents within the Army Air 
Forces. During the first half of 1945, 31 percent of in-flight accidents were the result of a “forced 
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landing;” 24 percent were due to “collisions with mountains, trees, and wires;” 11 percent were 
caused by “fire or explosion;” 7 percent were from “spins or stalls;” 6 percent came when the 
crew abandoned their aircraft; 4 percent were from “collisions between aircraft not in 
formation;” and a rather high 15 percent were listed as “other.”832 The last category was 
indicative of the number of aircraft that were lost to unknown causes. 
The last three categories — taxiing, takeoff, and parked — comprised nearly one quarter 
of the accidents in the Army Air Force during the first half of 1945. Within these categories, 
collisions, ground loops, and “incomplete take-off” made up the preponderance of the causes.833 
Even though these statistics represent one six-month period, they all remained consistent 
throughout the war.  
Within these groups, the Office of Flying Safety divided accidents into four broad 
categories: personnel error, material failure, miscellaneous, and undetermined.
834
 During the first 
half of 1945, the Army Air Forces reported the following factors that contributed to accidents: 
Some 55 percent were caused by “pilot error,”13 percent “other personnel errors,” 17 percent 
“material failure,” and 14 percent “miscellaneous factors.”835 There were many reasons for these 
accidents such as pilot error, instructor error, violation of regulations, and mechanical error. The 
1943 Accident Facts book noted that landings consistently led in the category “nature of 
accidents,” citing that nearly 48 percent of accidents in the first half of fiscal 1943 occurred 
during landing; by comparison, the rate for 1945 was 41 percent.
836
 The report also noted that 
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this rate had been relatively constant since 1930.
837
 In early 1944, the New York Times reported 
that the most frequent kind of fatal accident was “collision in full flight with mountains, trees, 
telephone poles and other stationary objects.”838 However, a postwar study determined that spins 
and stalls accounted for the most fatalities.
839
 
During the first half of 1944, over 1,100 accidents were attributed to instructor 
error.
840
The Army Air Force considered this to be inevitable given “the size of the AAF training 
program and the premium on speedy output of pilots….”841 The Army Air Forces attributed 
instructor error to two causes: “First was the impossibility of always selecting as instructors 
those most fit to provide adequate instruction; and second was the difficulty of establishing a 
uniform and adequate course of instruction which would be universally applied.”842 In addition, 
in some cases the instructors were charged with permitting students to commit unsafe acts or not 
intervening quickly enough to prevent an accident.
843
In many cases, the instructors themselves 
set the tone for acceptable behavior in the air. Instructors were known to play chicken with trains 
at crossings or to go “hot-dogging” over the houses of girlfriends.844 In addition, in some cases 
the instructor was not much better trained in the aircraft being flown than were the cadets. One 
cadet recalled that his advanced flight-training instructor had exactly four hours more time in the 
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AT-17 twin-engine trainer than his students.
845
 He further stated that the instructor in this 
instance, besides being a bad instructor, was also afraid of the plane and could not fly it very 
well.
846
 
In the first half of 1944, lack of proficiency in the model flown was found to be the cause 
of over 2,000 accidents. In addition, the Army Air Forces found that 37 percent of pilot error 
accidents in cargo aircraft involved pilots with fewer than ten hours of flying time in the 
aircraft.
847
 In September 1944, there were 236 violations of regulations; these violations led to 70 
accidents resulting in eleven fatalities.
848
 During a six-month period, 553 accidents were 
attributed to airport conditions.
849
 Collisions with other aircraft, other types of vehicles, and other 
airport equipment were the leading cause of these accidents.
850
 Next came taxiing accidents 
many of which were attributed to “confusion at airports.”851 Looking to the future, a 1946 
Medical Section Safety Bulletin hinted that shortcuts in control tower operations may have been 
acceptable under wartime conditions but should not be condoned in peacetime.
852
 
 Over 2,700 accidents during the war were attributed to bad weather conditions.
853
 A 
postwar Army Air Forces report found that during the first seven months of 1944 one out of 
every five fatalities, for a total of 632, occurred on an extended flight.
854
 The leading cause was 
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flying into or being caught by bad weather followed by poor navigation.
855
 The report went on to 
state that between January and May 1944 an average of 50 accidents per month were the result of 
the pilot “getting lost.”856 Not surprisingly, the Army Air Forces reported that the accident rate 
for night flying was two to four times greater than during the day.
857
 A combination of the two 
could be deadly on a training flight. For example, a training flight composed of 34 Royal Air 
Force (RAF) students and nine American instructors ran into bad weather during the return leg of 
a night cross-country flight. That night, twelve planes out of 35 crashed resulting in the death of 
seven student pilots.
858
 In another, more poignant, example, one unfortunate pilot became lost on 
a night navigation training flight. The pilot eventually identified an airfield and after landing 
discovered he was only 40 miles from his home field. At 0245, the pilot and his gunner took off 
again; they were expected back at their base by 0330. The accident report ends with the simple 
yet haunting sentence, “The airplane was never heard from again.”859 
 Almost from its inception, the Air Force placed the majority of the blame for accidents on 
the pilots. In 1974, retired Air Force General Noel Parrish recalled that the Air Corps of the 
1930s was a dangerous place. In an interview as part of the Air Force’s Oral History program, 
General Parrish told Air Force historian Dr. James C. Hasdorff that fifteen of the 96 members of 
his advanced flight training class died in accidents within a year of graduation.
860
These were 
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“[m]ostly from pilot error.”861 In Global Mission, Arnold recalled that after every crash, despite 
the sometimes-crude state of early aviation technology, it was “seldom the plane, or an unknown 
quantity in the air, but almost always the pilot, who was blamed for being in error.”862 However, 
in another book, This Flying Game, Arnold had stated: “Hazard in the air will always be 
primarily due to pilotage errors; conversely, safety aloft must be placed to the credit of pilot 
skill.”863 On 24 April 1942, the chief of the Office of Flying Safety reported to the New York 
Times that “Human failure is the basic problem.”864 He added that fewer than 14 percent of 
accidents were the result of mechanical failure.”865 
Even later, when technology was more advanced, the pilot was “almost always” the 
cause. In early 1942, the Office of Flying Safety reported: “Analysis of aircraft accidents during 
the past twelve years shows that on the average 69 percent of all accidents are due to personnel 
error and that 64 percent of all accidents are due to pilot error. These percentages have been 
increasing. In the fiscal year 1941, the percentages were 80 and 75, respectively.”866 A 1943 
report concluded, in spite of evidence to the contrary, that, even in cases where mechanical 
failure was the cause, “…it might be surmised that often the maintenance personnel may not be 
fulfilling their duties properly, but since the pilot should be able to land in spite of the engine 
failure, he is charged with the blame.”867 
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However, over the course of the war, the rate, as reported, showed a downward trend. A 
January 1944 New York Times article noted that 48 percent of all fatal accidents were the result 
of personnel error, a number that was supported by the 1
st
 Air Force in 1945.
868
 The 1
st
 Air 
Force’s June 1945 Safety Bulletin stated that pilot error accounted for 50 percent of all accidents 
and four fatalities for the month of May.
869
 Nonetheless, between 1940 and the first half of 1945, 
the Army Air Forces attributed 39,000 or 75 percent of all accidents to pilot error.
870
 In August 
1942 a new section was added to the Directorate of Flying Safety to address the increasing 
number of accidents attributed to pilot error; it was called Educational Projects.
871
 For the first 
time the Army Air Forces began investigating how to educate pilots about safety and accident 
prevention.
872
 
 A postwar study by the Army Air Forces separated pilot errors into the following 
categories: 19 percent misused power plant or flight controls; 15 percent failed to coordinate 
controls; 14 percent unfamiliar with aircraft or not proficient with instruments; 12 percent failed 
to see and avoid obstacles; 10 percent misused landing gear controls or brakes; 4 percent violated 
flying regulations; and 4 percent did not make adequate flight preparations.
873
 
  However, based on the accident reports and recollections of the pilots, the vast majority 
could have been attributed to the unstated category of “overconfidence.” As noted previously, 
Arnold cautioned that there was a brief period in flight training when a cadet “becomes 
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overconfident and knows more about flying than he will ever know again.”874 He considered this 
the most dangerous period in a pilot’s career.875 
Pilot error was the cause of 86 percent of accidents during primary flight training and 
caused 63 percent of the fatalities.
876
 In basic flight training, the percentage of accidents was 
slightly lower at 81 percent; however, 73 percent of fatalities were directly attributable to the 
pilot.
877
 A 1943 report noted that the majority of accidents in advanced training could be 
attributed to “carelessness” on the part of the student pilots.878 The report concluded: “It has been 
observed that in several cases, Advanced Flying School students seem to underestimate the 
hazards or to overestimate their ability.”879 In an attempt to curb some of this enthusiasm, a 1943 
report recommended that students be reminded that “Instructions and regulations are made by 
older, more experienced men for the sole purpose of making the students’ training complete and 
safe.”880 
 The official history for Randolph Field noted that “Pilots still tend to be overconfident 
and careless in the AT-6 [an advanced trainer], and practically all accidents are the result of pilot 
error.”881 In one instance, a cadet, after his first solo flight in basic flight training, flew back to 
his primary flight-training airfield to show off for his old instructor. He was killed due to a high-
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speed stall.
882
 Another cadet, Phillip Ardery, recalled returning from a ferry flight and the pilots 
putting on their customary “rat race,” performing various maneuvers over the field before 
landing.
883
 In another instance, he recalled a “rat race” with a fellow pilot. “It was a sort of 
follow-the-leader with each trying to outdo each other.”884 However, he did claim that, in spite of 
the risk, “This flying was great training for us….”885 General Parrish summed it best in a postwar 
interview when he recalled: 
Crashes — mostly pilot error, and most of it was from high-spirited 
behavior. We, of course, had no radios in the planes, and people 
would take chances on weather…. Doing stunts, flying under things, 
flying low, especially, and pulling up. Most of us had no strong desire 
to get up where it was terribly lonesome and fly around, other than to 
do a little acrobatics, but to get down low where people could see us, 
because we attracted an awful lot of attention. Everybody came out to 
watch….This was too much temptation and led to a few crashes of 
people doing stunts, pulling out, flying low, and pulling steep climbs, 
and things of that sort — doing acrobatics at low altitudes. Some of it 
was engine failure, things of that sort would cause it, but it was a very 
risky life.
886
 
 
While the crash of a ten-place bomber had the potential for more fatalities than the crash of a 
single-seat fighter, it was fighter pilots in training who suffered a higher rate of fatalities. With 
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an emphasis on acrobatics and risk taking, the rate for these pilots was 70 for every 100,000 
flight hours.
887
 
 The accidents of foreign nationals in Army Air Forces flight training were assigned to the 
same categories, as noted before, as for American cadets. Even though they were tracked and 
reported separately, their numbers were rolled up in the final tabulations for the Army Air 
Forces. The official history of foreign pilot training notes that British cadets “were notorious for 
their indifference to American flying regulations.”888 For example, “The students buzzed 
highways at low altitude, causing car wrecks; flew under bridges; dog-fought [sic] above the 
town; and took great delight in bouncing their planes in front of vehicles on the highways.”889 
The history failed to mention that American cadets were partial to the same stunts. In addition, 
according to the official history, “they [the British cadets] had even developed the notion that it 
was smart [meaning it was a badge of honor] to walk away from an accident, and at one time 
eighteen planes were wrecked at one airfield in the space of four days.”890 
During 1942, at Gunter Army Air Field in Alabama, 20 British students were killed while 
only five Americans died in training.
891
 Another field reported that it did not have any training 
accidents until the British arrived, and then it had sixteen, eleven involving British students.
892
 
The airfield personnel did not explicitly claim that there was a correlation. However, the History 
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of Foreign Training in ATC, 1941–1976, in a bit of national chauvinism, attributed the British 
accidents to the fact that 
…most of the British students were unaccustomed to driving 
automobiles and did not have mechanical toys as children. 
Consequently, it was believed, they were lacking in mechanical 
aptitude. Poor eyesight was also blamed, because the RAF’s 
standards of visual acuity were lower than those of the Army Air 
Corps.
893
 
 
 Several of the accidents and fatalities suffered by French cadets were due to a change in 
the program of instruction requested by their air force. In December 1944, based on reports from 
the field, “on-the-deck” flying was added to the training regimen.894 The cadet was required to 
fly below fifty feet in simulated strafing runs. While there were not any serious injuries during 
this training, there were numerous accidents, enough that “it was thought prudent to do away 
with flying under fifty feet to eliminate further accidents at this height.”895 The program of 
instruction was eventually modified to have the “cadet reduce his altitude to fifty feet over a 
period of flights.”896 
 Even instructors were not immune to “pilot error.” In a postwar interview, Major General 
David V. Miller recalled the time when, as an instructor, he landed with his wheels up. In the 
interview, he pointed out that the landing gear warning horn was sounding, but he 
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absentmindedly switched it off because it was “making too much noise.”897 After touching down 
and before realizing his mistake, General Miller recalled thinking to himself, “this field is sure 
rough since the last time I landed.”898He said he owned up to his mistake and reported it as 
“100% pilot error.”899 Miller also concluded that many accidents, especially in more complex 
twin-engine aircraft, were the result of the Air Corps’ lack of familiarity with that type of 
aircraft.
900
 
 A postwar study by the Office of the Air Surgeon admitted that some accidents that had 
been attributed to “pilot error” were sometimes due to poor design or poor layout of controls.901 
This was also sometimes categorized as “misuse of controls.” Misuse of controls covered a wide 
variety of errors from confusing switches to failing to switch fuel tanks.
902
For instance, 
confusing the flap and landing gear switches accounted for 457 accidents during a 20-month 
period of the war.
903
 In one aircraft, the AT-10 twin-engine trainer, confusing the flap and 
landing gear switches was the cause of 78 accidents in early 1943.
904
 Later that same year, the 
switches were modified and relocated in the cockpit; that relatively simple change was credited 
with reducing the accident rate in the AT-10 to seven for the remainder of the year.
905
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The operation of the fuel selector valve was blamed for several accidents in basic flight 
training. The investigating officer recommended that the Air Corps should determine if a better-
designed selector valve was available.
906
 The same report suggested that a review of the layout of 
controls should be conducted on all aircraft in the Army Air Forces.
907
 The report concluded: “A 
pilot becomes accustomed to reaching for a lever in a particular place; then he changes the type 
of plane and has difficulty.”908 For example, Charles Watry in his memoirs described a 
potentially dangerous situation he put himself and his crew in through his own error. He was on 
his fourth flight in a B-25 during advanced training. When the instructor called for an adjustment 
in the controls, Watry reached for the controls where they would have been on his previous 
aircraft. Unfortunately, the arrangement on the controls of B-25 was not the same — in fact, it 
was the opposite — and Watry’s actions almost shut off the fuel to the engines. Even though the 
controls were the same color in both aircraft, the positioning was different. Watry admitted he 
“had acted from habit not from logic.”909 
Another category created by the Army Air Forces was “Other Personnel Error.” This 
category was a catch-all for errors by “maintenance personnel, crew members, flying instructors, 
supervisory personnel, etc.”910 It was noted in the Accident Bulletin for Medical Investigators 
issue for February 1945 that this category accounted for one-fifth of all accidents in the last 
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quarter of 1944.
911
 In October 1944 alone, two accidents a day were attributed to this category.
912
 
Other personnel errors were broken down into the following categories: 36 percent supervisory; 
20 maintenance; 17 percent instructor; 17 percent crewmembers; and 10 percent and an 
undefined “other.” 
 Supervisory personnel included tower personnel and anyone involved with approving 
flights. Therefore, this category includes dispatching aircraft in less than optimal conditions, 
failing to mark obstacles on the field, incorrect weather forecasts, and inadequate directions 
from the tower.
913
 For example, Major General Miller recalled an incident in which in the name 
of efficiency the base commander established two control towers, one for each squadron. The 
experiment lasted long enough for two planes, on night flight training, to collide.
914
 In 
recounting more of the “beno” rules at his airfield, Charles Watry noted that one of the rules 
was “there would ‘beno’ sleeping on the flight line.”915 Watry recalled that the stress of flight 
training and lack of sleep were causing pilot errors.
916
 He said that this rule stayed in effect until 
the flight surgeon ordered cots to be placed in the ready room so that cadets could sleep on them 
between flights.
917
 It was reported in 1943 that many accidents attributed to weather were 
actually the result of pilots being cleared for an instrument flight without the supervisory 
personnel certifying that the pilot was properly trained for instrument flying.
918
 Another 
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instance of increased supervision came in early 1945 when the commander of Air Training 
Command informed one of his subordinate commanders that the Army Air Forces had recently 
suffered seventeen accidents, that ten of those were attributable to weather conditions, and that 
all ten of those accidents were fatal.
919
 He wanted to emphasize that even though winter was 
upon them, the answer to accident prevention was not the curtailment of activities but “better 
supervision during the flight planning process.”920 
 Maintenance errors ran the gamut from installing the improper part or installing the right 
part improperly, to leaving tools and other objects in the aircraft.
921
 However, it must be kept in 
mind that the number of maintenance personnel was expanding as rapidly as the aircrews, so 
there were bound to be some inadequately trained maintenance personnel. At other times, it 
could be a combination of supervisory and maintenance errors. For example, a report from the 
Air Staff to the Commanding General, Air Training Command was the culmination of an eight-
month investigation into the cause of a fatal crash of a C-54 transport airplane. The 
investigation found that improper maintenance practices, such as a locally fabricated gasket and 
overlooking frayed cables, contributed to the crash. In addition to the maintenance issues, it was 
discovered that on 64 flights the aircraft had been operated on “red diagonal.” This meant that it 
was known that the aircraft had mechanical problems, but an officer in the chain of command, 
usually the executive officer, authorized the aircraft for use.
922
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 Many accidents were attributed to two groups the Army Air Forces was reluctant to 
discuss. Pilots returning form combat assignments formed the first group, and those with a “fear 
of flying” made up the second. In 1943, Lieutenant W. F. Dougherty of the Air Staff sent an 
embarrassing memorandum to Lieutenant W. S. Griswold of the Army Air Forces Historical 
Office concerning returning pilots. In the memorandum, Dougherty noted that Lieutenant 
Colonel E. N. Townsend, the commander of Region Ten, reported that many pilots with combat 
experience were not qualified to fly cross-country navigation flights because, “When flying 
combat missions, they follow the leader or depend on their navigator.”923 The same document 
recommended that flight surgeons spend more time with returning pilots in order to assess their 
mental state. As the memorandum noted, “One interview is not sufficient for psychoanalysis, 
and it is evident that the daring and cockiness instilled in combat pilots lingers after return to the 
continental limits of the United States, and it is something that should not be removed by quick 
extraction.”924 In addition, in August 1945, the Office of Flying Safety requested that 
supervisors take a more active role in accident prevention, especially for returning combat pilots 
and those awaiting reassignment. They were exhorted to enforce “air discipline to eliminate 
needless accidents resulting from flagrant violations of flying regulations.”925 The problem 
became more acute after the war and the Army Air Forces Safety Council noted its concern over 
the increased accident rate among experienced pilots returning from overseas.
926
 The Council 
suggested that returning pilots were having a difficult time transitioning to lighter aircraft after 
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flying heavier combat aircraft.
927
 The rise in the accident rate was also attributed to the loss of 
maintenance personnel and supervisors in flying schools due to demobilization.
928
 The last 
cause cited by the Council was pilots taking a “farewell” flight before leaving the service.929 
According to the Safety Council, the best solution to this last problem was to remove pilots 
from flight status as they approached the date of their discharge from the Army.
930
 
 The other category was more sensitive for the Army Air Forces to address. For obvious 
reasons, the Army Air Forces considered “fear of flying,” also referred to as “lack of incentive 
for flying,” as the most “vexing and harassing” of all grounds for dismissals.931 In the first nine 
months of 1944, the Army Air Forces averaged fewer than 20 discharges for “fear of flying”; 
however, the number rose to 63 in October 1944. The Army Air Forces believed the rise was 
due to a change in the regulations making the separation of inferior pilots easier so that units 
were no longer reassigning officers with a “lack of incentive for flying” to administrative 
duties.
932
 Officers so categorized, but who were of “mature judgment and extensive service,” 
could be retained because it was assumed that these officers could still contribute in non-flying 
assignments.
933
 For example, based on problems in finding suitable pilots and crews for the B-
29 program, the commander of 2
nd
Air Force, who was responsible for preparing the first B-29 
group for combat, suggested that it would be beneficial to remove more senior officers from 
flight status who were no longer useful to the Army Air Forces as pilots. However, he also 
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recommended that they should be released “with a ‘pat on the back’ for a job ‘well done.’”934 
On the other hand, newer officers were a different matter. The official history stated that “young 
officers who had been trained and commissioned for the sole purpose of flying were of value 
only in that role; if they refused to perform it, they were to be eliminated from the AAF.”935 The 
training regimen was not perfect, and sometimes cadets made it through who were not very 
good pilots. In those cases, the officers were offered to Army Ground Forces (AGF).
936
 
Nonetheless, the results, in the long term, reaffirmed the Army Air Forces’ selection 
procedures. The Army Air Forces conducted a study of 9,000 cadets in the 2
nd
 Air Force to 
determine the correlation between stanine scores and accidents. The study found that the lower 
the stanine score the greater the chance of the pilot being involved in a “pilot error” accident.937 
As a postwar safety study stated: “. . . while a large proportion of all aircraft accidents can be 
traced to the pilot as the immediate cause, avoidance of these errors often depends upon 
improvements in the aircraft rather than the pilot.”938 Throughout the war, material failure was 
the primary contributing factor in more than 13,000 accidents. The following categories made 
up the majority of these accidents: 5,500 power plant failures, 4,400 landing gear failure, and 
over 1,000 to airframe failures.
939
 
 A 1944 New York Times article noted: “The safest plane is the primary trainer and the 
most dangerous is the fighter, with the light bomber, the medium and heavy bombers following 
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in that order.”940 The article went on: “The fatality rate in flying training alone is about the same 
as before the war but it is during combat training that the rate rises.”941 A postwar study noted: 
“The design of military aircraft has been predicated on many factors other than safety.”942 
Safety considerations were limited to such things as “wing loading, adequate power, protective 
armor, or seat belts.”943 In late 1942, Lieutenant General George Brett, one of the pioneers of 
the Army Air Forces, told the New York Times that the Army Air Forces was not going to build 
“freak airplanes.” He was referring to his own assumption and that of many other leaders in the 
Army Air Forces that Axis aircraft designers were “willing to risk their pilots’ lives to enhance 
performance, an assumption that was wrong.”944 Nonetheless, General Brett added, as reported 
in the New York Times: 
“We aren’t going to sacrifice a single item essential to safety in order 
to save weight,” he added, “We aren’t going to sacrifice essential 
armament to gain another 500 feet of altitude. We’ll get that other 
ways. We aren’t going to eliminate leak-proof gasoline tanks or 
parachutes or any other form of protection.”945 
 
However, there were instances when accidents resulted from design decisions. For 
example, numerous accidents were attributed to poor visibility out of the cockpit.
946
 In another 
case, the Accident Bulletin for Medical Officers for February 1945 stated that the P-47 was noted 
for having its running lights built into the wing, making them difficult to see from behind, 
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leading to possible accidents.
947
 One cadet, Charles Watry, blamed the training program and the 
aircraft itself for his slow progress in learning how to fly the B-25 Mitchell medium bomber. He 
recalled that cadets were not allowed to conduct “touch-and-go” landings but had to taxi back to 
the end of the runway to take off again. The cadet then had to fly around for 30 minutes to let the 
brakes cool off before he could practice another landing.
948
 
Some airplanes acquired a bad reputation because of design flaws or flight 
characteristics. As Arnold noted in his postwar memoir, “In my long experience with airmen and 
airplanes, I have learned that if the flyers themselves come to genuinely believe that a certain 
plane is a “’Flying Coffin’ or a ‘Man Killer,’ then it is definitely a ‘Flying Coffin’ or a ‘Man 
Killer’ until they have been convinced otherwise.”949 Other names crews gave to the planes were 
of a lighter nature. For instance, Charles Watry mentioned some his fellow pilots’ names for the 
AT-17 Bobcat twin-engine trainer, such as “Bamboo Bomber” or “Termites Delight,” which 
highlighted the plane’s wooden construction.950 
In his memoir Global Mission, Arnold discussed dealing with perception and reality 
when it came to aircraft. During World War One, the DH-4 was called the “Flying Coffin” by 
the crews because the fuel tank was located between the pilot and observer.
951
 After the fuel tank 
was moved, the crews felt more secure and the name was dropped. Arnold stated that he had 
observed the same phenomenon during World War Two concerning the B-26 Marauder, a twin-
engine medium bomber, and the P-38Lightning, a twin-engine single-seat fighter. For example, 
in the first six months of 1944 over 25 of all P-38 accidents were fatal, while the other four 
                                                 
947
 Medical Safety Division, Accident Bulletin for Medical Investigators, 3. 
948
 Watry, Washout!: The Aviation Cadet Story, 128. 
949
 Arnold, Global Mission, 67. 
950
 Watry, Washout!: The Aviation Cadet Story, 113. 
951
 Arnold, Global Mission, 67. 
172 
 
primary fighter types averaged fewer than thirteen fatal accidents all combined.
952
 The P-38 also 
illustrates the tradeoff between safety and performance. The Safety Office recommended that fire 
extinguishers be fitted toP-38 engines in order to reduce accidents due to engine fires.
953
 The 
Material and Services Division countered that recommendation by pointing out that the P-38 was 
already overloaded and the extinguishers would increase the weight by 58 pounds, which would 
hinder the overall performance of the aircraft.
954
 The Material Division assured General Arnold 
that it was pursuing other means to reduce engine fires.
955
 
 In the case of the B-26, the Army Air Force’s Safety Board concluded that the primary 
problem with the B-26 was inexperienced air and ground crews plus the increased weight of the 
aircraft to meet combat conditions without an increase in power.
956
 In due course, it gained a 
reputation not only as a “Man Killer” but also as a maintenance problem. At one point, in 1943, 
the maintenance problems with the B-26 were so severe that at one school there were only nine 
aircraft for 92 students.
957
 In another instance, the demand for pilots forced the graduation of one 
class after only one solo flight.
958
 Because of its reputation as a deadly airplane, emergency 
procedures received more emphasis in transition training for the B-26 than any other aircraft 
during the war.
959
 
                                                 
952
 Memorandum for Brigadier General Kenneth C. Royall, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, Subject: Hood 
Committee Investigation – P40 and C46 Foreign Accidents, 31 July 1945. 
953
 Memorandum from Executive Officer Material and Services Division to Chief of Air Staff, March 1945. 
954
 Ibid. 
955
 Ibid. 
956
 Robert Jackson, Infamous Aircraft: Dangerous Designs and their Vices (Barnsley, U.K.: Pen & Sword Aviation, 
2005), 61. 
957
 United States Army Air Forces, Army Air Forces Historical Study, no 18: Pilot Transition to Combat Aircraft 
(Maxwell AFB AL: United States Army Air Forces Historical Division, 1944), 194. 
958
 Ibid., 172. 
959
 Ibid., 81. 
173 
 
 In 1942, Congress was on the verge of cancelling production of the B-26 because of the 
number of accidents in training whereas the crews flying them in combat campaigned to keep it 
in production.
960
 The Army Air Forces took further measures in 1943 to rehabilitate the 
reputation of the B-26 by sending combat experienced crews to the training bases to give lectures 
and demonstrations on the capabilities of the aircraft.
961
 Over time these visits improved morale 
and enhanced the cadets confidence in the B-26; in fact, at one base after one of these visits, one 
third of the class volunteered for B-26 training.
962
 Nevertheless, the B-26 never completely shed 
its image as a dangerous plane. For instance, in late 1943, WASP pilot Sara Chapin expressed 
hope that she would not “get” B-26s coming out of flight school. As she explained in a letter to 
her mother, “I don’t think I’m hot enuf [sic]—and there have bin [sic] too many accidents.”963 
 The two primary heavy bombers throughout the war, the B-17 Flying Fortress and the B-
24 Liberator, accounted for 32 percent of the flight training fatalities in the Continental United 
States.
964
 However, the B-24 was the deadlier of the two (Table 6). Between 1942 and 1943, the 
B-24 was the deadliest bomber during training. In 1943 alone, 850 men lost their lives in 298 
accidents.
965
 One group lost seven planes and 43 men in one six-week period.
966
 At a 1943 
training conference concerning the B-24, it was agreed that “the actual flying of a B-24 airplane, 
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by a young [new] pilot [because it was a more complex and demanding aircraft], was thirty 
percent more difficult than the flying of a B-17 airplane, as the B-17 was more conventional in 
design and operation and was more like what the young pilot had been accustomed to.
967
 
Instrument training, in particular, was much easier to accomplish in a B-17 than in a B-24 
airplane.”968 Philip Ardery, a B-24 instructor, stated in his memoirs that a spate of crashes by B-
24s was attributed [by the pilots] to “poorly rebuilt engines” and green pilots unfamiliar with 
emergency procedures.
969
He recalled that the result of these crashes was “near panic among the 
pilots.”970 
 After the B-26, the next most infamous airplane for accidents was the B-29 Superfortress. 
The B-29 represented a giant leap in technology and complexity for the Army Air Forces. In 
addition, a significant amount of financial and material resources had been diverted to the B-29 
program; therefore, special steps were taken to insure the crews were properly trained. When it 
was introduced, it was deemed so advanced that the Army Air Forces established special 
requirements for assignment to that plane. For instance, priority was given to pilots with 1,000 
hours of four-engine flying time.
971
 In addition, according to the official history of combat crew 
training, accidents with the B-29 occurred so frequently that more instruction on bailout and 
                                                 
967
 The B-24 was a radical design for its time. It outperformed the B-17 in speed, range, and bomb load but it was 
difficult to fly. Partially this as due to its new wing design that allowed the plane to fly higher than the B-17 but it 
also required more control input. This flaw made it difficult for new pilots to maintain formation, a requirement for 
the Army Air Forces precision bombing doctrine.   
968
 United States Army Air Forces, Army Air Forces Historical Study, no 18: Pilot Transition to Combat Aircraft, 
148. 
969
 Ardery, Bomber Pilot: A Memoir of World War II, 51. 
970
 Ibid., 51. 
971
 United States Army Air Forces, Army Air Forces Historical Study, No 18: Pilot Transition to Combat Aircraft, 
77. 
175 
 
ditching procedures was recommended along with reduced load limits during the initial training 
flights.
972
 
 Over time, the B-29 began gaining a reputation similar to that of the B-26 and began 
causing a similar concern among the senior leaders of the Army Air Forces. One example was a 
letter from Brigadier General Lauris Norstad, Chief of Staff of the first unit to be equipped with 
the B-29, to the Chief of Air Staff concerning the increasing number of B-29 accidents caused by 
engine fires. Norstad stated that at the current rate it would not be unforeseeable for the rate to be 
“something like one ‘accident’ per day.”973 He gave no explanation for putting the word accident 
in quotation marks. However, General Norstad’s prediction was not far off the mark; between 1 
September and 24 November 1944, the rate was nearly one accident every two days.
974
 Engine 
fires continued to be a problem in the B-29 program. For example, in a letter to Deputy 
Commanding General and Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Barney Giles, Major General 
Robert B. Williams, the Commanding General 2
nd
 Air Force, voiced his concern that the fear of 
engine fires in B-29s was causing crews to abort training flights over minor malfunctions.
975
 The 
Army Air Forces’ response to this problem was similar to that taken with the B-26. However, 
there was a chauvinistic twist. One of the Army Air Forces’ most experienced pilots with the B-
29, Colonel Paul Tibbets, was tasked to find a way to convince the men that the plane was safe. 
His solution was to train two WASP pilots to fly the B-29.
976
 He chose Dora Dougherty and 
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Dorothea Johnson Moorman from a group of eight volunteers at Eglin Field, FL.
977
 In a matter of 
days, Tibbets trained Dora as the pilot and Dorothea as co-pilot.
978
 Not surprisingly, one of the 
plane’s engines caught fire during the check ride but both followed the standard emergency 
procedures and safely landed the plane.
979
 The next step in Tibbets’ plan was to take the women 
around the B-29 airfields to put on demonstration flights to shame the men and show them that 
“even a woman” could fly the plane.980 
On the other hand, at times, some short cuts were taken in order to get the plane into 
combat. For example, Major General Kenneth B. Wolfe, chief of the B-29 program, suggested 
combining testing and training to save time in the B-29 program. His recommendation was to 
take new crews and have them conduct the flight test of a plane just coming off the assembly line 
as they trained. Wolfe estimated that this change would save six months if a plane from the 
assembly line was matched up with a crew in transition training. Arnold approved this change 
and commended Wolfe for his recommendation in the annual report to the Secretary of War.
981
 
 In another instance, a memorandum dated 18 June 1945 from the Headquarters of Flying 
Training Command to the Commander of Randolph Field, where B-29 transition training was 
taking place, informed the commander that the training must conform to Army Air Force policies 
“as closely as possible. However, you are authorized to graduate [a] crew when the airplane 
commander has accomplished one day solo and one night solo flight and has a minimum of 15 
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hours.”982 The memorandum from Flying Training Command went on to add “In all instances 
the pilot, copilot, and flight engineer of the crew will receive as much ground training as 
possible,” leaving the definition of “as possible” open to interpretation.983 
 “Material failure” was another major category of accidents. In 1945, an Army Air Forces 
study revealed that nearly 40 percent of accidents during the previous six months were the result 
of material failure.
984
 The Army Air Forces identified the following sub-categories under 
material failure: 45 percent power plant; 29 percent landing gear; 7 percent airframe; and 19 
percent other. 
Beginning in 1944, a disproportionate number of accidents began to occur with the AT-6 
trainer. The Office of Flying Safety began a special investigation into the problem. It was 
eventually determined that the majority of accidents were attributable to a “material failure of the 
fuel system resulting in fire or explosion.” In early 1945, General Arnold became so concerned 
about fires in C-46 transport aircraft that he directed a special study be completed to find out 
why these fires were occurring.
985
 The report concluded that, although 10 percent of C-46 
accidents between September 1944 and February 1945 had been attributed to fire, a closer 
examination of the accident reports indicated that only 5 percent could be specifically attributed 
to it. The rest were the result of maintenance or mechanical failure.
986
 In addition, in some cases, 
the “material failure” could be traced back to the manufacturer. In 1943, there was a scandal 
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concerning defective engines being produced by the Curtiss-Wright company. The Truman 
Committee, formally known as the Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National 
Defense Program, announced in July, after a six-month investigation, that the Curtiss-Wright 
Corporation, with the aid of Army Air Forces personnel, had conspired to sell the government 
defective engines.
987
 Moreover, in an interesting memorandum, the Assistant Chief of the Air 
Staff for Material and Services reviewed the accidents of four prototype P-80 jet aircraft. He 
noted the “mechanical failure” in the case of each accident; however, no mention was made of 
the fate of the pilots.
988
 
 There were numerous investigations conducted by the Army Air Forces during the war. 
The Army Air Forces regulation on accidents, Army Air Force Regulation 62-14, “Reporting and 
Investigation of Aircraft Accidents,” stated that investigations were conducted for one reason: 
“To establish causes in order that preventive action may be taken.”989 The regulation set the 
parameters for all investigations as well: “In order to establish ‘cause,’ the investigation must be 
thorough, searching, and in detail, and in addition proceed according to a logical plan. Lack of a 
plan of investigation generally results in overlooking the item responsible for the accident.”990 
According to the regulation, “for study and analysis,” the investigator was to classify accidents 
by “Cause,” “Nature,” “Results to personnel,” and “Damage to material.”991 These were to be 
further sub-divided into three categories: “Major,” “Minor,” and “Underlying.”992 According to 
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regulation, “Statistically, the ‘Major’ and ‘Minor’ groups are sufficient to provide the necessary 
data for studies in trends, for studies in control, etc.; however, for critical analysis leading to 
corrective action, both individually and as a group, the ‘Underlying Cause’ assumes paramount 
importance.”993 
 The investigating officers were given wide latitude in executing their duties. The 
regulation noted: 
The investigation will be in sufficient detail to determine the nature, 
cause, and results of the accident or damage. The officer or officers 
charged with the investigation are authorized to interview witnesses, 
take testimony, and obtain the professional opinion of experts and to 
take whatever steps necessary to secure sufficient evidence upon 
which to base accurate findings.
994
 
 
In one instance, “whatever steps necessary” included drugging a witness. During the 
investigation into the ditching of a B-17, the investigators noted discrepancies between the 
pilot’s account and those of some members of the crew.995 The board received permission to 
interview the pilot using sodium pentothal.
996
 Nevertheless, even under the effects of the drug, 
the pilot’s account remained the same. The report went on to caution: 
The Office of the Surgeon General wishes to make clear its policy on the 
use of sodium pentothal. Pentothal is to be used in the investigation of 
aircraft accidents only if a psychiatrically trained medical officer feels that 
an amnesia exists. Pentothal is not to be used when it is felt that the 
subject is not telling the truth, unless its use is ordered by the President of 
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the Court Martial Board or by other competent authority. Then it should 
be given only by a medical officer trained in the use of pentothal and 
should be given in the presence of competent witnesses.
997
 
 
Regardless of the method of investigation, there were still some accidents where a cause could 
not be determined. For example, during the first half of fiscal year 1943, investigators were 
unable to determine the cause in over 35 percent of fatal accidents.
998
 Nonetheless, pilot error 
was still attributed half of the accidents for the year.
999
 
 At times, the senior leaders of the Army Air Forces believed that more rigorous 
enforcement of existing regulations and policies would solve the problem. In a letter to 
Lieutenant General Barton K. Yount, Commanding General Army of the Air Forces Training 
Command, Lieutenant General Barney Giles, Deputy Commander of Army Air Forces, and 
Deputy Chief of Staff, voiced his concern over the increasing fatality rate during late 1944. 
Although he acknowledged that the increase was attributable to the increased use of tactical 
aircraft in training, General Giles exhorted General Yount to reduce the rate without sacrificing 
any of the training regimen. He suggested that “increased supervision and enforcement of 
regulations” would lower the fatality rate.1000 A copy of this letter was also sent to all major 
subordinate commanders the same day.
1001
 In another instance, in early 1945, Arnold went 
outside of official channels and personally directed that a special board of “safety and material 
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experts” be convened to investigate a sudden increase in P-38 accidents.1002 However, there were 
other officers, including General Arnold, who believed that direct supervision was the correct 
response. For example, training visits to airfields by numbered Air Force personnel or directly 
from the Headquarters Army Air Forces were an important part of improving the quality if 
training. The official history noted: “These inspectional visits resulted in new suggestions with 
respect to the content and conduct of training.”1003 
At other times the findings of the board were little more than mild rebukes. For example, 
a member of an accident classification committee commenting about ground loop accidents 
stated: “The student should be emphatically convinced that an airplane is not completely landed 
until it is parked on the line, the motor shut off, brakes locked, and controls locked.”1004 In 
another example, following an accident in advanced flight training, Charles Watry and a fellow 
cadet appeared before an accident board. Watry had been the co-pilot when the plane “ground 
looped” as the result of the pilot trying to keep the airplane straight on takeoff. When asked if 
they had tried to use the brakes to steer the plane, both answered “no,” explaining that they had 
been taught not to use the brakes to steer their plane.
1005
 The incredulous board president 
admonished Watry and his partner by telling them, “When flying an airplane, boys, use 
everything you’ve got.” 
Other investigations were undertaken as the result of public or official inquiries. In April 
1942, Arnold received a note from Colonel Dunn, one of his subordinates, concerning a 
Congressional investigation. In the letter, Colonel Dunn noted: 
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…the Congress intends to investigate the alleged high accident rate in 
the Army Air Forces. While the accident rate has increased, I am not 
so sure the actual death rate has increased along with it. For mortality 
figures, statisticians and actuaries all figure the number of deaths 
against the exposed risk. In all of the figures produced for publication 
by the Air Forces to date, I have not noticed anything like this.
1006
 
 
As noted previously, the rate of accidents did not increase; but no one, including the public, was 
prepared for the scale of accidents and fatalities. This, in turn, led to an increased interest in the 
Army Air Forces’ training and safety procedures. However, the Army Air Forces ran a very 
effective public relations campaign. 
 In response to a Congressional inquiry on the number of accidents, a staff officer implied 
that the Army Air Forces’ accident rate had been reduced as a result of the increased emphasis 
on safety education and training since the start of the war.
1007
 In a speech criticizing the Senate 
War Investigating Committee on 11 January 1945, Senator William Langer of North Dakota also 
questioned the accident rate in the Army Air Forces. Within five days, the Air Staff had prepared 
a rebuttal demonstrating that the accident rate had been reduced by 51 percent since Pearl 
Harbor, while acknowledging that the fatality rate had only been reduced by 10 percent.
1008
 At 
times, the staff had to answer Congressional inquiries about combat accidents. In a letter to her 
Congressman, Charles L. Gifford, one mother asked if he would inquire into the facts about her 
son’s death as a B-24 pilot in a flying accident over England. From the members of the crew she 
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ascertained that the plane was “war weary” with over 105 missions to its credit.1009 In reply to 
this Congressional inquiry, the Army Air Forces congressional liaison assured Congressman 
Gifford that there were policies and procedures in place to insure that the emphasis was not only 
on “getting the planes to the target but on getting them back again.”1010 The staff officer also 
informed the Congressman that while “accidents sometimes occur” he should also know that the 
accident rate had been reduced to a “residual minimum.”1011 
 As the “residual minimum” rate increased with the expansion of the Air Corps, the senior 
leaders undertook initiatives to address the problem. The primary effort was the establishment of 
the Safety Section. In July 1941, the Safety Section of the Inspection Division occupied a small 
office in the headquarters of the Chief of the Army Air Forces.
1012
 The Safety Section was under 
the supervision of a proven test pilot, Captain Samuel R. Harris.
1013
 His entire staff consisted of 
two other officers and six civilians.
1014
 However, the official history concluded that the section 
was not “seriously understaffed” because aircraft accidents were “relatively scarce.”1015 
Nonetheless, Harris prepared a memorandum outlining his vision for the Safety Section. He 
stated  
The objectives of the safety section involve not only the collection 
and compilation of data, but its statistical analysis and interpretation 
as well. After valid conclusions have been reached by means of 
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scientific statistical analysis and interpretation, action must be taken 
to apply the knowledge gained to real and practical problems.
1016
 
 
One of two salient points that Harris made to his staff was that data should be collected “[b]y 
aircraft type in order to determine if a particular aircraft is more dangerous or developing 
dangerous characteristics.”1017 The other point presaged the Army Air Forces’ later findings from 
the stanine exams. Harris noted: “Some pilots are undoubtedly more likely to have accidents than 
others. These pilots should be given special attention for their own protection and for the 
conservation of Air Corps equipment.”1018 
 One of Harris’ civilian subordinates, Charles S. Prince, suggested that previous 
conclusions about accidents might not apply as the Air Corps expanded. Previously, the Air 
Corps had grouped pilots and accidents “to obtain stratified examples from the universe of data; 
samples in which the susceptibility to accidents of the individuals is expected to be more or less 
uniform” for statistical analysis.1019 As Prince stated in a memorandum for Colonel Harris, 
 
In the past years, the Air Corps pilots have been grouped according to 
component in an effort to obtain homogeneity in connection with the 
samples used in the analyses of aircraft accidents. The assumption has 
been made that the exposure to accidents has been comparable for all 
pilots in these components, or accident groups, and that the 
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susceptibility to accidents of the individual within the accident groups 
has been similar.
1020
 
 
He concluded that the previous data were based on a relatively stable pilot base that he claimed 
no longer existed.
1021
 He concluded that: 
… these assumptions are seriously in error, and that dependable 
accident statistics have been obtained only because the experience 
level (a measure of the susceptibility to accidents) of the various 
accident groups has remained rather constant due to the stability of 
the strength of the various groups, the similarity of training and 
operating conditions, and the small number of new, inexperienced 
pilots whose susceptibility to accidents it can be expected to vary 
rapidly as experience is gained . . . . This stable condition no longer 
exists due to the expansion of the Air Corps.
1022
 
 
 By 1 December 1941, the staff had grown by 24 civilians but the number of officers 
remained the same. However, in recognition of his increased duties and responsibilities, Captain 
Harris was promoted to Major.
1023
 Harris interpreted that the mission of the Safety Section 
should be prevention; however, it was not until December1941 that he had the personnel to 
establish a section for statistical analysis.
1024
 This section would lay the “foundation for flying 
safety regulations, instruction and advice.”1025 
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 In a letter to the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, Brigadier General Lawrence S. Kuter, 
Major Harris recommended new safety procedures because of the “alarming increase of the over-
all accident rate.”1026 In the same letter, Harris said: “With such an organization set up and 
operating, the undersigned is willing to state that the accidents can be reduced by 25percent.”1027 
Harris went on to warn that, “If such system is not set up, the present uncontrolled accident 
problem within the AAF will more than triple itself within the next year.”1028 
To emphasize this point, Harris’ office put together a presentation outlining the accident 
and safety issues in the Army Air Forces.
1029
 In the presentation, it was stated, somewhat 
obviously, that, when it came to training, “accidents struck down more pilots and destroyed more 
equipment” than any other factor.1030 The presentation attempted to personalize the problem for 
General Arnold by stating, “Accidents are front page news. The public mind, and the Congress, 
holds the Commanding General responsible for each one.”1031 In a plea for funding, the report 
placed the cost benefit analysis of the program in terms any airman could understand. The cost of 
the program was estimated to be less than five B-17s.
1032
 In return, the study estimated, the 
savings in lost equipment alone would equip five heavy bomb groups, two medium bomb 
groups, five light bomb groups, and eight fighter groups.
1033
 However, the presentation did point 
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out that “In Oct 1941 the Chief of the Air Corps amplified his directive to include accident 
prevention. No organization or budget was provided.”1034 
 An April 1942 reorganization expanded the role of the Safety Section. The section was 
renamed the Directorate of Flying Safety, in “official recognition of the inexorable increase of 
accidents in A.A.F flight training.”1035 This reorganization meant a promotion for Major Harris 
to Lieutenant Colonel and for the first time a more precise mission for the Directorate: 
To develop, implement, regulate, investigate and inspect systems and 
methods of accident control, including systems and methods of 
personnel control and flight control. 
 
To inspect and investigate conditions, practices, equipment and 
facilities which may affect safety in flight, and to take necessary 
corrective action. 
 
To supervise the investigation of aircraft accidents, including the 
development and regulation of the aircraft accident reporting system. 
 
To approve all regulations concerning aircraft operation, either in 
flight or upon the ground, which may affect safety of personnel or 
material.
1036
 
 
One of Lieutenant Colonel Harris’ first measures was to divide the continental United 
States into ten “safety regions in order to facilitate inauguration and maintenance of the policies 
set forth in the Directorate’s mission.”1037 In addition, the authorized strength of the directorate 
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was increased to 34 officers and 96 civilians. However, the Army Air Forces moved slowly with 
funding so that, for 1942, Harris’s staff remained three officers and 40 civilians.1038 However, 
Lieutenant Colonel Harris must shoulder some of the blame for this shortfall. He realized that he 
had to be judicious in selecting his regional safety officers because they would require 
specialized skills that few officers possessed.
1039
 As he noted in the presentation: “Assignments 
were made as qualified officers were found, but actually, the safety regions have always 
remained under-manned.”1040 Nonetheless, the following statement appeared in a New York 
Times article announcing the formation of the Office of Flying Safety: 
Safety in Flying has been made the responsibility of a board headed 
by Colonel Samuel R. Harris Jr.
1041
 This board has wide authority to 
recommend regulations for prevention of accidents and to check the 
causes that may be due either to mechanical or human failures.
1042
 
 
Only a few months before this action, Colonel Arthur Ennis, the chief of the public relations 
office of the Air Corps, told a local VFW post that the accident rate was low “because of the high 
standards [in training] set throughout the country.”1043 
 In December 1942, the Directorate of Flying Safety was reorganized once again and was 
renamed the Directorate of Air Traffic and Safety with three sub-directorates: Flying Safety, 
Safety Education, and Flight Control.
1044
 This new organization, still under the direction of 
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newly promoted Colonel Samuel Harris, was now authorized 365 officers and 3,664 civilians.
1045
 
In addition, Colonel Harris gave his new organization an updated mission statement: 
To develop a program to reduce aircraft accidents; to inspect all 
Army Air Forces activities; to determine adequacy of safety measures 
and compliance with safety regulations; to establish, supervise and 
regulate a system of aircraft accident investigation and reporting, and 
to secure and analyze reports of aircraft accidents, to provide 
statistical data thereon, and to recommend safety measures and 
procedures.
1046
 
 
This was followed by a press release from the Information Office of the War Department 
concerning training accidents and the Army Air Forces’ measures to address this problem: 
As training accidents in such planes are often fatal, the Director of 
Air Traffic and Safety has initiated research to offset the natural 
hazards of this type of high performance plane, both by safety 
education to eliminate personnel errors, and through the design and 
installation of structural safety devices.
1047
 
 
The Directorate of Flying Safety continued with its duties and missions as before by 
collecting and analyzing data. This was an ongoing process as the number of accidents continued 
to increase throughout the war. For example, in May 1945 the Office of Flying Safety instituted a 
study into “accident patterns.”1048 The study would be based on the “accident experiences of this 
Command in specific phases of training and in the operation of specific type of aircraft with 
detailed types and causes of accidents in order of frequency of occurrence and severity of results 
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together with preventive suggestions and recommendations.” 1049 In February 1945, the Office of 
Flying Safety automated the process of collating data by using punch cards to sort accident 
data.
1050
 The data from this streamlined process were then used to produce a monthly bulletin 
about aircraft accidents.
1051
 This bulletin would, among other things, “include a summary of the 
accident situation and appropriate comparisons of accidents by commands, phases of training, 
type of aircraft, cause of accident, etc.”1052 The first issue was published in April 1945.1053 
The Directorate of Flight Control was the largest of the sub-directorates with 256 officers 
and 3,337 civilians. Its mission was to supervise and establish standard procedures for flight 
operations on the ground and in the air. Its efforts included visits to the training airfields by 
personnel from the Directorate and the institution of new programs. For example, in August 
1945, members of the Directorate visited airbases to discuss the “present high accident rate” and 
to explore possible solutions in order to bring the number of accidents back down.
1054
 One of the 
most ambitious programs was an accident prevention course. In mid-1945, the Directorate of Air 
Traffic and Safety proposed establishing a one-week accident prevention course for base safety 
officers.
1055
 The first class was scheduled to begin in late August with 35 students.
1056
 However, 
because of a higher than usual number of transfers within Air Training Command to meet 
wartime needs, the Directorate requested a 30-day delay.
1057
 In October 1945, the school was 
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cancelled without ever having met. The reason given was that the school should not be a function 
of the Headquarters, Army Air Forces; rather it was a “function of the various Commands and 
Air Forces,” and, therefore, it was the responsibility of these subordinate organizations to 
manage and supervise such a course.
1058
 
 The most innovative of the directorates was the Directorate of Safety Education. This 
Directorate was the smallest of the organizations with only 41 officers and 45 civilians; however, 
it probably had the biggest effect on flying safety in the Army Air Forces. While its mission was 
straightforward, the Directorate’s influence would be far-ranging. Its target audience included 
not only Army Air Forces personnel, but also the American public. As its mission stated, the 
Directorate of Safety Education was tasked: 
To determine the educational requirements of the Army Air Forces 
and the general public in matters pertaining to the Directorate of Air 
Traffic and Safety and its sub-directorates; to produce or obtain such 
educational material, using any desired media; to direct the 
distribution of such educational material, both within the Army Air 
Forces and to the public; to coordinate with the War Department 
Bureau of Public Relations on all matters involving public release of 
information.
1059
 
 
The directorate produced pamphlets, posters, and films to get the safety message out to 
the Army Air Forces. Some of its efforts included numerous training films from the “How to 
Fly” series for every major aircraft in the Army Air Forces inventory to aircraft recognition and 
the fundamentals of gunnery. These films starred many famous actors of the era, such as James 
Stewart, Ronald Reagan, and Burgess Meredith, adding to the movies’ appeal to the public at 
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large as well as members of the Army Air Forces. It was also the organization responsible for the 
illustrated primary flight manuals for instructors and students discussed in Chapter 4. These 
manuals were so effective and popular that the Directorate of Air Traffic and Safety devoted 
several pages to the success of both manuals in its semi-annual report for the Chief of the Army 
Air Forces.
1060
 In addition, the Directorate was praised by pilots for its revision of the Pilot’s 
Information File from “a dull, thick compendium of complicated technical orders…to a readable, 
brief notebook.”1061 In producing another popular booklet, I’ve Got Wings, the Directorate 
utilized, according to the official history, “the Disney technique of giving distinct personalities to 
things as well as animate beings” in order to explain “Army Air Force Regulations.”1062 In the 
booklet the main character was a goggled pilot who was accompanied by a goggled bird “and 
[by] planes which register horror, contentment, anxiety, or confusion, as the case may be” as the 
pilot was placed in various situations that a real pilot might find himself.
1063
 Another initiative 
was the publication of an illustrated accident report to bring “preventive lessons” from the 
accident reports to the attention of the aircrews.
1064
 It was intended that this publication would be 
“posted on bulletin boards, discussed at meetings, and maintained in reading files.”1065 
 Other means of dissemination included more mundane methods such as meetings and 
conferences. For example, following a conference of representatives from 2
nd
 Air Force and Air 
Training Command in 1943 on B-17 and B-24 transition training, the panel of officers 
recommended that accident data and reports be widely distributed to insure better understanding 
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of recurring problems throughout the training base.
1066
 Even though the Civilian Pilot Training 
Program (CPTP) was made up of independent contractors, their policies on reporting training 
accidents in primary flight training accidents mirrored the Army Air Force. The CPTP policy 
was to analyze the written report concerning each accident and then forward that analysis and 
recommendations to all schools.
1067
 In addition, the Army Air Forces formed a Safety Council 
composed of safety officers from the subordinate commands. The council met monthly to discuss 
current safety issues and make recommendations. These findings were distributed to all airfields 
and commands in the Safety Council minutes.   
 Many of the recommendations of the Safety Council reflected a shift to more bureaucracy 
in the Army Air Forces regarding safety in general and accident prevention and reporting in 
particular. For example, in August 1945 when drowning deaths were on the rise, the Council 
suggested that 50,000 cards on swimming safety be published and distributed.
1068
Statistics, 
gathered by the Office of Flying Safety, indicated that accidents due to pilot error were more 
likely to involve pilots with significantly lower aptitude scores on their stanine test. The Council 
recommended that a standardized checkout procedure be adopted.
1069
 In June 1945, one of the 
agenda items for the Council was a concern that there were not enough safety posters in the 
theaters of operation.
1070
 At the same council meeting, the safety officers who had gathered 
recommended that aircraft be marked with larger identification numbers so it would be easier to 
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report a pilot when he violated regulations.
1071
 The creeping influence of bureaucracy can also be 
detected in the inclusion of a section in the monthly memorandum from the Office of Flying 
Safety for those commands that had submitted “Unsatisfactory Reports.”1072 For example, the 
entry for 30 June noted that on a “considerable number” of AAF Form 14 Accident Reports, 
Section L7, General Information, was left blank.
1073
 Another example was that stations were not 
submitting properly prepared accident reports and that this was causing an unspecified 
“unsatisfactory condition.”1074 However, some of the advice was at times so obvious or else so 
vague as to be practically useless. For instance, a 1
st
 Air Force safety bulletin concerning 
airplane fires admonished: “Do your best to combat engine fires but do not stay with the ship so 
long that you are trapped.”1075 On the other hand, the individual commands were given some 
latitude to adjust training requirements. For example, the commander of the 2
nd
 Air Force was 
concerned that one of the training requirements for his bomber crews was for them to fly in a 
“four group formation.” His concern was that this requirement meant that up 72 planes would be 
flying in close proximity. The commander did not believe it was “practical to include this size 
formation in the training program.”1076 Therefore, in the name of safety, 2nd Air Force dropped 
the requirement even though it was “desired by Washington.”1077 However, the directive from 
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2
nd
 Air Force gave subordinate Wing Commanders the latitude to conduct “four group 
formation” training if they found it “practical.”1078 
Nonetheless, as the war progressed, a sense of flying safety began to permeate the Army 
Air Force. A 1943 press release referred to the safety officers as a “force of field officers” sent 
out to aid commanders as “missionaries of flying safety.”1079 In a letter to his subordinates, the 
commander of Air Training Command emphasized that among the keys to improving flight 
safety was the need for “continuous education and training” and “maintaining realistic discipline 
programs.”1080 In a memorandum from the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, to the commander of 
Air Training Command discussed some of the measures he was taking to reduce the accident 
rate.
1081
 These included transferring more experienced personnel to bases with higher accident 
rates, new training programs such as a two-week Flight Planning course, and insuring that 
returning combat pilots understood their responsibilities in training command.
1082
 
At all levels commanders appeared to be trying to outdo each other in safety and accident 
prevention. After taking command of the Pacific Division of Air Training Command, Brigadier 
General William H. Tunner reported to his superior that he had appointed a Division Flying 
Safety Officer and a Flying Safety Committee where there had been none before.
1083
 He also 
reported that he was waiting on funding to begin publishing his own “graphic anti-accident 
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bulletins.”1084 In another example, the commander of Air Transport Command, in response to a 
request from the Chief of Air Staff on accident prevention and reduction, provided two and one 
half pages discussing the procedures in his command.
1085
 In the event that his superior still did 
not understand how much he was emphasizing safety, he included nine enclosures supporting his 
position.
1086
 
However, this attitude towards safety was not limited to the Army Air Forces. Beginning 
in 1942, the National Safety Council, for every six-month period, established the “Wings for 
Victory” award for the primary, basic, and advanced school with the lowest accident rate in each 
training command.
1087
 For example, the New York Times reported that the National Safety 
Council awarded the honor to Western Flying Command for the second half of 1944.
1088
 The 
new zeal for flight safety even reached down to the public high schools. A 1945 Army Air Force 
press release reported that one of the missions of the Safety Education Office was to “inculcate 
in the minds of the Army Air Forces pilots of tomorrow the principles of flying safety.”1089 
In the end, the effort paid off. One example from Randolph Field brought all the 
measures of flight safety that had been developed throughout the war to bear on an increase in 
AT-6 accidents. The Office of Flying Safety assigned an Accident Officer to each squadron to 
increase safety awareness and to implement safety procedures.
1090
 These measures included 
posters, briefings, and a written exam for all pilots covering safety procedures and Pilot 
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Information File material.
1091
 After implementation of these measures, one base official noted, 
“the accident rate has sharply decreased in the past two months.”1092 In July 1944, the Army Air 
Force informed the New York Times that “The rate of aircraft accidents and of fatalities in the 
Army Air Forces operations in this country decreased substantially during the first five months 
of this year, compared with the corresponding period last year.”1093 While the lower rate of 
accidents and fatalities might be attributed to many factors, not the least being the decreased 
pressure to produce pilots, the Army Air Forces credited the lower rates to “the emphasis placed 
on flying safety.”1094  
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Chapter 6 - Conclusion 
 
…the art of flying is not the simple, courageous, carefree, chance 
occupation of irresponsible adventurers . . . The men who fly 
airplanes have a profession.  
 
Our superlative, prewar, tailor-made flyers, good as they were, have 
not proven superior to the mass-production flyers turned out in great 
quantity from our wartime schools.
1095
 
   General Henry H. Arnold from This Flying Game. 
 
 Both of Arnold’s statements capture the changes that took place in the Army Air Forces 
as a result of its wartime experience. This change was best summed up in a July 1944 
memorandum from the Chief of the Office of Flying Safety to the Deputy Chief of Air Staff, 
outlining the procedures and policies of the Office of Flying Safety. In the memorandum, the 
Chief criticized the Army Air Forces’ past and commented on its future:  
The day of swashbuckling, irresponsible flying is gone. It may have 
been all right to tolerate an occasional violation when the Air Corps 
consisted of 1,000 pilots. But, when the records for one month, 
December 1943, show that 153 accidents involved a violation and out 
of 153, 147 accidents were the direct result of violations, it is time to 
take immediate and drastic action. Of these accidents involving 
violations, 25 were fatal, producing 58 fatalities. Aircraft wrecked or 
damaged are estimated to cost more than $8,000,000.
1096
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The Chief went on to complain that many times these accidents also caused damage to private 
property, thus burdening the Army Air Forces not only with a monetary cost but also with a 
“serious public relations problem.”1097 Moreover, in the same memorandum the Office of Flying 
Safety cautioned: “As the European war passes its climax, public and congressional attention 
will be focused more and more on Army Air Forces domestic accidents. Relaxing of pressure on 
the training program will require more, not less, emphasis on accident prevention.”1098 
 The Chief of Flying Safety may have been overstating that the flyers of the prewar Air 
Corps were “swashbuckling and irresponsible;” however, since he was speaking as a prewar 
flyer himself there must be a grain of truth in his statement. Nevertheless, the postwar Army Air 
Forces did shed some of its “club-like” culture, as Curtis LeMay referred to it, over the course of 
the war. Gone were the days when a pilot could pull a stunt such as James Doolittle, on nothing 
more than a dare, sitting between the wheels of airplane as it landed and receiving only a rebuke 
from his commander. Over the course of the war, regulations were rigidly enforced and 
violations dealt with appropriately. For example, in one instance President Roosevelt tried to 
intervene in the case of a pilot, because the pilot was a West Point graduate, who had violated 
regulations. The Air Staff refused to change the punishment. In a letter to the President 
concerning the case, the Chief of the Air Staff stated that the Army Air Forces’ position was that 
the rules and regulations applied equally to all officers regardless of commissioning source.
1099
 
These changes could be attributed to the massive expansion of the Army Air Forces. With tens of 
thousands of pilots entering the service, it was no longer possible to build the close-knit 
                                                 
1097
 Ibid. 
1098
 Ibid. 
1099
 Memorandum from Major General Laurence S. Kuter, Acting Chief of Air Staff to Colonel Richard Park, 
Military Aide to the President, 14 April 1945.  
 
200 
 
relationships that characterized the prewar Air Corps. Moreover, the increasing size of the Army 
Air Forces dictated a larger bureaucracy to manage selection, training, procurement, and safety.  
 On the other hand, perhaps, the Army Air Forces, much like the interwar Air Corps, was 
reflecting the continuing pursuit of safety in the society in general. For example, in 1947 the 
National Safety Council began the Green Cross for Safety program. The program was piloted in 
twenty cites around the nation.
1100
  The National Safety Council produced statistics that 
indicated, over a five year period, that in areas where “strong, continuing, over-all safety 
programs” existed, there was a “25 to 40 per cent” reduction in accident rates.1101  Founded in 
1913, the National Safety Council received a congressional charter in 1953. At the council’s 41st 
congress and convention, the charter was presented by Congressman Clifford Davis of 
Tennessee.
1102
 In his speech to the convention, Davis told the audience that:  
…the charter symbolized “the confidence and trust reposed in the 
council by the Government of your country.” 
“May you accept it,” he added, “as your authority to continue to 
increase your efforts to make the nation safer.” 
 
 The postwar Army Air Forces was also concerned about flight safety, both internally and 
externally. For example, in early 1943 the Army Air Forces was aware that the public was 
becoming concerned over the ever increasing number of accidents in training. The concern, 
among the Army Air Forces leaders, such as Arnold, was that the American public did not grasp 
the tremendous increase in hours and miles being flown and were only being told about the 
accidents. The report concluded: “The accident problem is serious but it is far from being as 
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alarming as regular reading of newspapers would lead the average citizen to believe.”1103 During 
the war, the Army Air Forces undertook massive public relations campaign to assure the 
American people that USAAF was taking all the necessary steps to make military flying as safe 
as possible. The postwar Army Air Forces continued these steps, first by making the Office of 
Flying Safety a permanent organization, in the closing months of World War Two, under the 
command of a “Regular Army” colonel.1104 In addition, as planes became not only more complex 
but also more expensive, the Army Air Forces couched its emphasis on safety in economic 
terms. For example, a postwar study noted: “Now that the war is over, aircraft accidents can no 
longer be condoned in terms of military necessity, but must be measured in terms of economic 
waste.”1105 
 Moreover, the Army Air Forces wanted to pass this newfound zeal for safety on to 
commercial aviation. The same postwar study concluded that, “The AAF must not only assure a 
high degree of safety for its own postwar operations, but it also has the responsibility and 
opportunity to translate its wartime experience into the promotion of safety in civil aviation.”1106 
However, the Army Air Forces placed its support for civil aviation flight safety in the context of 
national defense. The Air Staff postulated that the size and funding for the Army Air Forces 
would be influenced by public perceptions and acceptance of aviation as a viable and safe mode 
of transportation. A postwar study noted: “Public acceptance of aviation as a principal segment 
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of the transportation system will to a major extent provide the basis for national security.”1107 
The report concluded: “. . . the degree of safety which can be achieved in private and commercial 
flying becomes a matter of primary national concern.”1108 In addition, many, such as Carl Spaatz, 
the first Chief of Staff of the Air Force, were concerned about the effect of the rapid 
demobilization on readiness. In November 1945, only two months after the end of the war, 
Spaatz warned that the “hysterical demobilization” would contribute to “a rising curve of flying 
accidents, due to the loss of experienced ground personnel.”1109 In another example, George 
Kenney, the first commander of Strategic Air Command, and his deputy, Major General 
Clements McMullen, looked for ways to make this new command more efficient with limited 
personnel and equipment. As airpower historian Herman S. Wolk has noted, Kenney’s efforts 
worked but “neglected the training of combat crews.”1110 
 This is not to say that the postwar Air Force did not face challenges that required 
courageous pilots willing to accept the risks inherent in flying. The challenges for the postwar 
pilots were no less dangerous than those faced by the prewar pilots. The Arnolds, Spaatzs, and 
Eakers of the prewar Air Corps and earlier learned how to master problems such as long distance 
navigation through flights such as Eaker’s transcontinental flight using nothing but instruments, 
or discovering the potential endurance of aircraft and aircrews in flights such as the Question 
Mark endurance flight in January 1929. The postwar pilots were challenged with mastering the 
problems that turbine engine technology presented. For example, one of the first was trying to fly 
faster than the speed of sound (breaking the sound barrier). As the New York Times reported, the 
                                                 
1107
 Ibid., 1. 
1108
 Ibid. 
1109
 New York Times, 16 November 1945. 
1110
 John L. Frisbee and United States. Air Force. Office of Air Force History, Makers of the United States Air Force 
(Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 147. 
203 
 
early attempts had “already killed some daring pilots.”1111 However, pilots such as Captain 
“Chuck” Yeager continued to try, and Yeager finally broke the sound barrier in October 1947. It 
should be noted that Yeager was a product of the Army Air Forces’ more structured wartime 
selection and training process.  
 Throughout the interwar period, the Air Corps maintained strict standards for acceptance 
into flight training. However, with limited budgets it was easy for the Air Corps to limit the 
number in training. By 1939, the Air Corps was faced with the problem of recruiting and 
selecting enough cadets to meet President Roosevelt’s vision for an expanded air force. Based on 
its experience up to that point, the Air Staff expected that up to 50 percent of those who entered 
flight training would wash out before earning their wings. The challenge for the Air Corps was 
how to adjust the standards to allow more young men to apply while at the same time ensuring 
that only those with the potential for completing flight training were selected.  
 The Air Corps increased the pool of applicants by accepting graduates of Civilian Pilot 
Training Program, by eliminating the college education requirement, and by opening up flight 
training to enlisted soldiers. Although the Air Staff was initially hostile to the CPTP because they 
were not sure of the quality of the pilots that a civilian school could produce, wartime 
requirements forced the Air Staff to accept them. Moreover, by the end of the war, Arnold 
praised the contribution of the program to the war effort.
1112
 Arnold reluctantly eliminated the 
requirement for a minimum of two years of college and replaced it with a qualification exam. 
This action made it possible for those with native intelligence who lacked the means to attend 
college to have the opportunity to become military pilots. In addition, it was a move that was 
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praised by many both inside and outside the Air Corps. Eliminating the college education 
requirement and opening up training to enlisted soldiers insured that the Army Air Forces 
received the best and the brightest from its own ranks. Men such as “Chuck” Yeager more than 
proved the worth of the program. Nonetheless, these programs did not survive long after the war. 
The CPTP was ended in 1944 after the demand for pilots decreased. The college education 
requirement was reinstated after the war though the qualification exam was kept for 
classification purposes.  
 However, the postwar Air Force did retain from the selection process the three tests that 
made up the classification system. These exams consisted of a pencil and paper test of general 
knowledge, a psychomotor exam, and a psychological evaluation by a trained psychologist. The 
general knowledge test evaluated the cadets understanding of maps, charts, principle of 
mechanics, and the “ability to understand technical information.”1113 The psychomotor 
examination placed the cadet in various situations to test, among other things, his manual 
dexterity and reactions to changing stimuli.
1114
 However, it was the psychological evaluation that 
the cadets feared most. It was one thing to wash out because one lacked the physical ability for 
flight training but quite another to not be accepted because one had misread an inkblot.
1115
 Based 
on his score on these three tests, a cadet was assigned his Standard Nine or stanine score that 
marked him for a particular specialty — pilot, navigator, or bombardier. By the end of the war, 
the Air Staff was confident that they had perfected a system for the selection and classification of 
aircrew that was superior to the prewar model 
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 Over the course of the war, the Army Air Forces’ training methods for these specialties 
— pilot, bombardier, and navigator — changed as well. Whereas the prewar Air Corps cadet 
would undertake primary flight training at a centralized facility, it was the responsibility of the 
squadrons and groups to complete the pilot’s training after he earned his wings in primary flight 
training. As the Air Corps began to expand in 1939, Arnold and the Air Staff realized that this 
method of making “tailor-made” flyers would not work for the larger force. By 1943, the Army 
Air Forces was taking a more systematic approach to training by identifying tasks, conditions 
and standards for each phase of training and checklists so the instructors could log the progress 
of the pilots and crews as they completed flight training.
1116
 For example, in 2
nd
 Air Force, at 
least four different multiple-part forms had to be maintained for every training flight. These 
forms were collected by the airplane commander and were carried by the crew to deliver to their 
new group so the commander could evaluate the level of training of the crew he was 
receiving.
1117
 
 Moreover, in the prewar Air Corps the positions of bombardier, navigator, and gunner 
were considered additional skills that anyone could pick up. In particular, the conventional 
wisdom in the Air Corps was that a good pilot could be a good navigator. Even more interesting 
is the fact that the prewar Air Corps, despite its doctrine of high-altitude precision bombing, did 
not make the position of bombardier a distinct specialty. Nonetheless, in the crucible of combat it 
became apparent that navigators, bombardiers, and gunners required specialized training, and the 
Air Staff established specialized schools for each position. In addition, as discussed previously, 
the Army Air Force began selecting for those positions based on a cadet’s stanine score.  
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The postwar Army Air Force retained nearly all of the wartime selection process; 
however, pilot training was divided into two six-month phases, primary and basic rather than the 
wartime phases of primary, basic, and advanced. In addition, the Air Force would eliminate the 
Aviation Cadet program in 1962. After that year, every pilot entering training would already be a 
commissioned officer and would earn his wings only upon graduation from basic flight training.   
 By the end of the war, the Army Air Forces had developed numerous programs to 
investigate, classify, and prevent accidents. Beginning with the establishment of the Office of 
Flying Safety in 1942, the Army Air Forces took positive steps to address the accident rate. 
Throughout the war, the Office of Flying Safety produced manuals, pamphlets, posters, and even 
animated shorts to educate the force on safety. Moreover, the efforts paid off as the various 
commands vied with each other over their safety records. 
 Despite the best efforts of the squadron and group commanders, accidents could not be 
completely prevented. For example, the Medical Safety Section bulletin for January 1946 
reported that November 1945 had the highest incidence of accidents since the wartime high in 
December 1943.
1118
 The same report placed the blame for the increase on “personnel errors” and 
recommended more training, refresher courses, and reminders to the pilots, crews, ground 
personnel that “safety in flight demands their best efforts.”1119 The report warned that short cuts 
in such things as control tower operations “may have been acceptable under wartime conditions 
but should not be condoned in peacetime.”1120 In another instance, future astronaut Michael 
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Collins recalled that in 1952 his advanced combat training class lost two pilots a week during the 
eleven-week course.
1121
 
 Shortly after the end of the war, the Army Air Forces undertook a massive study of the 
safety problem during the war. Published in 1946, Safety as a Factor in the Future of Aviation 
analyzed every aspect of the wartime safety issues in order to determine not only where military 
aviation could improve but also what steps civil aviation could take to improve. The study noted: 
“Safety must be engineered into the aircraft in a positive manner which will eliminate partially or 
altogether many of the opportunities now afforded the human being to make errors.”1122This was 
supported by a postwar study by the Office of the Air Surgeon that found some accidents 
attributed to “pilot error” were sometimes due to poor design or control layout.1123 This in turn 
led the Army Air Force to reassess some of its conclusions concerning pilot error. The authors of 
Safety as a Factor noted: “For airplanes performing fairly similar missions and operated by 
personnel of generally equal capabilities, rate variations suggest that the aircraft themselves, 
rather than those who fly them, may be chiefly responsible for the differences in accident 
frequency.”1124 In another instance, the report concluded that when it came to comparing the 
accident rate for taxiing collisions between conventional and tricycle landing gear aircraft that 
tricycle landing gear equipped had a lower rate because of the better visibility out of the cockpit. 
In the report’s words, “And while these accidents are immediately attributable to pilot error, 
basically it is the airplane which is blind, and not the pilot.”1125 The study also hinted that safety 
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was compromised as “wartime circumstances dictated that speed and volume of aircraft 
production should govern AAF procurement.”1126 
 It would be logical to assume that safety was “compromised” because of “wartime 
circumstances” but the record would indicate otherwise. By the end of the war over 15,000 pilots 
and aircrew had been killed in accidents within the continental United Sates.
1127
 That was the 
equivalent of a wartime infantry division, lost without firing a shot. A postwar report noted:  
Accident reports received from both the U. S. and overseas reveal that 
non-combat accidents have numbered in the tens of thousands. The 
Commanding General of the AAF reported, for example, that during 
the first 32 months of the war a total of approximately 11,000 aircraft 
had been lost in wrecks in the U. S. alone, compared to 7,700 lost on 
combat missions either to known enemy action, or to unknown causes 
with enemy aircraft present.
1128
 
 
The same report concluded that these were acceptable losses by noting: 
The heavy accident toll experienced during the hurried wartime 
expansion of the AAF was the price which had to be paid to achieve 
the air power required for victory. That price was accepted as part of 
the cost of the war.
1129
 
 
Nonetheless, in the face of these losses and the demand for more trained aircrews, the Army Air 
Forces became more safety conscious and changed the culture of the Air Force. In his final 
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report to the Secretary of War, Arnold referred to the “vigorous preventative measures” the 
Army Air Forces undertook to control the accident rate. What Arnold failed to mention, and very 
well may not have known, was the fact that those measures were the result of the prewar Army 
Air Corps transitioning from a “small and fixed group of men,” as he referred to them, 
comfortable with a more open approach to training and accidents to the more bureaucratic and 
structured approach to selection, training, and safety that the Army Air Forces embraced coming 
out of the war.  
 There were, if not readily apparent, implications of this transition for the US Air Force. In 
1947, the Air Force finally gained its long-sought independence from the Army. The leaders of 
the new Air Force, men such as Spaatz, LeMay, and Kenney, found themselves in a situation 
reminiscent of the interwar period. At that time, they were trying to sell the American public on 
the Air Corps and aviation in general. However, in the postwar period they had to sell the 
American public the role of aviation and the Air Force in national defense. In Safety as a Factor 
in the Future of Aviation, the authors made the point that there was a direct link between safety 
in aviation and national defense noting: 
The sound development of civil aviation is therefore a primary 
concern from the military standpoint. It is also an objective which the 
wartime military experience can advantageously promote. . . . 
Achievement of greater flying safety, therefore, is a problem of 
primary importance. The experience and resourcefulness of all 
aviation interests are required for its solution.
1130
  
 
The report also reminded the reader that: 
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In military aviation, strict standards have been established for flying 
personnel, including physical qualifications, technical knowledge, and 
flying skill. In addition, considerable emphasis has been placed on the 
maintenance of proficiency.
1131
  
 
Throughout the report, the Army Air Forces wartime experience is emphasized as the driving 
force for the implementation of those “strict standards.” Only vaguely implied is the notion that 
those standards may not have been in place or strictly enforced before the war.  
 Enforcement of those standards would result in a change in the Air Force culture. As an 
equal member of the armed forces the Air Force had to present a more professional outlook. And 
the Air Force set out to change the image of the pilot from the “swashbuckling, irresponsible” 
pilot before the war to the sober professional with peace as his profession.
1132
 However, the 
change was not always met with acceptance by the pilots and some bemoaned what they 
believed the Air Force had lost. As one former pilot noted in the introduction to Charles Watry’s 
book: “To me, the Air Force. . . hasn’t permitted the truly outstanding leaders to move upward, 
promotion being given to those with flying safety record and political yes-men, who couldn't 
lead anyone to the latrine, let alone in combat.” Regardless of the reason for the change the 
culture of the Air Force did change and that change was the direct result of the Army Air Forces 
wartime experience with accidents and fatalities.  
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Appendix A - Tables  
Type of aircraft Dec 
1941 
Dec 
1942 
Dec 
1943 
Dec 
1944 
Aug 
1945 
Maximum on 
Hand 
Combat Aircraft 4,477 11,607 27,448 41,961 41,163 May 1945 
(43,248) 
Very Heavy Bombers - 3 91 977 2,865 August 1945 
(2,865) 
Heavy Bombers 288 2,076 8,027 12,813 11,065 April 1945 
(12,919) 
Medium Bombers 745 2,556 4,370 6,189 5,384 October 1944 
(6,262) 
Light Bombers 799 1,201 2,371 2,980 3,079 September 1944 
(3,338) 
Fighters 2,170 5,303 11,875 17,198 16,799 May 1945 
(17,725) 
Reconnaissance 475 468 714 1,804 1,971 May 1945 
(2,009) 
Support Aircraft 7,820 21,697 36,784 30,765 22,552 July 1944 
(41,667) 
Transports 254 1,857 6,466 10,456 9,561 December 1944 
(10,456) 
Trainers 7,340 17,044 26,051 17,060 9,558 May 1944 
(27,923) 
Communications 226 2,796 4,267 3,249 3,433 December 1943 
(4,267) 
Total 12,297 33,304 64,232 72,726 63,715 July 1944 
(79,908) 
 
Table 1. Aircraft Production by Type and Year 
      (Source: US Army Air Forces Statistical Digest) 
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Year Number Percent of US 
Army Strength 
1930 13,305 9.7 
1931 14,425 10.4 
1932 14,650 11.0 
1933 14,817 11.0 
1934 15,621 11.4 
1935 15,945 11.6 
1936 16,863 10.2 
1937 18,572 10.4 
1938 20,196 11.0 
1939 22,387 11.9 
1940 51,185 19.3 
1941 152,125 10.5 
1942 764,415 23.2 
1943 2,197,114 31.4 
1944 2,372,292 31.0 
1945 2,282,259 27.6 
 
 
Table 2. AAF Military Personnel — Number and Percent of US Army Strength: 1930 – 1945 
(Source: USAAF Statistical Digest – World War II) 
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Table 3. US Army Air Forces Training Facilities by Function and Year 
(Source: US Army Air Forces Statistical Digest) 
 
Type of facility 7 Dec 411 31 Dec 41 31 Dec 42 31 Dec 43 31 Dec 44 31 Aug 45 
Main bases 114 151 345 345 377 344 
Satellite bases - - 71 116 37 57 
Auxiliary fields - - 198 322 309 269 
Bombing & Gunnery 
Ranges 
- - Unknown - 480 433 
Contract Pilot Training 
schools 
Unknown Unknown 69 66 14 6 
Civilian & Factory 
Technical Schools 
- - 66 47 21 16 
College Training 
Detachments 
- - 16 234 2 1 
Total Installations 114 151 765 1,130 1,240 1,126 
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Table 4. Aircraft Accidents — Number and Rate: Fiscal Year 1936 – 1945 
* Rates are per 100,000 flying hours. 
(Source: US Army Air Forces Statistical Digest) 
 
 
Year All Accidents Fatal Accidents Fatalities Aircraft Wrecked 
 Number Rate* Number Rate Number Rate Number Rate 
1936 430 83 42 8 59 11 113 22 
1937 358 69 27 5 48 9 87 17 
1938 375 63 38 6 62 10 80 13 
1939 389 53 32 4 52 7 86 12 
1940 478 51 46 5 90 10 100 11 
1941 1,304 58 116 5 199 9 228 10 
1942 5,612 74 582 8 1,096 14 1,259 17 
1943 15,632 70 1,779 8 4,209 19 3,854 17 
1944 20,883 54 2,272 6 5,616 14 5,387 14 
1945 10,798 42 1,378 5 3,779 15 3,624 13 
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Table 5. Airplane Accidents in Flight Training 
* Rates are per 100,000 flying hours. 
(Source: US Army Air Forces Statistical Digest) 
 
 
 
Table 6. Airplane Accidents in Transition Flight Training: 1942 – 1945 (primary models only). 
* Rates are per 100,000 flying hours. 
(Source: US Army Air Forces Statistical Digest) 
 
 
 Primary 
Trainer 
Basic 
Trainer 
Advanced 
Trainer 
All Accidents: Number 8,256 4,881 13,511 
                          Rate* 48 27 55 
Fatal Accidents 333 825 943 
Fatalities 439 1,175 1,888 
Airplanes Wrecked 1,032 1,558 2,227 
 B-17 B-24 B-25 B-26 B-29 P-38 P-47 P-51 
All Accidents: 
Number 
1,589 1,713 921 739 272 1,403 3.049 824 
                          Rate* 30 35 33 55 40 139 127 105 
Fatal Accidents 284 490 233 223 63 337 404 131 
Fatalities 1,757 2,796 936 993 461 379 435 137 
Airplanes Wrecked 479 746 446 408 119 758 1,125 338 
